Montgomery Cnty. Career Fire Fighters Ass'n v. Montgomery Cnty.

• Citation: 62 A.3d 287,210 Md.App. 200
• Decision Date: 04 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. 1933,Sept. Term, 2011.,1933
• Parties: MONTGOMERY COUNTY CAREER FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, et al. v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, Maryland, et al.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

210 Md.App. 200

62 A.3d 287

MONTGOMERY COUNTY CAREER FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, et al.

v.MONTGOMERY COUNTY, Maryland, et al.

No. 1933, Sept. Term, 2011.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

March 4, 2013.

Molly A. Elkin (Kurt T. Rumsfeld, Woodley & McGillivary, on the brief), Washington, D.C., for Appellant.

Edward B. Lattner, Chief (Marc P. Hansen, County Attorney, on the brief), Rockville, MD., for Appellee.

Panel: WRIGHT, HOTTEN, and JAMES R. EYLER, (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

WRIGHT, J.

This appeal arises from appellee, Montgomery County Executive Isiah Leggett's (“County Executive's”), failure to include sufficient funds to implement a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between Montgomery County and the appellant, Montgomery County Career Fire Fighters Association (“Fire Fighters”), in the proposed budget for Fiscal Year 2012 (“FY12”). The Fire Fighters filed a prohibited practice charge against the County Executive accusing him of violating §§ 33–147, 33–153(k), 33–153( l ), 33–154(a)(1), and 33–154(a)(8) of the Montgomery County Code (“MCC”). On May 17, 2011, the Montgomery County Labor Relations Administrator (“LRA”) found that while the County Executive had violated the MCC labor relations provisions, those actions did not constitute prohibited practices under Montgomery County Circuit Court precedent. The Fire Fighters filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County which dismissed the petition as moot. This timely appeal followed.

Questions Presented

The Fire Fighters ask us to determine the following:

1. Did the Circuit Court err in dismissing the Appellant's judicial review petition on grounds that it is moot?

2. Did the [LRA] err in ruling, based on an erroneous decision of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, that Appellees did not commit prohibited practices pursuant to Chapter 33, Article X of the Montgomery County Code when County Executive Isiah Leggett failed to include funding sufficient to implement the collective bargaining agreement between Appellant and Montgomery County, Maryland as required by the interest arbitration decision of Impasse Neutral M. David Vaughn, in his Fiscal Year 2012 Proposed Budget Submission to the Montgomery County Council?

Finding that the LRA's decision was based on a correct interpretation of the law and the circuit court erred in dismissing the Union's petition as moot, we reverse the circuit court's judgment.

Facts and Procedural History

The facts in this case are undisputed. The Fire Fighters are the exclusive bargaining representative for Montgomery County employees classified as Fire Fighter/Rescuer II, Fire Fighter/Rescuer III, Master Fire Fighter/Rescuer, Fire/Rescue Lieutenant, and Fire/Rescue Captain. This union and Montgomery County (the “County”) were parties to a CBA in effect from June 1, 2008, through June 30, 2008 (“2008 CBA”).

Pursuant to MCC §§ 33–147 to 33–157, the parties began negotiating a successor to the 2008 CBA in November 2010. Upon reaching an impasse, the parties submitted the dispute to an impasse neutral (the “Neutral”). The parties were required by the MCC to submit their last, best, final offers (“LBFO”) to the Neutral for the Neutral to review and decide which LBFO was the most reasonable. In making a conclusion, the Neutral was regulated by MCC § 33–153(i), which stated the following:

(1) In determining which final offer is the more reasonable, the impasse neutral must first evaluate and give the highest priority to the ability of the County to pay for additional short-term and long-term expenditures by considering:

(A) the limits on the County's ability to raise taxes under State law and the County Charter;

(B) the added burden on County taxpayers, if any, resulting from increases in revenues needed to fund a final offer; and

(C) the County's ability to continue to provide the current standard of all public services.

(2) After evaluating the ability of the County to pay under paragraph (1), the impasse neutral may only consider:

(A) the interest and welfare of County taxpayers and service recipients;

(B) past collective bargaining agreements between the parties, including the past bargaining history that led to each agreement;

(C) wages, hours, benefits and conditions of employment of similar employees of other public employers in the Washington Metropolitan Area and in Maryland;

(D) wages, hours, benefits, and conditions of employment of other Montgomery County employees; and

(E) wages, benefits, hours, and other working conditions of similar employees of private employers in Montgomery County.

