Montgomery County v. McDonald

• Decision Date: 01 September 1988
• Docket Number: No. 190,190
• Citation: 549 A.2d 766,77 Md.App. 153
• Parties: MONTGOMERY COUNTY, Maryland, et al. v. James W. McDONALD, Jr. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 153

77 Md.App. 153

549 A.2d 766

MONTGOMERY COUNTY, Maryland, et al. v. James W. McDONALD, Jr.

No. 190, Sept. Term, 1988.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Nov. 7, 1988.

Alfred J. Dirska (Dirska & Levin, on the brief), Columbia, for appellants.

Thomas L. Heeney (Heeney, Armstrong & Heeney, on the brief), Rockville, for appellee.

Argued before GILBERT, C.J., and BISHOP and GARRITY, JJ.

GILBERT, Chief Judge.

The Workers' Compensation Act, Md.Ann.Code art. 101, provides in § 26(b) that "[w]henever a disability from an occupational disease occurs to any employee it shall be the duty of the employer ... to at once report such disability to the Commission...." (Emphasis supplied.) The Act, however, neither defines the phrase "at once" nor does it expressly provide sanctions against the employer for failure to comply with its clarion command.

In the matter sub judice we shall explore the meaning of the phrase "at once" and determine what, if any, sanctions are to be imposed against an employer who fails to carry out the statutorily imposed duty.

From the statement of facts, we learn that on August 23 and September 5 of 1984, James W. McDonald filed workers' compensation claims against his employer, the Montgomery County Police Department, and its insurer, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company. In the first claim, McDonald asserted that on August 5, 1977 he sustained an occupational disease, a heart attack, which arose out of and in the course of his employment with the police department. The subsequent claim arose from a heart attack that occurred on August 1, 1984. McDonald averred that it, too, was the result of an occupational disease.

Both cases were heard before the Commission, which found that McDonald had indeed sustained an occupational disease as a result of the heart attack on August 5, 1977. Notwithstanding that finding, the Commission decided that the first claim was barred by the statute of limitations, and that the employer's failure to file an Employer's First Report of Injury "at once" did not extend the time for filing the employee's claim. Additionally, the Commission held that McDonald's second claim was causally related to the first and thus was also barred by limitations. Dissatisfied by the Commission's decision, McDonald sought redress in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, where Judge Irma Raker reversed the Commission. Montgomery County, aggrieved by Judge Raker's order, has prosecuted this appeal.

The single issue presented is whether the trial court erred in concluding that McDonald's claim was not barred by the statute of limitations because of Montgomery County's neglect to adhere to the hest of Md.Ann.Code art. 101, § 26(b) and "at once" file a disability report with the Commission.

THE FACTS

McDonald contends that despite his failure to file a claim within two years from the date he suffered an occupational disease his claims are nonetheless timely. He argues that the statutory two year period of limitations was tolled by the County's failure to report "at once" to the Commission that he had sustained a disability from an occupational disease. Md.Ann.Code art. 101, § 26(b). That section provides, in pertinent part:

"Whenever a disability from an occupational disease occurs to any employee it shall be the duty of the employer promptly upon obtaining knowledge or notice thereof, to at once report such disability to the Commission.... Such report shall state (1) the time, cause and nature of the disability, and the probable duration; (2) whether the disability from an occupational disease arose out of and in the course of the injured person's employment; (3) any other matters the rules and regulations of the Commission may prescribe." (Emphasis supplied.)

McDonald acknowledges that, even though § 26(b) requires the employer "to at once report" to the Commission any disability incurred by an employee from an occupational disease, the statute is silent as what, if any, sanctions are to be invoked in the event the employer fails to comply. He argues that the tolling provision of Md.Ann.Code art. 101, § 38(c) applies. Under the provisions of § 38(c), limitations will not begin to run against a claimant if an employer fails to report an accident causing disability once he has obtained notice of the injury. McDonald reasons that the estoppel feature of § 38(c) is applicable to § 26(b). Although we disagree with McDonald's application of the § 38(c) feature to § 26(b), we, nevertheless, concur with his "bottom line" conclusion that, when an employer violates the notice provision of § 26(b), the statute of limitations is tolled.

THE LAW

The Legislature in 1939 passed House Bill 484, which added ten sections to article 101 of the Annotated Code of Maryland. 1939 Md.Laws, ch. 465. One of those, § 32F, is presently codified as § 26(b). Forty-nine years after the original enactment of § 32F, the Governor's Study Commission on Workmen's Compensation Coverage ¹ identified the exact problem with § 26(b) that now faces this Court. See Report of the Governor's Study Commission on Workmen's Compensation Coverage (1980). The Study Commission suggested that the Legislature enact an amendment to § 26(b), which would have provided "Limitations should not begin to run against a claimant or his representative who has given notice to his employer until the employer has submitted a report of the employee's death or disability due to an occupational disease to the Workmen's Compensation Commission."

That same year the Study Commission's suggestion was incorporated into Senate Bill 973 and assigned to that body's Economic Affairs Committee. The bill, however, to use the vernacular, "died in committee."

Faced with an enigma the Legislature has failed to solve, we must interpret what sanctions, if any, that august body intended to impose upon an employer who fails to comply with the notice requirement of § 26(b).

We look, in construing legislation, at the carefully crafted guidelines that have become anchored in the case law. A fundamental precept of those guidelines requires us to construe statutes reasonably and with reference to the legislative purpose sought to be accomplished. Comptroller v. John C. Louis Co., 285 Md. 527, 538-39, 404 A.2d 1045 (1979). Because it is unquestionably social legislation, the Workers' Compensation Act is liberally construed so that its beneficial protection of injured workers may be achieved. Bayshore Industries v. Ziats, 232 Md. 167, 173-74, 192 A.2d 487 (1963); W.C. & A.N. Miller Dev. Co. v. Honaker, 40 Md.App. 185, 189, 388 A.2d 562 (1978); R. Gilbert & R. Humphreys, Jr., Maryland Workers' Compensation Handbook § 2.2-1 (1988). "Any uncertainty in the law should be resolved in favor of the claimant." Howard Co. Ass'n Retard. Cit. v. Walls, 288 Md. 526, 530, 418 A.2d 1210 (1980).

To determine what sanctions, if any, the Legislature intended when it enacted § 26(b), we turn for guidance to the words of similar provisions. Md.Ann.Code art. 101, § 38 provides, in pertinent part:

"(b) ... Whenever an accident causing disability for a period of more than three days following the happening of such accident occurs to any employee, it shall be the duty of the employer within ten (10) days after the receipt of notice of such accident, oral or written, to report such accident and injury resulting therefrom to the Commission. Such report shall state (1) the time, cause and nature of the accident and injuries, and the probable duration of the injury resulting therefrom; (2) whether the accident arose out of and in the course of the injured person's employment; (3) any other matters and rules and regulations as the...