Montgomery v. Gov't
| Docket Number | 2:21-CV-1826-KJM-DMC-P |
| Decision Date | 07 August 2023 |
| Parties | JONLYNN S. MONTGOMERY, Plaintiff, v. GOVERNMENT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Plaintiff a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's first amended complaint, ECF No. 11.
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C § 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. Dep't of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “ short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory.
This action proceeds on Plaintiff's first amended complaint. ECF No. 11. At the time the first amended complaint was filed, Plaintiff was a prisoner at Rio Consumnes Correctional Center. See id. at 1. Plaintiff has since been transferred to San Quentin State Prison. See ECF No. 19 (). Plaintiff names the following individuals as defendants, all of whom at all times related to this complaint were working at William R. Ridgeway Justice Center: (1) Richard E. Stover, who at all times mentioned in this complaint was working as a probate referee; (2) Judge Dhillon, who at all times mentioned in this complaint was working as a probate judge; (3) James Tucker Fletcher, who at all times mentioned in this complaint was working as a probate referee; and (4) T. Brice, who at all times mentioned in this complaint was working as a court clerk. See ECF No. 11, pg. 2. Plaintiff also lists the following entities in the caption of the amended complaint: “William R. Justice Center (Probate)” and “Sacramento Sheriffs Department.” Id. at 1. These are not named as defendants. The Court notes the list of named defendants is different from those named in the original complaint addressed in the prior screening order. Compare ECF Nos. 1, 11.
Plaintiff asserts a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and Eighth Amendment rights through cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 3-4. In identifying the issues involved, Plaintiff states: “access to court” and “violation of policy and procedures of court.” Id. at 3. Montgomery makes a claim, unsupported by specific facts, that he was denied access to the courts, given limited access to the law library, and not given zoom or phone calls to attend court dates. He seeks to recover his inheritance and life insurance policy left to him by his father, Robert C. Montgomery Jr., and if funds from the aforementioned sources have been fraudulently taken, or mismanaged, then he seeks to be fully reimbursed and compensated. Id. at 5.
Plaintiff's father allegedly owned a Cigna life insurance policy when he passed away on August 20, 2020. Id. at 3. Although Plaintiff was allegedly the sole beneficiary of his father's life insurance policy, he claims he was unable to collect because he was in Sacramento County Jail at the time, and therefore, unable to attend a probate hearing regarding the policy. Id. Plaintiff did allegedly file a petition for probate in order to claim the payout of the life insurance policy and to administer his father's estate, and claims his petition was granted, naming him the executor/administrator of the estate. Id.
When an alleged court hearing was scheduled with Judge Dhillon at the William R. Ridgeway Justice Center, which Plaintiff was unable to attend due to his incarceration, the Judge supposedly granted a continuance, and a later hearing was to be conducted over the phone with the judge and Plaintiff's mother. Id. Although Plaintiff contends he was on time for this later hearing, he states his claim was never heard. Id. Plaintiff claims he has repeatedly requested the minute order from the later hearing but did not receive a response and has been informed by the William K. Justice Center there isn't a minute order on file. Id. at 4. Plaintiff also contends he was assigned two Probate Referees, the first of which was Defendant Tucker, who allegedly failed to process the DE-160 and DE-161 appraisal of estate forms. Id. Plaintiff's Probate Referee was changed to Defendant Stover, allegedly, without formally notifying Plaintiff. Id. When Plaintiff sent Defendant Stover the forms to be processed via mail and a family member, Defendant Stover informed Plaintiff he would not process the forms, and that they would be discarded if they were sent again. Id. Plaintiff also allegedly sent the aforementioned forms to the clerk of the court on three separate occasions, and they were all returned. Id.
The Court finds that the first amended complaint does not raise any cognizable claims and further finds that, even if there were cognizable claims asserted, all named defendants are immune.
The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a claim of deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must allege the existence of a liberty or property interest for which the protection is sought. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Due process protects against the deprivation of property where there is a legitimate claim of entitlement to the property. See Bd. of Regents, 408 U.S. at 577. Protected property interests are created, and their dimensions are defined, by existing rules that stem from an independent source - such as state law - and which secure certain benefits and support claims of entitlement to those benefits. See id.
Montgomery has a sufficient property interest in the payout of his father's life insurance. However, the amended complaint does not demonstrate he was denied due process. “Due process requires notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 686 F.3d 965, 985 (9th Cir. 2012). Montgomery alleges that his case was never heard on the date of his hearing. ECF No. 11 at 3. However, Montgomery was assigned two probate referees to assist him. Id. Montgomery was able to send forms to the referees and directly to the clerk of the court. Id. The forms were never filed and were returned to Montgomery, though the complaint does not explain why. Id. Although Montgomery's forms were rejected, he was given the opportunity to object. The facts pled here do not reflect a denial of due process.
Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated individuals are treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). Prisoners are protected from invidious discrimination based on race. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Racial segregation is unconstitutional within prisons save for the necessities of prison security and discipline. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (per curiam). Prisoners are also protected from intentional discrimination on the basis of their religion. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997). Equal protection claims are not necessarily limited to racial and religious discrimination. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686-67 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying minimal scrutiny to equal protection claim by a disabled plaintiff because the disabled do not constitute a suspect class); see also Tatum v. Pliler, 2007 WL 1720165 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (); Harrison v. Kernan, 971 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2020) (applying intermediate scrutiny to claim of discrimination on the basis of gender).
In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that defendants acted with intentional discrimination against plaintiff, or against a class of inmates which included plaintiff, and that such conduct did not relate to a legitimate penological purpose. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial