Montgomery v. Branon
| Decision Date | 13 December 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 1053,1053 |
| Parties | Charles L. MONTGOMERY et al. v. W. Barry BRANON et al. |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Clayton H. Kinney, Rutland, for plaintiffs.
Hanford Davis, Brandon, for defendants.
Before HOLDEN, C. J., SHANGRAW, BARNEY and KEYSER, JJ., and DIVOLL, Superior Judge.
The plaintiffs have brought suit, on the basis of a record title acquired in 1952, to oust the defendants from lands held by them under a claim of right going back forty years. The issue is the sufficiency of the defendants' claim of title by adverse possession.
About 1921 or 1922 a man named Scott built a camp on Hinkum Pond, which is still standing. A year or two later he was deeded about a quarter of an acre of land surrounding the building and upon which it sits. Through subsequent deeds to various users and occupiers of the camp property, the premises have been transferred to certain persons who are defendants in this litigation. These conveyances have all been recorded in the land records of Sudbury, the town where the camp is located. Access to the property was over an old road by permission of some landowners named Ramp.
In 1952, knowing of the presence of the camp, the plaintiff purchased record title to most of the land involved, including that upon which the camp sits, from the Central Vermont Public Service Corporation. In 1953, by warranty deed, they acquired title in fee simple to the Ramp road. In 1954 they bought other property to the west of their first purchase, which took in the balance of the defendants' quarter-acre. In 1957 the plaintiffs made it known to the defendants that they challenged their title. Thereafter, they began this suit. Since the beginning of this litigation the plaintiffs have also acquired the half interest of the Maroneys, two of the original defendants.
Left at issue now is a one-half interest in the camp and environs. The defendants concede superior record title in the plaintiffs and rely entirely on adverse possession. The county court's judgment order recognized their claim only as to the cottage itself and the land beneath the building The defendants claim error in that they view the facts as establishing sufficient occupancy of the quarter-acre as to validate their claim to all, or nearly all, of it.
The land in the vicinity of the cottage is described as open, unenclosed land, grown up to saplings, brush and second-growth trees. The surrounding area is open, unenclosed woodlands. The camp has been seasonally, but regularly, occupied as a summer cottage and fishing and hunting camp. Below the rocky bluff or cliff in front of the camp and upon which it is located, on the shore of the pond, docks have been maintained for many years, and boats of the occupants of the camp tied up.
There is an unenclosed roadway, wide enough for a car to travel, leading from the Ramp road to the pond in the vicinity of the dock. It has been used occasionally by the defendants to put their boat in the water. Others have also used this road. A well worn and clearly visible footpath leads from the kitchen door of the camp to the pond. Another such path leads from the Ramp road to the cottage, also going to the kitchen door. These paths, taken together, represent travel completely across the lot claimed in an east-west direction, as well as about half of the north-south direction. The camp itself is located in the northwesterly corner of the lot. The old road leading to the pond comes very near to being the southerly boundary of the lot. The path from the camp to the Ramp road leads out to the southwest corner of the claimed lot, where the old road to the pond and the Ramp road join. The path from the camp to the pond goes to the southeast corner of the lot, meeting the old road to the pond at the dock. Outhouses have been maintained to the rear of the camp, in the northwest corner of the lot. Also, at least three areas for dumping refuse have been used over the years, two in the neighborhood of the paths and one outside the area claimed.
The court found that the defendants conceded that their claim was limited to all or part of the land represented in their deeds, described there as follows:
Commencing about twenty feet westerly of the west shore of Hinkum Pond at a marked hemlock tree; thence westerly to an old pine stump; thence northerly to a point; thence easterly to a marked pine tree about twenty feet from the shore of Hinkum Pond; thence southerly to the place of beginning; containing one-fourth of an acre, more or less, being bounded on all four sides by land of Mary Germond. Also a right of way over lands owned by said Mary Germond to and from the road and to and from Hinkum Pond.
The findings also state that the boundaries of the lands claimed by the defendants are not visible on the ground with any degree of certainty. These defendants were found to have purchased the property without having...
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In re Davis
...The Davises were occupying the land in question. Occupancy need only be consistent with the nature of the premises. Montgomery v. Branon, 125 Vt. 362, 365, 216 A.2d 41 (1965). The posting of "no trespassing" signs, the placing of storage trailers, the storing of personal property on the pre......
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NAS Holdings, Inc. v. Pafundi
...entire quarry. We affirm in part and reverse in part. Adverse possession is a mixed question of law and fact. See Montgomery v. Branon, 125 Vt. 362, 365, 216 A.2d 41, 43 (1965). When reviewing the factual findings of a trial court, we view them in the light most favorable to the prevailing ......
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Laird Properties New England Land Syndicate v. Mad River Corp.
...actual hostile possession of another under a claim of title. 3 Am.Jur.2d Adverse Possession § 18. This Court in Montgomery v. Branon, 125 Vt. 362, 365, 216 A.2d 41, 43 (1965), 'The presence of a claim of title in the land records meant that actual and exclusive occupation of any part of the......
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Community Feed Store, Inc. v. Northeastern Culvert Corp.
...occupation of any part of the deeded premises carr[ies] with it constructive possession of the whole...." Montgomery v. Branon, 125 Vt. 362, 365, 216 A.2d 41, 43 (1965). In the absence of color of title, however, and where a lot has no definite boundary marks, adverse possession can only ex......