Montana Ry Co v. Warren
| Decision Date | 08 December 1890 |
| Citation | 11 S.Ct. 96,137 U.S. 348,34 L.Ed. 681 |
| Parties | MONTANA RY. CO. v. WARREN et al |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
John F. Dillon and Harry Hubbard, for plaintiff in error.
S. S. Burdett, for defendant in error.
The plaintiff in error, desiring to construct its railroad through a tract of land belonging to the defendants in error, the same being a mining claim known as the 'Nipper Lode,' situated in Silver Bow county, Montana territory, took appropriate proceedings for the condemnation of a right of way. The appraisers assessed the damages at $1,552. From such appraisement the defendants appealed to the district court, and on trial there the jury found the damages to be $7,000, for which, with costs, judgment was entered against the rail- road company. An appeal was taken to the supreme court of the territory, which affirmed this judgment; which judgment of affirmance has been brought before us for consideration. The opinion of that court will be found in 6 Mont. 275, 12 Pac. Rep. 641.
A preliminary question is presented by the defendants in error. They insist that no bill of exceptions was taken at the trial, and that therefore no rulings of the trial court are before us for consideration, citing as authority the case of Kerr v. Clampitt, 95 U. S. 188. In that case, as in this, after the trial a statement of the errors alleged, upon which a motion for a new trial was based, was prepared and filed; but, although signed by counsel, it was held by this court to be not the equivalent of a bill of exceptions, and to be available only for the purpose expressed, to-wit, the motion for a new trial. There was in that case no stipulation that the statement should be treated as a bill of exceptions, or be available for other purposes than that of a new trial. It was not authenticated by the trial judge. Lacking that authentication, it was adjudged available only for the purpose named; and that it did not bring into the record, for review in this court, the questions presented. In this case the proceedings on the trial are embodied in a statement prepared like that for the purpose of a motion for a new trial; but in addition, it is authenticated by the trial judge as a correct statement of the proceedings. Further than that, at the trial a bill of exceptions was prepared in respect to the rulings of the court on instructions, signed by the trial judge and filed at the time, which bill of exceptions was incorporated in the statement. So that we have a separate and perfect bill of exceptions as to the ruling of the court on the matter of instructions, and a statement of all the proceedings in the trial, approved by counsel and authenticated by the trial judge. This proceeding was authorized by the statutes of Montana, and must be adjudged as sufficient for the purposes of review here.
When the case was brought to the supreme court of Montana, no new assignments of error were made. The only specifications of error were in the statement prepared for the motion for a new trial in the district court. Perhaps nothing more was necessary, and all the questions arising on the trial may have been open to consideration. Be that as it may, the opinion of the supreme court opens by saying: It then discusses them, and closes with the statement that 'these are all the errors complained of and relied upon in appelln t's brief.' The court also comments upon the character of the record, and says: 'It is certainly apparent that it is not such a record as should be filed in this court.' The question now arises whether our inquiry is limited to the matters presented to and considered by that court, or should be broadened to all matters that transpired at the trial. Obviously, the former. Error is alleged in the judgment of the supreme court of the territory, and if in all matters presented to it its rulings were correct, it cannot be affirmed that its judgment was erroneous because there were in the record matters not vital to the question of jurisdiction or the foundation of right, but simply of procedure, to which its attention was not called, and in respect to which its judgment was not invoked. All such matters must be considered as waived by the complaining party. It would be an anomaly if a party feeling himself aggrieved by the rulings of a trial court could appeal to the supreme court of his territory, and invoke its judgment on certain alleged errors, and when defeated there could transfer the judgment of that territorial supreme court to this, and ask a reversal here of its judgment on grounds involving mere matters of procedure in the prior trial, to which its attention was not directed. It is fundamental that when the judgment of a court is challenged in error its...
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