Montanez v. Price
| Docket Number | CIVIL 3:22-cv-1267 |
| Decision Date | 23 August 2023 |
| Parties | JOSE MONTANEZ, Plaintiff v. PAULA PRICE, et al., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Plaintiff Jose Montanez (“Montanez”), an inmate confined at the State Correctional Institution, Huntingdon, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Huntingdon”), initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). The matter is proceeding via an amended complaint. (Doc. 24). Named as Defendants are Healthcare Administrator Paula Price, Nurse Melanie Wagman, Registered Nurse Supervisor Davis, Healthcare Administrator R. Ellers, Superintendent Wakefield Superintendent John Riviello, and Mary Patton (collectively the “Commonwealth Defendants”), and WellPath LLC, Dr. Preston, Dr. Rajinder Mahli, Dr. David Edwards, and Gabrielle Nalley, P.A.-C (collectively, the “Medical Defendants”). Presently pending before the Court are Defendants' motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Docs. 27, 29). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Defendants' motions.
On August 28,2021, Montanez was in his cell when he attempted to stand up to use the bathroom. (Doc. 24, p. 4). Montanez alleges that his legs gave out when he stood up, and he realized his body was numb. (Id. at pp. 4-5). Montanez notified an unidentified correctional officer who was walking by the cell. (Id. at p. 5). The correctional officer and Sergeant Bullick[1] then helped Montanez walk down the stairs. (Id.). Nurse Wagman was waiting with a wheelchair and wheeled Montanez to the medical department. (Id.). Once in the medical department, Montanez's vitals were checked, and Nurse Wagman examined his legs. (Id.). Nurse Wagman then called Dr. Malhi, who stated that Montanez should be moved to the first tier, and he would examine Montanez the next day. (Id. at pp. 5-6). Montanez alleges that he told Nurse Wagman he “needed to be taken to a hospital,” but she denied his request. (Id. at p. 6). Nurse Wagman then wheeled Montanez to a cell, where he requested a grievance form from Sergeant Bullick. (Id.).
The following day, August 29, 2021, Dr. Malhi examined Montanez at his cell. (Id.). Montanez alleges that he was unable to walk, and he told Dr. Malhi that he was urinating on himself, but Dr. Mahli only nodded and walked off. (Id.). Montanez claims that he remained in his cell for three (3) days. (Id. at pp. 6-7).
On August 31,2021, Montanez was transported to an outside hospital, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (“UPMC”) Altoona. (Id. at p. 7). While at the hospital, Montanez underwent an MRI which revealed he had spinal cord stenosis and spinal cord edema. (Id.). Thereafter, on September 10, 2021, Montanez underwent surgery. (Id.). On September 15, 2021, he was transferred to Encompass Health for physical therapy. (Id.).
On October 1,2021, Montanez was transferred to the infirmary at the State Correctional Institution, Rockview, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Rockview”), and treated by Dr. Preston. (Id.). Montanez alleges that Dr. Preston “denied [him] proper or adequate pain medication even after falling and causing a herniated disk.” (Id.) He alleges that Corrections Health Care Administrator Ellers “lied about the results of the X-ray taken after the fall,” which he claims resulted in a delay of treatment. (Id.).
Montanez asserts that he returned to SCI-Huntingdon on November 12, 2021. (Id.). He alleges that Corrections Health Care Administrator Price “created a policy that I could not get access to her until a grievance was filed,” which allegedly delayed his treatment. (Id.). Montanez then submitted a sick call slip. (Id.). Physician's Assistant Nalley purportedly replied to the sick call slip and denied Montanez's request for a double mattress and stronger pain medication, lied to him about his treatment, and allowed him to walk without a cane or crutches. (Id. at pp. 7-8).
On December 14, 2021, Dr. Edwards treated Montanez in the infirmary at SCI- Huntingdon. (Id. at p. 8). Montanez alleges that Dr. Edwards refused to prescribe stronger pain medication, refused a request for a double mattress, and should have ordered an MRI of his left hip. (Id.). He then asserts that Superintendent Wakefield “allowed the actions by Dr. Edwards," and “allow[ed] cold air to continue to blow into [his] cell during a snowy winter.” (Id.).
Montanez alleges that Well Path “is being sued as a public entity contracting the medical staff' in this case. (Id.). Lastly, Montanez asserts that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania “is being sued in accordance with the type of claims in this lawsuit[].”[2] (Id.).
Montanez alleges that Defendants did not render adequate medical care for his back pain in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. He also brings claims under the Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) for the alleged denial of his post-surgery physical therapy. (Id. at pp. 11-12). For relief, Montanez requests a permanent single cell, to be moved to a facility that is closer to Philadelphia and that offers physical therapy for his legs, and $5,000,000 as compensation, (/d.atp. 13).
Defendants move to dismiss all claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The motions are fully briefed and ripe for resolution.[3]
A complaint must be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570,127 S.Ct. 1955,167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The plaintiff must aver “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,129 S.Ct. 1937,1949,173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
“Though a complaint ‘does not need detailed factual allegations,... a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Prop. Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In other words, “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114,118 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A court “take[s] as true all the factual allegations in the Complaint and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts, but... disregard[s] legal conclusions and threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ethypharm S.A. France v. Abbott Laboratories, 707 F.3d 223, 231, n.14 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Twombly and Iqbal require [a district court] to take the following three steps to determine the sufficiency of a complaint: First, the court must take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, the court should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.
Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). This “plausibility” determination will be a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
However, even “if a complaint is subject to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).
In the context of medical care, the Eighth Amendment “requires prison officials to provide basic medical treatment to those whom it has incarcerated.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192,197 (3d Cir. 1999). To establish an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, a claimant must demonstrate “(i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.” Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).
Deliberate indifference has been found “where the prison official (1) knows of a prisoner's need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended medical treatment.” Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197. The “deliberate indifference” prong of the Eighth Amendment test requires that the defendant actually know of and disregard “an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Circumstantial evidence can establish subjective knowledge if it shows that the excessive risk was so obvious that the official must have known about it. See Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120,133 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at...
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