Montag v. People

• Decision Date: 24 March 1892
• Citation: 30 N.E. 337,141 Ill. 75
• Parties: MONTAG v. PEOPLE.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

141 Ill. 75

30 N.E. 337

MONTAG

v.PEOPLE.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 24, 1892.

Error to criminal court of Cook county; HENRY M. SHEPARD, Judge.

Indictment of Joseph Montag for murder. Defendant was convicted, and brings error. Reversed.

Alshculer & Murphy and N. A. Kauffman, for plaintiff in error.

Atty. Gen. Hunt, J. M. Longenecker, State's Atty., and C. G. Neely, Asst. State's Atty., for the People.

CRAIG. J.

At the June term, 1890, of the criminal court of Cook county, Joseph Montag, plaintiff in error, was indicted for the murder of his wife, Anna Montag, on the 9th day of June, 1890. A trial of the cause before a jury resulted in a verdict of guilty of murder as charged in the indictment, and the jury fixed the punishment at death. The court overruled a motion for a new trial, and rendered judgment on the verdict, and the defendant applied for and obtained this writ of error, which was made a supersedeas. It appears from the record that plaintiff in error was engaged in the mercantile business for several years at 129 North Clark street, Chicago. In the latter part of May, 1890, Eickmeier, a son-in-law, obtained a judgment against the plaintiffin error, levied upon the stock of goods, and, upon a sale, the stock was bought by Mrs. Cickmeier, a danghter of the defendant. She then carried on the store, defendant's wife acting as cashier. The defendant and his wife resided at No. 107 Wells street, and Mrs. Eickmeier resided next door. About the middle of May a difficulty arose between the defendant and his daughter Mrs. Eickmeier, in which defendant's wife took sides with the daughter. The result of this difficulty was defendant was required by the wife and daughter to leave the home residence. The fact that defendant was required to leave home seems to have been the source of considerable trouble to him, and he made several efforts to induce his wife to consent to his return. On June 9th he calied at the store between 12 and 1 o'clock, and had a long interview with his wife, remaining some two hours, but his wife did not consent that he might return home. Defendant then left the store, and returned in about a half hour, and shot his wife, and in the alley in the rear of the store he shot himself. The wife died a few moments after she was shot, but the wound defendant inflicted on himself did not prove to be dangerous. There is no substantial controversy in regard to the facts. The fact that the defendant shot and killed his wife is conceded; that the homicide was deliberately and intentionally committed is beyond dispute; but counsel for the defendant, as we understand the argument, rely upon three alleged errors to reverse the judgment: First, that the evidence does not show that the accused was of such sound mind at the time of the killing as to support a verdict of guilty; second, that instruction No. 21, given for the people, was erroneous; and, third, that the court improperly permitted a witness to state what the deceased told her the accused had said 10 or 15 minutes before the killing.

Much is said in the argument in regard to the proof of insanity, and the burden of proof on that question in a case of this character. The law on that subject is plain and well understood. Every man is presumed to be sane, and, in the absence of evidence which may raise a reasonable doubt of sanity, no evidence need be introduced; but, whenever the question of sanity is put in issue by facts coming from either side which may raise such doubt, then it devolves upon the people to establish the sanity of the prisoner. Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269;People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9;Hopps v. People, 31 Ill. 394. In this case the people offered no proof whatever on the question of the defendant's sanity. We are, however, inclined to think that no proof was required. There was evidence that the defendant was in trouble with his family; that he was disturbed in mind, and perhaps somewhat excited; but there was little or no testimony which, when properly considered, could raise a reasonable doubt in regard to the sanity of the defendant.

In this connection complaint is made that the court failed to instruct the jury in regard to the form of verdict in case they found defendant insane at the time of the homicide. No instruction was asked by the defendant on this question, and the court could not be required to volunteer an instruction, especially when there was no sufficient evidence which would justify a verdict of insanity. Instruction numbered 21, complained of, was as follows: ‘(21) The court instructs the jury that voluntary intoxication furnishes no excuse for a crime committed under its influences, even if the intoxication is so extreme as to make the author of the crime unconscious of what he is doing, or to create a temporary insanity.’ The evidence fails to show that the offense was committed by the defendant while intoxicated, or that he was unconscious of what he was doing, or temporarily insane from intoxication. The evidence on this question was, briefly, as follows: Bill testified: ‘Defendant said he had been drinking previous to this day, as I understood it. I should think he was drinking that day. I could smell liquor from his breath. Could not tell how much or how little he had been drinking.’ Ida Hoerneffer, who was present when the shooting occurred, and during several interviews of the accused with his wife, testified: ‘I did not see anything to indicate that he was drinking. * * * When he was in there the fourth time I did not see anything in his manner that would indicate that he was intoxicated.’ Henry Montag testified: ‘I saw him at 9 o'clock, and at 1 o'clock in the afternoon on the day of the shooting. He seemed excited. I cannot say that he was intoxicated.’ William Welty, who saw him two hours before the shooting, testified: ‘He was sober at that time.’ There was some other evidence in regard to the defendant's habits for sobriety, but we find no other evidence in regard to the intoxication of the defendant at the time of the shooting. There was therefore no evidence introduced on the trial that could justify the instruction, or upon which it could be predicated. This is conceded in the argument for the people. But it is claimed that, as there was no evidence to which the instruction, could be applied by the jury, they could not be misled by it. The object of an instruction to the jury is clearly laid down in Baxter v. People, 3 Gilman, 381, where it is said: ‘The object of instructions is to convey to the minds of the jury correct principles of law, as applicable to the evidence which has been laid before them, and nothing should be...