Monteiro v. Dep't of Justice
| Decision Date | 25 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. 18-00072-WES |
| Parties | WALTER MONTEIRO v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 by Defendant United States Department of Justice - Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") and five unnamed DEA Agents. (ECF No. 25). Plaintiff Walter Monteiro filed an Objection. (ECF No. 31). This matter has been referred to me for preliminary review, findings and recommended disposition. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); LR Cv 72(a). A hearing was held on May 13, 2020. After listening to the parties' arguments and reviewing the Memoranda and relevant case law, I recommend that the Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED.
Pursuant to Local Rule 56(a), Defendant submitted its Statement of Undisputed Facts (ECF No. 26) and Plaintiff responded by filing his Statement of Disputed Facts (ECF No. 29) as well as a Statement of Additional Undisputed Facts. (ECF No. 30). The following facts are gleaned from the parties' submissions. On February 20, 2015 Plaintiff was arrested in Providence Rhode Island. (ECF No. 26 at ¶ 1). Immediately prior to his arrest, Plaintiff was travelling in the passenger seat of a vehicle that was stopped by a marked Providence Police vehicle driven by two male uniformed Providence Police Officers. Id. ¶¶ 2, 3. Plaintiff testified that a third Officer (identified as Officer #3), was present when Plaintiff's passenger door was opened and took Plaintiff to the ground. Id. ¶ 4. Plaintiff described Officer #3 as "another cop...another police officer." Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiff testified that "as soon as he stepped out to the ground, [he] was lifted up off [his] feet"..."and slammed to the ground." Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff testified that he was grabbed by his shirt, lifted and "slammed" to the ground. Id. ¶ 7. He described this as "quick," "so quick," "instantaneously" and "only a few seconds." Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff and cannot describe Officer #3, stating that he "never got a look at him." Id. ¶ 9. A fourth Officer (identified as Officer #4), put his knee on Plaintiff's back. Id. ¶ 10. These two Officers (Officers #3 and #4) "were the only two that made physical contact with [Plaintiff]." Id. ¶ 11. The only physical force that Plaintiff alleges he was subjected to was being taken to the ground and the application of the knee to the back; Plaintiff further clarified that he was not "kneed in the back," that the contact with his back was "nothing." Id. ¶ 12. When Plaintiff was on the ground and the Officer pulled Plaintiff's arm back to place handcuffs on him, Plaintiff felt pain. Plaintiff felt pain when the handcuffs were applied. (ECF No. 30 at p. 1).
Plaintiff testified that after getting up off the ground, he was "handed...off to another Providence cop in an SUV," who "drove [Plaintiff] to the [Providence Public] Safety Complex." (ECF No. 26 at ¶ 13). That SUV was a marked Providence Police vehicle, driven by two uniformed Officers. Id. ¶ 14. The person who handcuffed Plaintiff and handed him off to the Providence Officer in the SUV was "in plainclothes" and was either Officer #3 or Officer #4. Id. ¶ 15. While Plaintiff observed some of the Officers on the scene in plainclothes or, as he phrased it, "regular clothes," with badges on, Plaintiff did not observe any badge or identifying marks onthe Officer who handed plaintiff off to the Providence Officer in the SUV. Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff "didn't see what agencies they were or anything like that." Id. ¶ 17.
After the two uniformed Providence Officers transported him to the Providence Public Safety Complex, Plaintiff was seen by a Providence Police Sergeant and transported, again by the same two Providence Police Officers, to Roger Williams Hospital for examination and treatment. Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff does not assert that any DEA personnel were involved in any of these actions. Hospital records indicate that Plaintiff was discharged from Roger Williams Hospital at 7:48 p.m., approximately two hours after his arrest. Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff testified that his only known interaction with anyone from the DEA was with an individual he referred to as "DEA guy" who was present the next day (February 21, 2015) at the Providence Public Safety complex with Providence Police personnel at an attempt to question him. The "DEA guy" did not provide him with any information about DEA's involvement in his arrest. Id. ¶ 22.
