Montano v. Hedgepeth

Decision Date23 July 1997
Docket NumberNo. 96-2487,96-2487
Citation120 F.3d 844
PartiesNick P. MONTANO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Paul HEDGEPETH; James Helling; Dale Vande Krol, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Kelly A Phipps, Iowa City, IA, argued, for plaintiff-appellant.

William A. Hill, Asst. Atty. Gen., Des Moines, IA, argued, for defendants-appellees.

Before WOLLMAN, FLOYD R. GIBSON, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

FLOYD R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Nicholas P. Montano, an inmate at the Iowa State Penitentiary (the "ISP"), filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Dale Vande Krol, a prison chaplain, primarily claiming that the clergyman had excluded Montano from Protestant services in violation of his rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994). After a bench trial, the district court determined Montano had failed to demonstrate that his inability to attend Protestant services infringed upon his sincerely held religious beliefs. The court thus entered judgment in favor of Vande Krol, 1 and this appeal followed. Based on our conclusion that a prison chaplain, when performing purely ecclesiastical duties, is not a state actor, we affirm the district court's judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Montano, though not Jewish by either birth or conversion, practices a religion known as Messianic Judaism. By his own account, this means that he is "a Christian who studies from a Jewish perspective." Montano embraces many of the fundamental tenets commonly associated with the Christian faith, such as the divinity of Jesus Christ, but he also finds it important to observe traditional Jewish holidays and festivals like Rosh Hashana. Accordingly, while his theology borrows elements from Judaism and Protestant Christianity, it is apparent that he holds views which are offensive to at least some members of both sects. Unable to find acceptance within either of the two denominations which influence his own beliefs, the prisoner filed suit in federal court alleging a violation of his free exercise rights.

At the crux of this dispute lies the fact that Messianic Judaism is not an officially recognized religion at the ISP. As a result, its followers, who are few in number at the prison, 2 do not enjoy all the benefits accompanying that status. For example, the congregations of recognized denominations, including Protestantism, conventional Judaism, and Catholicism, enjoy one hour per week in the prison chapel for religious services, two additional hours of meeting time per week for educational purposes, an institutional financial account, a lockbox in the chapel, and the right to observe holy days. By contrast, adherents of Messianic Judaism, along with followers of other unrecognized faiths, only receive access to a lockbox and one hour per week in the chapel.

Evidently wishing to avail himself of the additional worship time afforded to members of recognized groups, Montano began attending Jewish services at the prison in early 1993. In March of that year, however, the religious consultant for Judaism, Rabbi Horn, announced that Messianic Judaism is "basically a Christian organization" with teachings "contrary to Judaism." Accordingly, the rabbi asked Chaplain Vande Krol to prevent Messianic Jews from attending traditional Jewish observances. 3 Vande Krol acceded to this request and, by memorandum dated March 11, 1993, promulgated a policy which barred from Jewish services all inmates claiming as their religion Messianic Judaism.

A short while later, Montano began attending Protestant celebrations. According to Chaplain Vande Krol, who is himself a Protestant and serves as religious leader for that faith, 4 Montano did not in any way disrupt the ceremonies. In fact, Montano initially assumed an instrumental role in the observances by leading the singing and taking "a very active part in Christianity for some time." Before long, however, other members of the Protestant group approached Vande Krol with concerns about some beliefs Montano had expressed. In particular, these "inmates of the church body" informed Vande Krol that Montano had advised other prisoners that salvation is possible other than through Jesus Christ, that the Bible in its current form is improperly translated, and that a person must study Jewish background and culture to properly understand the scripture.

Montano's propagation of these views, which Vande Krol deemed to be "false doctrine," prompted the chaplain to convene a meeting of "mature Christian brothers" to decide whether Montano should continue attending Protestant functions. 5 Vande Krol invited certain individuals, including the congregation's democratically elected elders, to discuss Montano's activities, and he refused Montano's entreaties to allow others to attend. At the conclusion of the gathering, during which the participants had an opportunity to personally question Montano about his beliefs, those assembled decided to preclude Montano from participating in Protestant events for one year. Everyone at the meeting, with the exception of one inmate, signed a letter informing Montano and other Protestants of the chosen course of action. The document, which Vande Krol wrote, indicated that Montano would be permitted to rejoin the "Body of Christ" only when he displayed a "true repentance." 6

Montano then attempted, unsuccessfully, to gain readmittance to the Protestant services by more fully explaining his predicament, via "inmate memoranda," to Vande Krol and James Helling, ISP's treatment director. What eluded Montano's own zealous efforts, however, was attained through the inexorable passage of time. Toward the close of his year of excommunication, Montano received a notice from Vande Krol extending to him "the opportunity to reunite with the Christian Body and to participate in corporate worship services." 7 Nonetheless, because his personal beliefs remained unaltered, and fearing swift discipline should he choose to rejoin the Protestant group, Montano declined this invitation and instead filed the instant suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. As relevant to this appeal, Montano's pro se Complaint alleged that Vande Krol violated his constitutional and statutory 8 free exercise rights by excluding him from Protestant activities. Though the district court found, over the State's protestations, that Vande Krol's conduct amounted to state action, it decided that the chaplain had not trammeled upon Montano's right to freely exercise his religion. In so holding, the court relied upon the fact that Montano does not claim to be either Jewish or Protestant. As such, the prison did not burden his religious expression when it prohibited him from attending services conducted by those faiths. To the contrary, the ISP reasonably attempted to accommodate Montano's rather unique beliefs by affording Messianic Jews a lockbox and weekly time in the chapel.

On appeal, Montano takes issue solely with the district court's decision that Vande Krol did not violate Montano's federally protected rights when the chaplain banned him from Protestant events. After lengthy and careful consideration of the record and the relevant authorities, we have resolved that Vande Krol did not act on behalf of the state when he excluded Montano from the Protestant services. Consequently, we affirm the district court's judgment in favor of Vande Krol.

II. DISCUSSION

A bulwark for individual liberties, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides legal redress to individuals who suffer violations of their federal rights at the hands of any "person" who acts "under color" of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). That being so, a § 1983 plaintiff can prevail only if he proves he has been subjected to a deprivation of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Comiskey v. JFTJ Corp., 989 F.2d 1007, 1010 (8th Cir.1993) (quotation omitted). And, naturally, the challenged conduct must have been committed by one who acts "under color of state law." Id. Presently, Montano contends that Chaplain Vande Krol infringed upon his First Amendment prerogative to freely exercise his religion. Like most other constitutional provisions, however, the First Amendment, which is binding on the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, see United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of America Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 831, 103 S.Ct. 3352, 3357-58, 77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983), erects a shield exclusively against governmental misconduct, see id. It provides no protection against private behavior, no matter how egregious. Consequently, this deceptively complex appeal requires us to apply the confused and confusing concepts attendant to the state action analysis.

In ascertaining the presence of state action, we must examine the record to determine whether "the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [is] fairly attributable to the State." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2753, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982). Resolving this question entails a journey down a particularly fact-bound path, see id. at 939, 102 S.Ct. at 2754-55, but the Supreme Court has identified two legal touchstones to provide guidance along the way. To begin with, there can be no "fair attribution" unless the alleged constitutional violation was "caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible." Id. at 937, 102 S.Ct. at 2753. Furthermore, "the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be because he is a state official, because he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise...

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