Montgomery County v. Schooley
| Decision Date | 01 September 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 1645,1645 |
| Citation | 627 A.2d 69,97 Md.App. 107 |
| Parties | MONTGOMERY COUNTY, Maryland, et al. v. James SCHOOLEY, et al. , |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Charles Michael Tobin (Stephanie L. Schwartz, Deborah M. Mulligan and Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Shriver, on the brief), Washington, DC, for appellees.
Argued before WILNER, C.J., and HARRELL and GETTY (JAMES S., Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
In an action filed in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, appellees challenged the councilmanic redistricting plan adopted by the County Council following the 1990 census. We are not concerned here with the validity of that plan, which has yet to be determined by the circuit court, but only with a discovery matter that arose during the litigation. The plaintiffs sought to take the deposition of a member of the County Council, Isiah Leggett; the County moved for a protective order blocking that deposition; the court denied the motion; and the County appealed. The two issues before us are (1) whether the County may appeal the denial of its motion, and (2) if so, whether the court erred in its ruling.
The Montgomery County Charter provides for a County Council of nine persons. Four of those persons are elected from the County at large. The other five are elected from councilmanic districts, the boundaries of which are to be redetermined every ten years following the national census. The redistricting process is set forth in § 104 of the Charter. Essentially, it provides for the appointment of a bi-partisan Commission on Redistricting to prepare a "plan of councilmanic In accordance with this procedure, a Commission was appointed following the 1990 census. On or about November 1, 1991, the Commission presented its plan and an explanatory report to the Council. Submitted with the plan and report were two minority reports presenting redistricting boundaries that were different than those recommended by a majority of the Commission. At the request of the Council's two Republican members, these minority reports were put into legislative form and, on November 7, 1991, they were introduced as bills. One of them was Bill No. 56-91.
districts," and to present that plan, together with a report explaining it, to the County Council. The Council is required to hold a public hearing on the plan within 30 days after receiving it, and "[i]f within ninety days following presentation of the commission's plan no other law reestablishing the boundaries of the councilmanic districts has been enacted, then the plan, as submitted, shall become law."
The challenge mounted by appellees arises from what occurred to Bill No. 56-91. Upon its presentation on November 7, Councilman Hanna offered amendments to the bill deleting the councilmanic districts contained in the bill and, with certain exceptions, replacing them with boundary descriptions similar to those proposed by the Commission. In the view of the County, the Hanna amendments were ultimately adopted and the bill, as so amended, was passed by the Council and signed by the County Executive. In their four-count complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, appellees contended, essentially, that (1) the Hanna amendments were not validly adopted, and (2) if the bill did contain those amendments, it was unconstitutional.
The first contention, as set forth in the complaint, was premised on the assertions that (1) at the November 7 meeting of the Council, the Hanna proposals were not presented as formal written amendments but were merely orally described; (2) although the Council held its mandatory public hearing on the Commission report and Bill No. 56-91 on November 26, 1991, the Hanna proposals were "not noticed for public hearing In May, 1992, the defendants--the County, the County Executive, the County Council, and the County election board--having previously answered the complaint, moved for summary judgment. In June, the parties were notified that a hearing on those motions was scheduled for September 28, 1992. On September 4, appellees noted the deposition of Councilman Leggett, who apparently had served as President of the Council during its consideration of Bill No. 56-91, to take place September 24 "for the purpose of discovery, or for use as evidence, or both." The County filed a motion for protective order, alleging that "[t]he deposition of a councilmember regarding issues surrounding the enactment of legislation should not be permitted, as it would violate the legislative privilege afforded to Mr. Leggett as a member of the County Council" and that Leggett's deposition "is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
and never became the subject of a public hearing" as required by the County Charter and the Council's own Rule; (3) the Council held a "work session" on December 3, 1991, but no attempt was made at that session to amend Bill No. 56-91; and (4) although on December 10, 1991, the Council purported to approve Bill No. 56-91 "as previously amended," in fact the bill had not been amended. From this, appellees urged that the bill actually passed by the Council and signed by the County Executive was the original version of Bill No. 56-91, exclusive of the Hanna amendments. 1
In their response to the County's motion, appellees contended that (1) the County had no standing to raise Mr. Leggett's legislative privilege, (2) the legislative privilege should not, in any event, prevent them from obtaining information relevant to the case, and (3) they were not seeking information as to "legislative intent" but rather information "about the procedural aspects of the enactment" of the legislation. In that last regard, they asserted that they sought from Mr. Leggett evidence "corroborating among other things claims that there were 'factors present, not of record, which influenced the Council.' " Rather than blocking the deposition entirely, they argued, the proper approach would be to allow Mr. Leggett, who neither sought a protective order on his own nor opposed the County's request for one, to assert his legislative privilege on a question-by-question basis, as he saw fit. It appears that the court agreed with one or more of these arguments, for, on September 24, 1992, it denied the County's motion and directed that the deposition proceed. The County filed an immediate appeal and, we are told, the deposition has been postponed pending this appeal.