On March 1, 2011, the Neutral found that the Fire Fighter's LBFO, which proposed no changes from the 2008 CBA, was the more reasonable offer. Under MCC § 33–153(k), the LBFO selected by the Neutral became the final agreement between the parties (“2011 Agreement”). MCC § 33–153( l ) further states:

In each proposed annual operating budget, the County Executive must describe any collective bargaining agreement or amendment to an agreement that is scheduled to take effect in the next fiscal year and estimate the cost of implementing that agreement. The annual operating budget must include sufficient funds to pay for the items in the parties' final agreement. The employer must expressly identify to the Council by April 1, unless extenuating circumstances require a later date, all terms and conditions in the agreement that:

(1) require an appropriation of funds, or

(2) are inconsistent with any County law or regulation, or

(3) require the enactment or adoption of any County law or regulation, or

(4) which have or may have a present or future fiscal impact.

If a later submission is necessary, the employer must specify the submission date and the reasons for delay to the Council President by April 1. The employer must make a good faith effort to have the council take action to implement all terms and conditions in the parties' final agreement.

On March 15, 2011, the date required for budget submission by § 303 of the Montgomery County Charter (“Charter”), the County Executive submitted a proposed budget (“FY12 Budget”) to the Council that did not include sufficient funds to implement the 2011 Agreement. On March 23, 2011, the Fire Fighters filed a prohibited practice charge pursuant to MCC § 33–154, with LRA Homer LaRue, based on the County Executive's action. The Fire Fighters requested an expedited hearing and pre-hearing briefing because the Council was required by Charter § 305 to approve an annual operating budget by June 1, 2011.

On March 30, 2011, the LRA established an expedited briefing schedule. Oral argument was heard regarding the charge on May 4, 2011. Before the LRA issued a decision, the County provided the LRA with a copy of the circuit court decision in Mont. Cnty. Exec. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Mont. Cnty., Case No. 346969(“ FOP Decision”).¹ In the FOP Decision, the trial judge reversed a finding by the Permanent Umpire that the County Executive had committed prohibited practices by refusing to include the CBA between the FOP and the County with sufficient funding in the FY12 Budget.

On May 17, 2011, the LRA issued a decision finding that the County Executive's actions of informing the Council about the 2011 Agreement did not satisfy the requirements of MCC § 33–153( l ), and that the MCC provisions regulating the County Executive's budget submissions could be harmonized with Charter §§ 303 and 510A. Nevertheless, the LRA concluded that he was bound by the FOP Decision and was, therefore, “required to order” that the County Executive did not violate MCC §§ 33–147, 33–157(k), 33–153(1), 33–154(a)(1), and 33–154(a)(8). The LRA disagreed with the circuit court's conclusion in the FOP Decision that the separation of powers doctrine prohibited the Council from mandating that the County Executive include specific funding in the budget.

On May 18, 2011, the Fire Fighters filed a Petition for Judicial Review (“Petition”). On May 26, 2011, the Council approved the County's final operating budget for fiscal year 2012, which did not include funding to implement the 2011 Agreement. On September 16, 2011, during oral argument on the Petition, the County told the trial court that it would not move to dismiss the case on the ground of mootness because the case presented a matter capable of repetition, yet evading judicial review. On October 16, 2011, the parties filed a joint brief urging the trial court not to dismiss the Petition. However, on October 17, 2011, the trial court entered an Order dismissing the Petition as moot and noting that resolution of the issues, specifically the interpretation of the MCC and Charter provisions, were “best left to the appellate courts.” The Fire Fighters filed the instant appeal on October 31, 2011.

Additional facts will be discussed in the relevant sections below.

Standard of Review

The parties urge us to apply the usual standard of review of administrative agency decisions. Under this standard, the appellate court's role is identical to that of the circuit court, and we review the agency, or in this case, the LRA's decision. Long Green Valley Ass'n v. Prigel Family Creamery, 206 Md.App. 264, 273–74, 47 A.3d 1087 (2012). As such, our review is limited to determining if the agency's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and “no error of law exists.” Id. The agency's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Generally, we accord some deference to the agency when it is interpreting the statutes it administers. Md. Aviation Admin. v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 572, 873 A.2d 1145 (2005). However, here the issue lies not with the collective bargaining statutes themselves, but with an interpretation of the Charter and the Council's ability to limit the County Executive's budgetary discretion. Therefore, no deference is required.

The Court of Appeals reminds us, in Balt. Cnty. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 4 v. Balt....