Montaup Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Corp.
Decision Date | 10 March 1983 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 79-0584 S. |
Citation | 561 F. Supp. 740 |
Parties | MONTAUP ELECTRIC CO., Plaintiff, v. OHIO BRASS CORP., Defendant, v. STONE & WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORPORATION, Third-Party Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
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Adler, Pollock & Sheehan by Peter L. Kennedy, Russell Pollock, Providence, R.I., for plaintiff.
Gunning, LaFazia & Gnys by Raymond A. LaFazia, Fred T. Polacek, Providence, R.I., for defendant.
Vetter & White by Gordon Cleary, Providence, R.I., for third-party defendant.
Plaintiff, Montaup Electric Company ("Montaup"), a Massachusetts corporation, seeks damages against Ohio Brass Corporation ("Ohio Brass"), an Ohio corporation, for the putative failure in May, 1977, of ground wire brackets manufactured by Ohio Brass and used in the construction of an electric transmission line for plaintiff. Montaup alleges that Ohio Brass breached its agreement and its express and implied warranties to provide brackets with a 15,000 pound strength capacity as specified in the contract for the purchase of the brackets. Montaup further alleges that Ohio Brass negligently furnished the brackets.
Ohio Brass filed a third-party claim against Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation ("Stone"), a Massachusetts corporation, seeking indemnity and/or contribution, based on Stone's alleged negligence in (i) designing the transmission line; (ii) placing the order for the brackets; (iii) supervising the construction. Ohio Brass alleges that its contract with Stone for provision of the brackets did not specify any strength rating.1 Neither Montaup nor Stone dispute this assertion.
The transmission line at issue was completed by December 27, 1967. No work or services were provided in connection with the project subsequent to July 24, 1969. Montaup filed its complaint in this Court on November 7, 1979; Ohio Brass filed its third-party complaint on June 26, 1981.
The case is before the Court on two motions for summary judgment, one filed by Stone against Ohio Brass and the second filed by Ohio Brass against Montaup. Stone argues that the third-party action brought by Ohio Brass is time-barred. Ohio Brass argues that the primary action brought by Montaup is likewise outlawed.
Plaintiff has also filed a motion for leave to amend its complaint so as to assert a direct claim against Stone.2 The proposed amended complaint discloses that Montaup intends thereby to cite Stone for alleged negligence (i) in design of the transmission line, (ii) in ordering the brackets, and (iii) in supervising the construction, and for breach of its agreement to provide professional engineering services.
In this diversity action, the Court must apply the substantive law of Rhode Island. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938); Lyons v. Salve Regina College, 565 F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 971, 98 S.Ct. 1611, 56 L.Ed.2d 62 (1978); Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F.Supp. 85, 87 (D.R.I.1968). Choice of law tenets fall within this mandate. Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 96 S.Ct. 167, 46 L.Ed.2d 3 (1975); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 1021, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941); Mason v. Southern New England Conference Association of Seventh-Day Adventists, 696 F.2d 135, 136 (1st Cir.1982).
Upon careful examination, it appears reasonably certain that Rhode Island courts view limitations questions in kindred manner as other substantive issues giving rise to conflicts of law problems. Brown v. Church of Holy Name of Jesus, 105 R.I. 322, 252 A.2d 176, 181 n. 10 (1969). Accord Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F.Supp. at 87 n. 1 (applying Rhode Island law). While no reported Rhode Island cases deal squarely with the application of a statute of limitations in a choice of law context, the state supreme court has postulated that "`the disposition of other issues issues which do not involve standards of conduct must turn, as does the issue of the standard of conduct itself, on the law of the jurisdiction which has the strongest interest in the resolution of the particular issue presented.'" Brown v. Church of Holy Name of Jesus, 252 A.2d at 181 n. 10, citing Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). This approach comports with the pronouncement of the First Circuit to the effect that statutes of limitations stand, for these purposes, on the same footing as substantive law issues "since they are one aspect of the parties' rights and liabilities." Templeman v. Baudhuin Yacht Harbor, Inc., 608 F.2d 916, 917 (1st Cir.1979). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has stated as much in holding that "a statute that would completely bar recovery in a suit if brought in a State court bears on a State-created right vitally and not merely formally or negligibly." Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 1470, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945).3
Rhode Island utilizes an interest analysis in determining governing law. Under this analysis, four factors must be taken into account. They are:
Brown v. Church of Holy Name of Jesus, 252 A.2d at 179, citing Restatement (Second) of Conflicts § 145(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1968).4 A court should assess these factors in light of five guidelines promulgated for weighing the competing interests in each case:
Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917, 923, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 957, 89 S.Ct. 387, 21 L.Ed.2d 371 (1968).
