Montana Catholic Missions S.J. v. Lewis and Clarke County
| Citation | 35 P. 2,13 Mont. 559 |
| Parties | MONTANA CATHOLIC MISSIONS, S. J., v. LEWIS AND CLARKE COUNTY et al. |
| Decision Date | 20 December 1893 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Montana |
Appeal from district court, Lewis and Clarke county; William H Hunt, Judge.
Action by Montana Catholic Missions, S. J., against the county of Lewis and Clarke and R. P. Barden, to enjoin the collection of taxes. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Statement of the case by the justice delivering the opinion:
This action was brought by the plaintiff against the county of Lewis and Clarke and the treasurer thereof, praying for a judgment that the assessment of general taxes against certain real estate of plaintiff, and the levy of said taxes, be adjudged to be void, and that the said treasurer be enjoined from selling said property for said taxes. The plaintiff set up in its complaint that it was an institution of purely public charity, and that it was the owner of certain lands in Lewis and Clarke county, describing them. It is not set up in the complaint that this land is now being used by the plaintiff in any manner. It is alleged in the complaint that the lands are held for the purpose of erecting buildings for certain purely charitable purposes, unsectarian in character. Upon these lands, the general taxes were assessed and levied by the county of Lewis and Clarke for the year 1892. The plaintiff claimed, before the board of equalization, that it was exempt from this taxation, but the board refused to allow said claim, except as to 20 acres of the tract above described, upon which is being built an asylum for orphans. A general demurrer to the complaint was sustained, and judgment thereon entered for defendants. The plaintiff appealed.
The appeal brings up for a construction the following provisions of the constitution and laws: "The property of the United States, the state, countries, cities, towns, school districts, municipal corporations, and public libraries shall be exempt from taxation, and such other property as may be used exclusively for agricultural and horticultural societies, for educational purposes, places for actual religious worship, hospitals and places of burial, not used or held for private or corporate profit, and institutions of purely public charity, may be exempt from taxation." Const. § 2, art. 12. In pursuance to this provision of the constitution, the legislature enacted as follows: "The property of the United States, the state, countries, cities towns, school districts, municipal corporations, public libraries, and such other property as is used exclusively for agricultural and horticultural societies, for education purposes, places for actual religious worship, hospitals and places of burial not used or held for private or corporate profit, and institutions of purely public charity, are exempt from taxation; provided, no more land than is necessary for said purposes shall be exempt." Section 2 of "An act concerning revenue," (page 73, 2d Sess. 1891.)
T. J Walsh, for appellant.
Henri J. Haskell, Atty. Gen., and C. B. Nolan, for respondents.
DE WITT, J., (after stating the facts.)
The contention of appellant is that section 2. art. XII., of the constitution, and section 2 of the revenue act of 1891 exempt from taxation the real estate described in its complaint. It is fully conceded by the complaint that the real estate is not used by the plaintiff exclusively, or at all, for an institution of purely public charity. It is alleged that it is intended to be so used. For the purposes of this decision, it may be considered that the plaintiff is an institution of purely public charity. It is observed that the section of the constitution cited describes two classes of property. We will notice the distinction as to these two classes: First, it names the United States, the state, countries, cities, towns, school districts, municipal corporations, and public libraries. It is not left to the legislature to say whether or not the property of these institutions shall be exempt. The constitution, in itself, settles that it shall be. Nor is the test of exclusive use mentioned. The constitution says, simply, "the property" of these institutions shall be exempt. Then the section of the constitution advances to another class of property, and describes it as "property as may be used exclusively for" certain purposes, and defines the purposes, and, among them, names "institutions of purely public charity." This class of property is not exempt from taxation under the constitution, but may be made so by the legislature. The legislature has acted. Revenue Act 1891, § 2. It has therein declared to be exempt, such property as is used exclusively for the purposes mentioned in the section of the constitution, supra; and redescribes those purposes in the exact language of the constitution, making only the appropriate changes in the mood of the verbs. So, with the constitution and the law together, we have this condition: Property of certain entities, as the state, cities, etc., is exempt, and property exclusively used for certain purposes is exempt. The property in question falls within the second class, as the plaintiff is not one of the institutions mentioned in the first class, as the state or a city, etc., but is an "institution of purely public charity." And we find from the complaint that the property is not used exclusively, or at all, by such "institution of purely public charity." The most that the complaint alleges is that the property is intended to be so used. Such intention is not sufficient to constitute the use contemplated by the constitution and the law. Green...
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