Montanez v. Town of Highland
| Decision Date | 13 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO.: 2:19-CV-208-TLS |
| Parties | GEORGE MONTANEZ, JR., Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF HIGHLAND, HIGHLAND POLICE DEPARMTMENT, CHIEF PETER HOJNIKCI, and UNKNOWN POLICE OFFICER, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants, Town of Highland, Highland Police Department, CPL. Michael Yonkman, and Chief Peter Hojnicki's Partial Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 34]. The Plaintiff did not file a response, and the time to do so has passed. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the motion and REMANDS the case to state court.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff George Montanez, Jr. filed a Complaint [ECF No. 6] in the Lake County, Indiana, Superior Court, on May 8, 2019, against Defendants the Town of Highland, the Highland Police Department, and an Unknown Police Officer for the alleged excessive forced used by the officer in violation of the United States Constitution, the Indiana Constitution, and Indiana state law when the Plaintiff was arrested, transported, and booked on May 8 and 9, 2017. On May 15, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint [ECF No. 8], adding Chief Hojnicki to the caption and correcting a factual allegation. The Defendants filed a timely Notice of Removal [ECF No. 1] on May 31, 2019. The Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint [ECF No. 26], on November 4, 2019, to identify the "Unknown Police Officer" as Corporal Michael Yonkman. Although Corporal Michael Yonkman's name is substituted in place of the "Unknown Police Officer" throughout the Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff did not update the caption. The Plaintiff makes the following factual allegations.
Corporal Yonkman is a police officer with and employee of the Highland Police Department, and Chief Hojnicki is Police Chief of the Highland Police Department. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 6, 32, ECF No. 26. At all relevant times, Corporal Yonkman was acting "under the color of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs, and usages of the Highland Police Department." Id. ¶ 9; see also ¶ 23. In the late evening to early morning of May 8 and 9, 2017, Officer Danny Ponce, who is not a party to this litigation, and Corporal Yonkman came to the residence of the Plaintiff's former significant other and minor daughter. Id. ¶ 12. Officer Ponce asked if the Plaintiff could leave, but the Plaintiff responded that he was unable to do so due to a physical handicap and that he was too intoxicated to drive. Id. ¶ 13. In response, Corporal Yonkman used unreasonable and excessive force by removing the Plaintiff from a bench, dragging him out of the home, and throwing him upon the ground in a brutal fashion despite having actual knowledge that the Plaintiff was physically handicapped. Id. ¶ 14. With the sole intention of causing the Plaintiff pain, Corporal Yonkman used unreasonable and excessive force by applying and over-tightening handcuffs, resulting in a wrist injury to the Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 15, 16. When the Plaintiff requested that the handcuffs be removed or loosened due to pain, Corporal Yonkman told the Plaintiff to "shut the f*** up." Id. ¶ 17. All of this occurred while arresting, transporting, and booking the Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 18. The Plaintiff did not resist, attempt to resist, attack, or attempt to attack any officer in the Highland Police Department. Id. ¶ 19. After the injury, the Plaintiff was denied prompt and reasonable medical care and treatment. Id. ¶ 21. ThePlaintiff alleges that he suffered injuries as a result of the alleged excessive force, including injury to his wrist, cervical spine, and lumbar spine. Id. ¶ 24.
Count I, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all the Defendants, alleges that Corporal Yonkman used excessive force and that the Plaintiff's arrest, transport, and booking was done in a violent and abusive manner with the intent of humiliating and embarrassing the Plaintiff and resulting in the physical injuries. Id. ¶¶ 24-28. The Plaintiff also alleges that the Highland Police Department systematically failed to train its officers in the proper use of force. Id. ¶ 30. The Plaintiff alleges that he was deprived of the following federal constitutional and state law rights in violation of § 1983: (1) Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure; (2) Sixth Amendment right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him; (3) Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law and right to equal protection of the laws; (4) Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; (5) right to not be treated with unnecessary rigor under Article I Section 15 of the Indiana Constitution; (6) right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under Article I Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution; and (7) related provisions of Indiana state law. Id. ¶¶ 33(A)-(G).
The Plaintiff then brings two state law claims. Count II alleges that Corporal Yonkman used excessive force in violation of Indiana state law when he wrongfully, unlawfully, wantonly, and maliciously assaulted and battered the Plaintiff while booking him. Id. ¶¶ 37, 41. Count III alleges a state law claim for reckless disregard of the Plaintiff's medical needs against all the Defendants. Id. p. 8. The Plaintiff alleges that the lawsuit is brought against the Town of Highland on theories of negligence and vicarious responsibility. Id. ¶ 11.
On December 16, 2019, the Defendants filed the instant Partial Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 34]. The Plaintiff did not file a response, and the time to do so has passed. See N.D. Ind.L.R. 7-1(d)(5) (). The same date, Defendant Town of Highland filed a Partial Answer [ECF No. 36] to the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint.
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6) "challenges the viability of a complaint by arguing that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court presumes that all well-pleaded allegations are true, views these well-pleaded allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Reynolds v. CB Sports Bar, Inc., 623 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 2010). Surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Id. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
ANALYSIS
In the instant motion, the Defendants seek dismissal of all the Plaintiff's claims with the exception of the claim of assault and battery against the Town of Highland. See Defs.' Mot. ¶ 8, ECF No. 26. The Court considers the arguments in turn.
Defendants seek dismissal of the claims against Corporal Yonkman as barred by the statute of limitations. When determining the statute of limitations for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal courts apply the forum state's statute of limitations for constitutional andpersonal injury claims. Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). In Indiana, the applicable statute of limitations period is two years. Id.; Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a). Although state law supplies the tolling rules, the accrual of § 1983 claims is governed by federal law. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). Accrual of § 1983 claims occurs "when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, . . . that is, when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief." Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In other words, "a personal injury claim raised under § 1983 accrues 'when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.'" Regains, 918 F.3d at 533 (quoting Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 888, 591 (7th Cir. 2013)). For the Plaintiff's Indiana state law claims, "the cause of action of a tort claim accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knew or, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, could have discovered that an injury had been sustained as a result of the tortious act of another." Filip v. Block, 879 N.E.2d 1076, 1082 (Ind. 2008) (quoting Wehling v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 586 N.E.2d 840, 843 (Ind. 1992)).
Here, the Plaintiff alleges that his arrest, transport, and booking occurred during the late evening to early morning of May 8 to 9, 2017. To bring a § 1983 claim or the state law claims against Corporal Yonkman, the Plaintiff was required to file his complaint against Corporal Yonkman within two years of his injury, which was May 9, 2019. However, the Plaintiff did not add Corporal Yonkman to this lawsuit until November 2019, after the statute of limitations had expired.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) allows an amendment to relate back to the date of the original complaint under limited circumstances. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1). When the amendment adds a defendant, the amended pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading only if the party to be added: "(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and (ii) knew or should have known that the action wouldhave been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(i)-(ii) (emphasis added). The Seventh...
To continue reading
Request your trial