On February 15, 2017, Plaintiff, in fact, sent an administrative tort claim to the DEA. Id. ¶ 23. That submission, titled "Presentment of SF-95 Claim for Damage, Injury, or Death," asserted tort claims based on the events of Plaintiff's arrest, arguing that "the arresting Providence Police officers and/or DEA agents used excessive force in apprehending him," specifically based on the assertion that plaintiff "was lifted off the ground and thrown down to the pavement," and that he was diagnosed later that evening at the hospital "with a left clavicle fracture." Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiff's administrative tort claim was accompanied by over one hundred pages of accompanying exhibits, including the Providence Police arrest report, documents from Plaintiff's criminal prosecution in state court, and medical records. These records detailed, inter alia, that, on February 20, 2015, Plaintiff engaged in the sale of crack cocaine, receiving $300.00 in DEAmarked and serialized currency, that he was arrested "by PPD/DEA at the intersection of Gifford Street/Laban Street;" that he was found, on arrest, to be in possession of DEA marked currency from the crack sale. Id. ¶ 25.
Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this action on February 19, 2018. Id. ¶ 26. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he was subjected to excessive force during this arrest, purportedly at the hands of the Providence Police Department and DEA personnel. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that, during his apprehension and arrest, he was lifted off the ground and then dropped to the pavement, resulting in a fracture to his left clavicle and other injuries. According to Plaintiff, the DEA Agents were (or at least should have been) aware that he had an unspecified condition affecting his right arm that should have precluded them from using what he alleges was excessive force. Plaintiff also alleged that he asked to be taken to a hospital after his arrest on February 20, 2015, but that he was instead taken to the Providence Police Department's Central Station; he did go on to allege, however, that he was ultimately taken to a hospital for examination and treatment. Id. ¶ 27.
Plaintiff pleaded that he filed an administrative tort claim with the United States regarding this incident. Plaintiff's Complaint asserted six separate theories of liability as to the DEA and the five "Doe" Defendants, sounding either in tort or based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The tort claims are set forth in Count I: Negligence, Count II: Intentional Tort and Count III: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; each of these three counts is pled as to the five "John Doe" Defendants. The Section 1983 claims are asserted against the five "Doe" Defendants in Count IV, and the DEA itself in Count VI. Count V, which purports to assert a respondeat superior claim as to the DEA, contains language that could arguably be read to plead either tort or constitutional claims. Id. ¶28. The parties appeared for a Rule 16 conference before the Honorable Lincoln D. Almond, United States Magistrate Judge, on September 12, 2018. Id. ¶ 29. At the September 12, 2018 Rule 16 conference, the United States identified the arresting Agent, on the record, as DEA Special Agent Alan J. Sims. Id. ¶ 30.
On November 1, 2018, the United States duly served Plaintiff with its initial disclosures in this case, identifying, as required, the names of witnesses (including seven DEA witnesses) likely to have discoverable information relevant to Plaintiff's claims. The first of these witnesses was Special Agent Sims; in the description of the subjects as to which he had information required by Rule 26(a) stated that "Special Agent Sims placed Plaintiff under arrest on or about February 20, 2015." Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff responded to written Interrogatories propounded by both the DEA and the individual Defendants in City of Providence. Id. ¶ 33. Among those discovery requests, Defendant DEA requested, via Interrogatory, that Plaintiff identify, in full and complete detail, "any injuries, disabilities, or other physical, emotional, and/or mental health conditions," allegedly resulting from the events alleged in the Complaint. Id. ¶ 34. This Interrogatory also specifically asked Plaintiff to "identify each person or persons who you allege inflicted or was responsible for the injury/condition," alleged. Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff did not object to the Interrogatory. His Response identified no mental health or emotional injuries of any kind, nor did it identify or describe any individuals responsible for his purported injuries. Instead, it repeated, nearly verbatim (substituting "I" for "Mr. Monteiro") the factual narrative contained in his SF-95 administrative tort claim. Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiff was similarly asked to identify, in an additional Interrogatory seeking the names of facilities, physicians, "psychiatrist[s], psychologist[s], social worker[s], therapist[s]...or other medical, psychological or mental health care personnel," whotreated him. In response, Plaintiff did not identify any instances of treatment for any emotional injury or resulting physical symptoms; instead, he identified only the physical injuries he claims to have incurred during arrest. Id. ¶ 37. Plaintiff's Responses to the Interrogatories propounded by Defendant Robles in the City of Providence matter similarly failed to identify any psychological or mental injury...
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