Monroe v. United Carbon Co., 13717.
Decision Date | 02 May 1952 |
Docket Number | No. 13717.,13717. |
Citation | 196 F.2d 455 |
Parties | MONROE v. UNITED CARBON CO. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Alden T. Shotwell, Monroe, La., for appellant.
George M. Snellings, Jr., Monroe, La., for appellee.
Before HOLMES, RUSSELL, and RIVES, Circuit Judges.
Alleged federal jurisdiction in this case rests solely upon diversity of citizenship between the parties, and the requisite jurisdictional amount, 28 U.S. Code, § 1332 (a) (b), but this action was originally filed in a state court of Louisiana, and removed to the court below upon the petition of the defendant therein, who is a citizen of Louisiana, the plaintiff therein being a Delaware corporation.
The petition for removal, filed by appellant, alleges that, inasmuch as plaintiff is a citizen of the State of Delaware, and the amount in controversy is over three thousand dollars, exclusive of interest and costs, said action is one in which the district courts of the United States are given original jurisdiction; and that petitioner is, therefore, entitled to remove said cause from the state court, wherein said action was instituted, to the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. The appellant's petition is filed under Section 1446 of the new Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1446; but Section 1441(b) of said code is as follows:
(Emphasis supplied.)
This is an instance where the removal jurisdiction of the federal court is narrower than its original jurisdiction. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 1441 must be read together. So read, it is apparent that no change in this respect was made by the new code, which became effective September 1, 1948. See Irvin Jacobs & Co. v. Levin, D.C., 86 F.Supp. 850; Id., 6 Cir., 180 F.2d 356. This is not a question of simple irregularity in the procedural requirements as to the removal of a case, but it is an instance where the requisites of removal jurisdiction do not exist, removal jurisdiction being wholly statutory. Section 1441(a), "except as otherwise expressly provided", grants removal jurisdiction of any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction; but, in the very next paragraph, it is otherwise expressly provided as follows: "Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought."
Thus the statute expressly makes a distinction between the original jurisdiction and the removal jurisdiction of the United States district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and 1441(b). Nevertheless, where a resident defendant has improperly removed a suit on the ground of diversity of citizenship, if no motion to remand is made and all jurisdictional requisites under said section 1332 are present, the court may treat it as an action originally brought in the federal court, and in which the question of venue and all procedural requirements are waived. The prototype of authorities to this effect is Baggs v. Martin, 179 U.S. 206, 21 S.Ct. 109, 110, 45 L.Ed. 155, which strangely enough did not depend wholly as to jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. In that case, the court said:
In Handley-Mack Co. v. Godchaux Sugar Co., 2 F.2d 435, the Sixth Circuit held that a cause was not removable by a resident defendant on the ground of diversity of citizenship; that consent could not confer jurisdiction on a federal court; and, if the record in that court did not show jurisdiction, it was the duty of the court of its own motion to refuse to exercise it; but that, where a federal court would have had jurisdiction of a cause if originally brought therein, and the parties fully consented to its jurisdiction after removal and acted thereon, it might retain jurisdiction though the cause was removed by a resident defendant who was without right of removal under the statute.
In Bailey v. Texas Company, 47 F.2d 153, the Second Circuit held that mutual consent of parties did not confer substantive federal jurisdiction, but that where a cause, of which the court would have had original jurisdiction, was improperly removed from the state court, the federal court might proceed to judgment if the plaintiff went to trial without moving to remand. The court said, 47 F.2d at page 155:
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