Monsur v. Chaddick
| Decision Date | 12 March 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 4108,4108 |
| Citation | 274 So.2d 499 |
| Parties | Habeeb MONSUR, Jr., Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Herschel C. CHADDICK, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Holt, Wagner & Lee by Richard E. Lee, Pineville, for defendant and appellant.
Mansour & Lauve by Alfred A. Mansour, Alexandria, for plaintiff and appellee.
Before FRUGE , MILLER and DOMENGEAUX, JJ.
In the latter part of 1968 defendant, Herschel C. Chaddick, owned a strip of land fronting on a highway in Rapides Parish, Louisiana. In order to improve the said highway, the Department of Highways of the State of Louisiana was planning to expropriate defendant's land. Defendant became aware of the impending expropriation and was fearful of receiving a diminutive price for his property, which he thought would be in the range of $150,000.00 Accordingly he sought out the services of plaintiff, Habeeb Monsur, Jr., a well known real estate entrepreneur in the Alexandria, Louisiana, area.
The two agreed that Monsur would make an effort to influence the State to pay defendant a proper price for his land and reduced their agreement to writing as follows:
Herschel C. Chaddick agrees to pay Hab Monsur 6% Commission on any price of $200,000 or over that said Hab Monsur is able to negotiate with the State in the expropriation of property that Mr. Chaddick owns on Baton Rouge Highway.
The quoted contract was actually the second one executed by plaintiff and defendant. The first one was worded in such fashion as to indicate that plaintiff would only receive 6% Of the price received over and above the sum of $200,000.00, whereas it was the intention of the parties that he should receive as compensation 6% Of the entire price if such price was at least $200,000.00. Defendant noticed the error and pointed it out to plaintiff, whereupon the first contract was destroyed and the one above quoted was executed.
Plaintiff testified that pursuant to his contract with defendant, he contacted Darrell V. Willet and T. J. Toups, the two appraisers which the State employed to determine the value of defendant's land. He presented Willet and Toups with certain information, including comparable sales, that would indicate that the land in question was more valuable than they at first thought. Additionally, when it was discovered that a lease containing provisions that were restrictive of the uses to which the property could be put was in effect, plaintiff engineered an amendment to the lease that removed the restrictions. Of course, as said by Willet, the land was more valuable when free of the restrictions.
Plaintiff further testified that he went to the appraisers, rather than to anyone else in the Highway Department, because it was his experience that once a figure was reached by the appraisers the Department would be unwilling to negotiate or change it. Thus, if a reasonable price was to be obtained it had to be done before a final appraisal was made.
The plaintiff's testimony was corroborated in whole or in part by three witnesses: Willet, Toups, and Neil Daspit, who had originally recommended plaintiff to defendant.
The Highway Department reached a valuation of $251,000.00 on all of defendant's land, then decided that it need not expropriate all of the property. Accordingly, when the expropriation suit was filed on November 6, 1969, the Department deposited only the sum of $234,794.00 as its offer of just compensation for the part of defendant's land that it desired to expropriate.
In the meantime, in October, 1968, defendant had retained an attorney to represent him in the same matter, but told him nothing of plaintiff's involvement until some two months later. The attorney engaged in considerable negotiations with the attorneys for the Highway Department and with Paul E. Litrette, who at the time was the right-of-way engineer for that Department, and the only person therein that was authorized to negotiate the prices to be paid for lands to be expropriated. These efforts ultimately resulted in a total price of $303.935.29 being paid amicably by the Highway Department for the property that it sought.
Plaintiff was unable to secure payment of his commission from defendant, and on March 17, 1971, he filed suit for 61% Of $303,935.29 or $18,236.11. Following a trial on the merits judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant for the sum of $15,060.00 representing 6% Of $251,000.00. Defendant appealed that judgment to this court.
Defendant takes two basic tacks in attacking the judgment, i.e. that the contract was invalid to begin with, and that plaintiff failed to show his performance under the contract.
Defendant makes much of...
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...a departure from the literal meaning of the terms of the agreement." Land and Offshore Co., supra; citing Monsur v. Chaddick, 274 So.2d 499 (La.App. 3d Cir.1973). In such cases, the law is never so inflexible as to bind parties to a contract which neither Applying these principles of contra......
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