Appellees have moved to dismiss this appeal on the ground that the County has not been aggrieved by the court's order. The sole basis of the motion for protective order was Mr. Leggett's legislative privilege which, they say, is personal to him and which he could interpose either through his own motion for protective order or by refusing to answer specific questions. Because the County, in their view, had no right to assert vicariously Mr. Leggett's privilege, it cannot be harmed by the rejection of its motion. The argument is essentially one of "standing," although appellees do not use that word in articulating it. In support, they cite Kreatchman v. Ramsburg, 224 Md. 209, 167 A.2d 345 (1961); Jabine v. Priola, 45 Md.App. 218, 412 A.2d 1277 (1980); and Harris v. Brinkley, 33 Md.App. 508, 365 A.2d 304 (1976).
Those cases simply express the well-established principle that only persons with a legally cognizable interest in the proceeding are entitled to appeal from judgments entered by a trial court. None of them addressed the issue here. The Court of Appeals did address that issue, however, in a manner wholly inconsistent with appellees' position, in Public Service Comm'n v. Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. 200, 477 A.2d 759 (1984). The substantive issue there was whether individual members of the Public Service Commission could be required to appear for pre-trial depositions in an action for judicial review of a Commission order. The petitioners in that action noted the depositions of the Commissioners, the Commission moved for a protective order, and, when the motion was denied, the Commission and the State appealed. The threshold question was whether they had the right to appeal the denial of the motion.
The Court viewed that preliminary question in terms of whether the order itself was appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The standing issue did not escape its attention, however. After stating at 205, 477 A.2d 759 that "[t]he threshold question is whether the Commission and the State may appeal from the trial court's discovery order," it held, in a footnote to that statement:
See also Dept. of Social Services v. Stein, 328 Md. 1, 12, 612 A.2d 880 (1992).
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Gill v. Ripley
...denied, 342 U.S. 843, 72 S.Ct. 20, 96 L.Ed. 637 (1951); Mandel v. O'Hara, 320 Md. 103, 576 A.2d 766 (1990); Montgomery County v. Schooley, 97 Md.App. 107, 627 A.2d 69 (1993). Immunity for executive officials arose later and has been modified over time. Initially, it too was cast as absolute......
-
State Of Md. v. Holton
...the State's argument that local legislators are only entitled to legislative immunity in civil cases. Citing Montgomery County v. Schooley, 97 Md.App. 107, 627 A.2d 69 (1993), the court determined that appellee, a local legislator, was entitled to the protections of common law legislative i......
-
Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery Cnty. Lodge 35 v. Montgomery Cnty. Exec.
...government officials or, in the case of Mont. Cnty. v. Schooley, involved deposing a member of the legislative branch. 97 Md.App. 107, 108, 627 A.2d 69 (1993). See Mandel v. O'Hara, 320 Md. 103, 576 A.2d 766 (1990); Dist. Heights v. Denny, 123 Md.App. 508, 719 A.2d 998 (1998). The Court of ......
-
Myers v. Town of Colmar Manor
...immunity provisions, which apply only to the members of legislative bodies mentioned within them." Montgomery County v. Schooley , 97 Md.App. 107, 627 A.2d 69, 73 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (emphasis added). However, over time "[t]he doctrine articulated in those provisions has ... been rega......