Montgomery County Welfare Bd. v. Donnally

• Decision Date: 17 May 1950
• Docket Number: 175.
• Parties: MONTGOMERY COUNTY WELFARE BOARD v. DONNALLY.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

73 A.2d 505

195 Md. 442

MONTGOMERY COUNTY WELFARE BOARD v. DONNALLY.

No. 175.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

May 17, 1950

Plummer M. Shearin, Asst. County Atty. Montgomery County, Rockville (David Macdonald, County Atty. Montgomery County, Rockville, on the brief), for appellant.

No brief and no appearance for appellee.

Before MARBURY, C J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON, HENDERSON and MARKELL JJ.

GRASON, Judge.

The Montgomery County Welfare Board alleges it advanced the sum of $2,014.30 to Mary Lyles Potts during her lifetime. Upon her death Letters of Administration were granted on her estate by the Orphans' Court of Montgomery County to Lydia Lyles Donnally, Administratrix. The Board filed a claim for the money so advanced, in the estate in the Orphans' Court and payment thereof was refused by the Administratrix. Thereupon the Montgomery County Welfare Board sued Lydia Lyles Donnally, Administratrix of the estate of Mary Lyles Potts, deceased, for the sum so advanced, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The Administratrix demurred to the declaration and set up as grounds for her demurrer that the Welfare Board is without authority to sue the estate for this claim, and the court sustained the demurrer.

In an opinion filed in the case the court stated, in effect, that the Board is given direct authority to sue under section 16 of Article 70A of the 1939 Code for reimbursement for assistance granted under that section, but that under section 17 of said Article the Board is not given authority to sue the estate of one who received assistance from the Board during his lifetime, and holds that 'the proper place to file a 'claim' against an estate is in the Orphans' Court', and that if the claim is established in that court it "shall be allowed". The opinion further states: 'The proper procedure would seem to be for the Welfare Board to petition the Orphans' Court to direct the administratrix to allow the claim. If any, or all, of the advancements by disputed the matter could be disposed of by the Orphans' Court upon submission by the parties; and, if they do not care to submit the same, issues could be framed and sent to the law court, which would settle whether or not any advancements were made. If found to have been made, they would be allowed as a claim; if not, they would be disallowed.'

It may be stated that the Orphans' Court is not a court of general jurisdiction, but its jurisdiction is limited and prescribed. Its authority is prescribed by law, and what is not so prescribed it does not possess. Townshend v. Brooke, 9 Gill 90; Lowe v. Lowe, 6 Md. 347; Fowler v Brady, 110 Md. 204, 73 A. 15; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Freud, 115 Md. 29, 80 A. 603; Mudge v. Mudge, 155 Md. 1, 141 A. 396; Hopper v. Hopkins, 162 Md. 448, 160 A. 166; Marbury v. Ward, 163 Md. 330, 162 A. 919; Greenhawk v. Quimby, 168 Md. 396, 177 A. 537; Baldwin v. Hopkins, 171 Md. 97, 187 A. 884; Phillips v. Phillips' Estate, 179 Md. 583, 19 A.2d 839; Barrett v. Clark, 189 Md. 116, 54 A.2d 128, 173 A.L.R. 988.

If a claim is filed against an estate being administered in the Orphans' Court and the representative of that estate refuses payment, the Orphans' Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim and the claimant must institute suit on the claim against the personal representative in a court of law.

In Marbury v. Ward, supra, this court said [163 Md. 330, 162 A. 921]: 'It is well settled that the Orphans' Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and has only such powers as are expressly given by statute which do not include the right to decide between an executor and third parties.' See authorities there cited. Strasbaugh v. Dallam, 93 Md. 712, 50 A. 417.

And when the administratrix refused to allow the claim of the Welfare Board, the Board was required to bring suit within nine months after the claim was refused by the administratrix. Art. 93, sec. 112, 1939 Code.

And 'no administrator shall be obliged to discharge any claim of which vouchers and proofs shall be exhibited as aforesaid, but may reject and at law dispute the same, in case he shall have reason to believe that the deceased never owed the debt or had discharged the same or a part thereof or had a claim in bar.' Art. 93, sec. 104, 1939 Code.

The passing of a claim in an estate by the Orphans' Court is not conclusive on the personal representative. He may, at his own option, contest it and compel the claimant to resort to law to enforce payment; nor can the Orphans' Court restrain him from so doing. Bowie v. Ghiselin, 30 Md. 553. See Levering v. Levering, 64 Md. 399, 2 A. 1. See Houck v. Houck, 112 Md. 122, 76 A. 581.

Article 70A, (Old Age Assistance) sec. 16, 1947 Supplement to the Code, provides that in case one who has received assistance from the Board 'becomes possessed of any property or income in excess of the amount stated in the application, it shall be the duty of the recipient immediately to notify the County Department of the receipt or possession of such property or income and the County Department may, after investigation, either cancel the assistance or alter the amount thereof in accordance with the circumstances. Any assistance paid before the recipient has come into possession of such property or income and in excess of his need shall be recoverable by the County Department as a debt due. * * *'

Section 17 of said Article provides: 'On the death of any recipient, the total amount of assistance paid under this Article shall be allowed as a claim against the estate. * * *'

Section 16 provides for the recovery of the difference between the property or income received by the recipient and the amount received from the Board as assistance 'as a debt due.' It does not affirmatively provide that the Board can bring suit in such case; neither does section 17 affirmatively provide that the Board can bring suit on a claim filed against the estate of one who has received assistance from the Board during his lifetime. The provision in section 16, that the amount is recoverable by the County Department as a 'debt due', and in section 17, that the amount allowed as assistance during the lifetime of a recipient 'shall be allowed as a claim against the estate', would be perfectly idle and useless if the Board could not sue in a court of law for the debt or for the claim against a recipient's estate.

Under Article 88A section 2A, 1947 Supplement to the Code, the State Department of Public Welfare is 'the central,...