Montana Coal & Coke Co. v. Livingston

• Decision Date: 11 April 1898
• Citation: 52 P. 780,21 Mont. 59
• Parties: MONTANA COAL & COKE CO. v. LIVINGSTON, County Treasurer.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

52 P. 780

21 Mont. 59

MONTANA COAL & COKE CO. v. LIVINGSTON, County Treasurer.

Supreme Court of Montana

April 11, 1898

Appeal from district court, Park county; Frank Henry, Judge.

Application by Montana Coal & Coke Company, a corporation, against Alexander Livingston, treasurer of Cook county, Mont., for injunction. The injunction was denied, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Cullen Day & Cullen, for appellant.

C. B Nolan, for respondent.

HUNT J.

Injunction. Plaintiff's application for an injunction restraining the sale of certain coal properties for nonpayment of taxes was denied. Plaintiff appeals.

Plaintiff's business is mining for coal and manufacturing the same into coke. Part of the coal lands described was plaintiff's by purchase from the United States under the land laws of the United States relative to the acquisition of coal lands; part was leased from the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, the said railroad company being the owner of such part by virtue of its land grant from the United States.

The appellant's counsel has presented to the court in his brief and oral argument but a single point, which may be stated in the following language: Are the annual net proceeds of coal mines and mining claims, acquired under the laws of the United States relative to the acquisition of coal lands taxable by the constitution and laws of the state providing for the assessment of the net proceeds of mines? Section 3 art. 12, of the constitution of this state, is as follows: "All mines and mining claims, both placer and rock in place, containing or bearing gold, silver, copper, lead, coal, or other valuable mineral deposits, after purchase thereof from the United States, shall be taxed at the price paid the United States therefor, unless the surface ground, or some part thereof, of such mine or claim, is used for other than mining purposes, and has a separate and independent value for such other purposes, in which case said surface ground, or any part thereof, so used for other than mining purposes, shall be taxed at its value for such other purposes, as provided by law; and all machinery used in mining, and all property and surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines and mining claims which have a value separate and independent of such mines or mining claims, and the annual net proceeds of all mines and mining claims shall be taxed as provided by law."

The appellant's construction of the foregoing section is that the net proceeds of coal mines are not the subject of taxation as a separate class of property, but that such net proceeds, together with the other personal property of the corporation, must be taxed as the property of the corporation at a uniform rate of assessment and taxation. That construction is too narrow. The principle of construction, as applied to a written constitution, is that effect must be given, if possible, to the whole instrument and to every section and clause. Judge Cooley (Cooley, Const. Lim. p. 72) says, concerning this rule: "If different portions seem to conflict, the courts must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative rather than one which may make some words idle and nugatory. This rule is applicable with special force to written constitutions, in which the people will be presumed to have expressed themselves in careful and measured terms, corresponding with the immense importance of the powers delegated, leaving as little as possible to implication. It is scarcely conceivable that a case can arise where a court would be justified in declaring any portion of a written constitution nugatory because of ambiguity. One part may qualify another so as to restrict its operation, or apply it otherwise than the natural construction would require if it stood by itself; but one part is not to be allowed to defeat another if by any reasonable construction the two can be made to stand together." When guided by these rules, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to avoid any construction which will make the word "coal," used in the section quoted, idle and nugatory, or which will eliminate it altogether from the context.

Again the subject of the whole section under consideration pertains to revenue and taxation necessary for the support of the state, while the object intended to be accomplished is the taxation of the net proceeds of any and all mines which contain valuable mineral deposits. Having collected this...