Mont v. United States
| Decision Date | 03 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 17-8995,17-8995 |
| Citation | 139 S.Ct. 1826 |
| Parties | Jason J. MONT, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Vanessa Malone, Akron, Ohio, for Petitioner.
Jenny C. Ellickson, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Stephen Newman, Federal Public Defender, Vanessa Malone, Office of the Federal, Public Defender, Akron Branch, Akron, Ohio, for Petitioner.
Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, Brian A. Benczkowski, Assistant Attorney General, Eric J. Feigin, Jenny C. Ellickson, Assistants to the Solicitor, General, Joshua K. Handell, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
This case requires the Court to decide whether a convicted criminal's period of supervised release is tolled—in effect, paused—during his pretrial detention for a new criminal offense. Specifically, the question is whether that pretrial detention qualifies as "imprison[ment] in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime." 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e). Given the text and statutory context of § 3624(e), we conclude that if the court's later imposed sentence credits the period of pretrial detention as time served for the new offense, then the pretrial detention also tolls the supervised-release period.
In 2004, petitioner Jason Mont began distributing cocaine and crack cocaine in northern Ohio. After substantial drug sales to a confidential informant and a search of his home that uncovered handguns and $ 2,700 in cash, a federal grand jury indicted Mont for multiple drug and firearm offenses. He later pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and to possessing a firearm and ammunition after having been convicted of a felony. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000 ed.) ; 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2000 ed.).
The District Court sentenced Mont to 120 months' imprisonment, later reduced to 84 months, to be followed by 5 years of supervised release. Mont was released from federal prison on March 6, 2012, and his supervised release was "slated to end on March 6, 2017." 723 Fed. Appx. 325, 326 (CA6 2018) ; see 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) (). Among other standard conditions, Mont's supervised release required that he "not commit another federal, state, or local crime," "not illegally possess a controlled substance," and "refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance." Judgment in No. 4:05–cr–00229 (ND Ohio), Doc. 37, p. 111.
Mont did not succeed on supervised release. In March 2015, an Ohio grand jury charged him with two counts of marijuana trafficking in a sealed indictment. Mont was arrested and released on bond while awaiting trial for those charges. Things only got worse from there. In October 2015, Mont tested positive for cocaine and oxycodone during a routine drug test conducted as part of his supervised release. But Mont's probation officer did not immediately report these violations to the District Court; instead, the officer referred him for additional substance-abuse counseling. Mont proceeded to test positive in five more random drug tests over the next few months. He also used an " ‘unknown’ liquid to try to pass two subsequent drug tests." 723 Fed. Appx. at 326. In January 2016, Mont's probation officer finally reported the supervised-release violations, including Mont's use of drugs and attempts to adulterate his urine samples. The violation report also informed the District Court about the pending state charges and the anticipated trial date of March 2016 in state court. The District Court declined to issue an arrest warrant at that time, but it asked to " ‘be notified of the resolution of the state charges.’ " Ibid. ; see 18 U.S.C. § 3606 ().
On June 1, 2016, approximately four years and three months into his 5-year term of supervised release, Mont was arrested again on new state charges of trafficking in cocaine, and his bond was revoked on the earlier marijuana-trafficking charges. He was incarcerated in the Mahoning County Jail and has remained in state custody since that date. Mont's probation officer filed a report with the District Court stating that he had violated the terms of his release based on these new state offenses. The officer later advised the court that because Mont's incarceration rendered him unavailable for supervision, the Probation Office was "toll[ing]" his federal supervision. App. 21. The officer promised to keep the court apprised of the pending state charges and stated that, if Mont were convicted, the officer would ask the court to take action at that time.
In October 2016, Mont entered into plea agreements with state prosecutors in exchange for a predetermined 6-year sentence. The state trial court accepted Mont's guilty pleas on October 6, 2016, and set the cases for sentencing in December 2016.
Three weeks later, Mont filed a written admission in the District Court "acknowledg[ing]" that he had violated his conditions of supervised release "by virtue of his conviction following guilty pleas to certain felony offenses" in state court. Record in No. 4:05–cr–00229 (ND Ohio), Doc. 92, p. 419. Even though he had yet to be sentenced for the state offenses, Mont sought a hearing on the supervised-release violations at the court's "earliest convenience." Ibid. The court initially scheduled a hearing for November 9, 2016, but then, over Mont's objection, rescheduled the hearing several times to allow for "the conclusion of the State sentencing." App. 8; 723 Fed. Appx. at 327.
On March 21, 2017, Mont was sentenced in state court to six years' imprisonment. The judge "credited the roughly ten months that Mont had already been incarcerated pending a disposition as time served." Id., at 327. The District Court issued a warrant on March 30, 2017, and ultimately set a supervised-release hearing for June 28, 2017.
Two days before that hearing, Mont challenged the jurisdiction of the District Court based on the fact that his supervised release had initially been set to expire on March 6, 2017. The court concluded that it had authority to supervise Mont, revoked his supervised release, and ordered him to serve an additional 42 months' imprisonment to run consecutive to his state sentence. The court held that it retained jurisdiction to revoke the release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i), which preserves, for a "reasonably necessary" period of time, the court's power to adjudicate violations and revoke a term of supervised release after the term has expired "if, before its expiration, a warrant or summons has been issued on the basis of an allegation of such a violation." The court further held that it retained authority to revoke Mont's term of supervised release because it gave "notice by way of a summons" on November 1, 2016, when it originally scheduled the hearing. App. 22. The court also concluded that the delay between the guilty pleas in October 2016 and the hearing date in June 2017 was "reasonably necessary." Id ., at 24.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed on alternative grounds. The court could find no evidence in the record that a summons had issued within the meaning of § 3583(i). 723 Fed. Appx. at 329, n. 5. But because Circuit precedent provided an alternative basis for affirmance, the court did not further consider the Government's argument that the District Court retained jurisdiction under § 3583(i). Instead, the court held that Mont's supervised-release period was tolled while he was held in pretrial detention in state custody under § 3624(e), which provides:
(Emphasis added.)
Relying on Circuit precedent, the Sixth Circuit explained that when a defendant is convicted of the offense for which he was held in pretrial detention for longer than 30 days and " ‘his pretrial detention is credited as time served toward his sentence, then the pretrial detention is "in connection with" a conviction and tolls the period of supervised release under § 3624.’ " Id. , at 328 (quoting United States v. Goins , 516 F. 3d 416, 417 (CA6 2008) ). Because Mont's term of supervised release had been tolled between June 2016 and March 2017, there was ample time left on his supervised-release term when the warrant issued on March 30, 2017.
The Courts of Appeals disagree on whether § 3624(e) tolls supervised release for periods of pretrial detention lasting longer than 30 days when that incarceration is later credited as time served on a conviction. Compare United States v. Ide , 624 F. 3d 666, 667 (CA4 2010) (supervised-release period tolls); United States v. Molina-Gazca , 571 F. 3d 470, 474 (CA5 2009) (same); United States v. Johnson , 581 F. 3d 1310, 1312–1313 (CA11 2009) (same); Goins , supra , at 417 (same), with United States v. Marsh , 829 F. 3d 705, 709 (CADC 2016) (); United States v. Morales-Alejo , 193 F. 3d 1102, 1106 (CA9 1999) (same). We granted certiorari to resolve this split of authority. 586 U.S. ––––, 139 S.Ct. 451, 202 L.Ed.2d 346 (2018).
We hold that pretrial detention later credited as time served for a new conviction is "imprison[ment] in connection with a conviction" and thus tolls the supervised-release term under § 3624(e). This is so even if the court...
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