Monroe v. United States

• Decision Date: 18 July 1978
• Docket Number: No. 12451.,12451.
• Citation: 389 A.2d 811
• Parties: Harold E. MONROE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

Page 811

389 A.2d 811

Harold E. MONROE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 12451.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued April 4, 1978.

Decided July 18, 1978.

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Gwendolyn Jo M. Carlberg, Washington, D.C., appointed by this court, for appellant.

Thomas G. Corcoran, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U.S. Atty., John A. Terry, Michael W. Farrell, and Paul N. Murphy, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before NEWMAN, Chief Judge, and YEAGLEY and MACK, Associate Judges.

NEWMAN, Chief Judge:

Appellant was convicted after a jury trial of kidnapping while armed, armed robbery, and two counts each of carrying a pistol without a license and unauthorized use of a vehicle. On appeal he alleges the abridgment of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by the trial court's summary denial of his pretrial motion to change counsel, and its concomitant failure to inquire into his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel before ruling on the motion. In Section I, we set forth the relevant evidence and trial proceedings. We determine the proper standard by which pretrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be measured in Section II. We discuss in Section III the proper scope of inquiry the trial court must conduct when confronted with a pretrial claim of ineffective assistance. Section IV contains reasons for our disposition adverse to appellant of this appeal. We affirm.

I

At approximately 12:00 a. m. on Friday, November 11, 1976, Moses Jahnrett drove to a Texaco gasoline station at the intersection of Good Hope Road and Thirteenth Street, Southeast to purchase a soda from the station's vending machine. After making the purchase, he returned to his auto; as he opened his car door to get back in, someone struck him, placed a gun to his head, told him "it was a stick-up," and pushed him into the car. A man later identified as appellant sat behind the driver's wheel, and a woman, later identified as his codefendant, Doretha Alston, got in on the passenger side. At appellant's direction, Alston searched Jahnrett's pockets, and took 23 cents and his watch.

Appellant then drove Jahnrett's car to Cooper's Bar on Good Hope Road. Alston went inside and soon returned with a second man, who seated himself in front beside Jahnrett. Appellant and Alston, who sat in the backseat behind appellant, repeatedly struck Jahnrett with the gun and demanded more money. Jahnrett replied that he had no more money. Appellant then drove around in the Southeast district and eventually stopped the car behind an apartment building near Route 95. There appellant resumed his beating of Jahnrett with the gun, pulled him out of the car, and continued to beat him. After stripping Jahnrett, who had fallen to the ground, of his clothing and covering him with a plywood board, appellant and his companions then drove away in Jahnrett's car.¹

Counsel was appointed for appellant on November 13, 1976, at presentment.² A preliminary hearing was held on November 18, 1976, and appellant was bound over for the grand jury. Subsequent to his indictment by the grand jury, appellant was arraigned on February 2, 1977, and a status hearing, which was attended by both appellant and his appointed counsel, was held on February 22, 1977. On April 4, 1977, a jury was impaneled, but not sworn, and trial was continued until the next day. On the morning of April 5 appellant's oral motion for severance of his trial from that of his codefendant Alston was heard and denied. Counsel for appellant thereupon informed the court that his client wished to address the court. The following colloquy between the court and appellant then ensued:

THE COURT: Mr. Monroe wants to say that he is noy [sic] satisfied with his attorney now, and I think you ought to bring him to the bench. . . . he can stand up and make known anything he wants in that regard.

* * * * *

THE COURT: Mr. Monroe, I understand you wish to voice some dissatisfaction with your lawyer. You may make any statement you want to.

First, I will make it clear that this lawyer has been appointed for you by another Judge of the Superior Court, not this present-sitting Judge.

Now, is there anything you want to say about him?

DEFENDANT MONROE: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Stand up and make your statement, sir.

DEFENDANT MONROE: Your Honor, I am not satisfied with my attorney in this case. I would like to say there is lack of communication. He hasn't investigated the case to the best of his ability.

THE COURT: All right. This case came on for hearing at 9:30 yesterday morning. And, as a matter of fact, it was discussed between the Government attorney and the two defense lawyers last week, with the Court.

Last week the defense attorneys, including yourself, had some matters to study out and to talk with their clients. You were brought up from the jail yesterday, and your attorney reported to me, in the course of the morning, that he had to talk some more with you. There was a conference between the Assistant U.S. Attorney, . . . and the two defense lawyers in my chambers before the trial started.

The purpose of the conference was to get this Court to not start promptly yesterday, but to give the lawyers a chance to talk with the defendants, and we didn't start until after 2:00 o'clock yesterday in this case. I guess it was probably after 3:30, which meant in some respects this Court lost the best part of a day waiting for lawyers to confer with their clients. I know at least that your lawyer have [sic] had that much communication with the defendants.

I have no evidence, from what you have said or anything that has been presented to me, one, that [your attorney] is not a competent attorney. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary, because this Court has seen him perform in his professional capacity in a number of cases for a number of years. And secondly, there is no evidence of inadequate preparation on his part, and the conclusion that the Court reaches is that there is no basis for this Court to conclude that [he] will not give you adequate representation in the course of this trial. If such occurs, then that will be another matter.

So I would presume your request is for continuance to get other counsel.

DEFENDANT MONROE: Yes.

THE COURT: If that is a request, it is denied.

Have you hired a lawyer?

DEFENDANT MONROE: My mother is trying to hire one now.

THE COURT: Trying to hire won't help. He should be here now, and if so, and he is ready to go forward, then the Court would request — had he wanted it done that way, the Court would request [your appointed counsel] to sit with your other lawyer to be counsel to him and assist in any way he can. But since he is not present

What is the name of the lawyer you hired?

DEFENDANT MONROE: Your Honor, I have no idea.

THE COURT: All right. We will proceed with the case. Thank you.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, for the purposes of the record I, yesterday, obtained beforehand the copy of the grand jury testimony, and also a copy of the statement that was made by the codefendant, and I have given that to my client. He has read it.

Also, since this case was brought up one day before, that if there was [sic] any witnesses that the Court would have those witnesses here, issue a forthwith subpoena and bring them forth to the court.

THE COURT: I would. I had to do that in the last case that you had before this Judge.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, sir.

I have indicated to him that certainly this would . . . be a situation where if we had any witnesses they would be brought to court. If there is anything that he wanted in reference to this trial, legally, if I could do it for him, I would do it for him.

THE COURT: Well, [DEFENSE COUNSEL], this Court finds no fault, and makes no criticism toward your representation of this defendant.

Do you know of any witnesses? Have any been made known to you from the defendant or anyone else, who are not present?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I know of no witnesses, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

II

The guarantee that a defendant shall enjoy the right to the assistance of counsel has been recognized in federal courts and in the District of Columbia since the adoption of the Sixth Amendment. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). For nearly a half-century, this guarantee has constituted the desideratum of the entire American system of criminal justice. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d. 562 (1975). Declaring the right to counsel to be "one of the safeguards . . . deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty," the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, stated:

[The Sixth Amendment] embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel. That which is simple, orderly, and necessary to the lawyer — to the untrained layman — may appear intricate, complex, and mysterious. [Id., 304 U.S. at 462-63, 58 S.Ct. at 1022.]

The Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel has been further described as "`so fundamental and essential to a fair trial, and so, to due process of law,'" Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, 372 U.S. at 340, 83 S.Ct. at 794 (citation omitted), as to be regarded as "`implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" Id. at 342, 83 S.Ct. at 795 (citation omitted).

It is now axiomatic that no defendant in a federal or state criminal proceeding may be validly convicted and imprisoned unless he has been afforded...