Monteer v. ABL Mgmt.
| Decision Date | 12 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 4:21-CV-756 ACL |
| Parties | JACOB ALLEN MONTEER, Plaintiff, v. ABL MANAGEMENT INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Jacob Allen Monteer, a pretrial detainee at Phelps County Jail, for leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. ECF. No. 2. Having reviewed the motion and the financial information submitted in support, the Court has determined to grant the motion, and assess an initial partial filing fee of $58.63. Furthermore, after reviewing the complaint, the Court will partially dismiss the complaint and will order the Clerk to issue process or cause process to be issued on the non-frivolous portions of the complaint.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to his account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner's account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.
In support of the instant motion, plaintiff submitted a copy of his inmate account statement. ECF No. 3. A review of plaintiff s account indicates an average monthly deposit of $293.00 and an average monthly balance of $65.93. Plaintiff has insufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee. Accordingly, the Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $58.63, which is 20 percent of plaintiffs average monthly deposit.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. An action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must assume the veracity of well-pleaded facts but need not accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
This Court must liberally construe complaints filed by laypeople. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). This means that “if the essence of an allegation is discernible, ” the court should “construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson's claim to be considered within the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). However, even self-represented complaints must allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). Federal courts are not required to assume facts that are not alleged, Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15, nor are they required to interpret procedural rules in order to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
Plaintiff a practicing Muslim, alleges he has been denied meals to accommodate his religious dietary needs. At all times relevant to his complaint, plaintiff was a pretrial detainee incarcerated at the Phelps County Jail (the “Jail”). Plaintiff sues four defendants in their official and individual capacities: ABL Management Inc. (“ABL”) (Food Contractor for the Jail), Heather Westerfield (Cook for ABL), Timothy Durbin (Sergeant), and Joe Taylor (Lieutenant and Jail Administrator). Plaintiff seeks monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief pursuant to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, etseq. (“RLUIPA”), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment, Equal Protection and Due Process violations.[1] Plaintiff also attempts to bring a claim under the “Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.”
Plaintiff states he completed a “Religious Meal Preference” form at the Jail and requested Kosher meals on February 24, 2020 and May 7, 2021. Plaintiff explains that the Inmate Handbook provides for religious meal preferences. Plaintiff asserts “Jail Supervisors have told [him] that the Jail has a Kosher menu.” Plaintiff alleges ABL and its employee cook, Heather Westerfield, refused to provide him with a religious diet. Plaintiff alleges Westerfield “[told] the Jail that [his] meals are Kosher” and would “lie to jail staff about [his] meals being appropriate.” For example, plaintiff states he was provided with a “bologna sandwich with cheese despite cheese on meat being in direct violation of all Kosher dietary laws.”
Plaintiff further alleges that from May 7, 2021 to May 24, 2021, he was “forced to eat [] unnutritional [sic], humiliating, [and] degrading meals.” Plaintiff states he was denied milk, protein, and eggs, and “was compelled to eat dry com flakes in a tortilla shell every morning.” Plaintiff alleges Westerfield provided him with degrading meals in retaliation for the grievances he filed with the Jail.
Plaintiff asserts he “explained to Jail Staff the abridgment of [his] rights, ” but defendants Sergeant Durbin and Lieutenant Taylor refused to provide him with Kosher meals or compel ABL to accommodate his religious requests. Plaintiff states Sergeant Durbin would call him “a liar and harass [him] in return for [him] trying to exercise his religion.” At some point, plaintiff alleges he spoke with Lieutenant Taylor's Administrative Assistant who confirmed his “meals [were] inappropriate, ” and Staff Sergeant Jackson “agreed that [the] Jail Policy [was] not being followed.” Sergeant Jackson allegedly told plaintiff that he directed Lieutenant Taylor to provide him with Kosher meals or give a valid reason for his denial. Plaintiff states if he “had been any other inmate they would have (at worst) received a vegetarian meal.”
Plaintiff further asserts the Jail does not allow Muslims to fast during Ramadan and does not recognize Muslim holidays, despite recognizing Christian holidays such as Easter and Christmas. Plaintiff does not, however, state that he personally was not permitted to fast. Plaintiff complains inmates receive candy canes at Christmas with a note “that candy canes are shepherd staffs, and an upside down ‘J' for Jesus.”
Additionally, plaintiff takes issue with the Jail's alleged refusal to grant him a hearing regarding the institutional grievances he has filed. Plaintiff states defendant Durbin “completely ignore[d his] claims” without an investigation, and defendant Taylor “will not answer [his] appeals.” Plaintiff appears to allege that his grievances were denied as retaliation for his religious accommodation requests.
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act provides, in relevant part:
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). “The Act defines ‘religious exercise' to include ‘any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.'” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 (2005) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)). “‘A person may assert a violation of [RLUIPA] as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.'” Id. at 716 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a)).
Having carefully reviewed the complaint, the Court finds that plaintiff has made a sufficient threshold showing of a substantial burden on his religious exercise to survive initial review. Plaintiff alleges he is a practicing Muslim and has stated the religious significance of a Kosher diet. Plaintiff asserts the defendants are substantially burdening the exercise of his religion by denying him access to Kosher meals on multiple occasions despite notifying them of his religious dietary needs.
Naming a government official in his or her official capacity is the equivalent of naming the government entity that employs the official. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Here, Phelps County employs defendants Sergeant Durbin and Lieutenant...
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