When the foregoing considerations are applied to the issue of which statute of limitations should properly govern the instant action, it is clear beyond cavil that Massachusetts law should apply to both the third-party action and to Montaup's primary claim against Ohio Brass.
With respect to Stone's motion for summary judgment against Ohio Brass, the following facts weigh heavily towards the application of Massachusetts law: (i) the ground wire brackets which ostensibly failed were attached to transmission lines located in Massachusetts; (ii) the contract between Stone and Ohio Brass for the supply of these brackets was prepared and executed in Massachusetts; (iii) the brackets were delivered and installed in Massachusetts; and (iv) Stone is a Massachusetts corporation which conducts substantial business within that state. Conversely, Ohio Brass is an Ohio corporation with no greater commercial affinity to Rhode Island than to Massachusetts. Palpably, the legitimate and compelling interests of the Commonwealth in the subject matter of this litigation far outweigh the competing interests (if any) of the forum state. The relevant Massachusetts statute of limitations must therefore govern Stone's motion for summary judgment.
A similar factual mosaic emerges with respect to Montaup's claim against Ohio Brass. The faulty brackets were attached to transmission lines located in Massachusetts and owned by a Massachusetts corporation (Montaup) doing substantial business there. Montaup's agreement with Stone for the design of the transmission line, ancillary to which the contract for the purchase of brackets was executed, was negotiated and signed in Massachusetts. Again, Massachusetts clearly has interests far more meaningful than those of Rhode Island vis-a-vis Montaup's claim. It follows inexorably that, as with the third-party claim, Massachusetts law must determine the outcome of Ohio Brass' motion against Montaup.
Ohio Brass seeks summary judgment based on Montaup's failure to comply with the time limitations imposed by either R.I. Gen.Laws § 9-1-29 or Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 260, § 2B ("2B").5 As previously discussed, the relevant Massachusetts statute of limitations controls. The Court concludes, however, that the relevant Massachusetts statute is not § 2B, but rather Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 106, § 2-318 ("§ 2-318").
§ 2B, by its terms, applies only to "actions of tort for damages arising out of any deficiency or neglect in the design, planning, construction or general administration of an improvement to real property...." Id. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that § 2B grants immunity from suit upon the expiration of the six-year period therein delimited only to architects, engineers, contractors and others involved in the design, planning, construction or general administration of improvements to real property. Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 437 N.E.2d 514, 524-25 (1982). It denies the same protection to materialmen, suppliers, owners, tenants and others in possession or control. Id. 437 N.E.2d at 523, 525.
Ohio Brass was a supplier of goods used in the construction of the transmission line. The definition of "goods," found in Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 106, § 2-102, includes the brackets at issue here. See White v. Peabody Construction Co., 386 Mass. 121, 434 N.E.2d 1015, 1021 (1982). As a materialman, therefore, the defendant may not be shielded by the protective armor of § 2B.
Thus, the statute of limitations applicable to Montaup's claim against Ohio Brass is § 2-318, which provides, in full:
Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in any action brought against the manufacturer, seller, lessor or supplier of goods to recover damages for breach of warranty, express or implied, or for negligence, although the plaintiff did not purchase the goods from the defendant if the...
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