Montgomery Light & Traction Co. v. King

• Decision Date: 30 June 1914
• Docket Number: 122
• Citation: 65 So. 998,187 Ala. 619
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: MONTGOMERY LIGHT & TRACTION CO. v. KING.

65 So. 998

187 Ala. 619

MONTGOMERY LIGHT & TRACTION CO. v. KING.

No. 122

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 30, 1914

Appeal from City Court of Montgomery; Armstead Brown, Judge.

Action by Marian King, by her next friend, against the Montgomery Light & Traction Company. From a judgment setting aside a verdict for plaintiff and granting a new trial, defendant appeals. Reversed and rendered.

The suit was for injuries consisting in the severing of the toes on the right foot and the mutilating of the left foot of a girl about 11 years old. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $2,500, which, on motion, the court set aside as excessively small and granted plaintiff a new trial.

Rushton Williams & Crenshaw, of Montgomery, for appellant.

Goodwyn & McIntyre, of Montgomery, for appellee.

DE GRAFFENRIED, J.

We quote with approval the following excerpt from the opinion in Moseley v. Jamison, 68 Miss. 336, 8 So. 745, as expressive of the law:

"It may be conceded that where there is no standard for measuring damages, and no certain rule can be prescribed for the guidance of the jury, the court should not ordinarily grant a new trial, although the damages awarded by the jury appear to be manifestly too small. In such case of incertitude in the measure of damages, the matter must be left to the discretion of the jury, nor should its verdict be disturbed on its finding, *** except in those cases where it has been plainly produced by prejudice or passion or other improper motive."

The above doctrine was announced by this court in National Surety Co. v. Mabry, 139 Ala. 217, 35 So. 698.

2. The above rule, applied to the facts of this case, makes our duty plain. In this case the law has fixed no standard for the admeasurement of damages by a jury. Damages, in such cases are left by the law to the sound discretion of the jury, and in such a case, under the law, the verdict of a jury should not be disturbed upon the ground of excessiveness or inadequacy, "except in those cases where it has been plainly produced by passion, prejudice, or other improper motive." The amount allowed the plaintiff by the jury in this case was substantial and was not so greatly inadequate as to indicate that the jury, in fixing the amount, was actuated by improper motives.

The injuries to the plaintiff were serious, painful, and permanent; but, as the law is, in such a case, unable to furnish a certain rule for the...