Montgomery v. Johnston Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs.

• Docket Number: 5:23-CV-00041-FL
• Decision Date: 02 June 2023
• Parties: Carrie Montgomery, Plaintiff, v. Johnston County Department of Social Services, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina

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Carrie Montgomery, Plaintiff, v. Johnston County Department of Social Services, et al., Defendants.

No. 5:23-CV-00041-FL

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Western Division

June 2, 2023

ORDER & MEMORANDUM & RECOMMENDATION

Robert T. Numbers, II United States Magistrate Judge

Carrie Montgomery, representing herself, has sued the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, Johnston County, the Johnston County Department of Social Services, several JCDSS social workers, and Allan DeLaine (her former attorney) for wrongs that allegedly stem from losing custody over her grandchildren. Compl., D.E. 1.

Montgomery claims that the Defendants violated both state and federal law by entering her home without permission to speak with the children, removing them from her care, and refusing to notify her about state-court child custody proceedings. See id. ¶¶ 33-48. She also contends that DeLaine failed to communicate with her before the child custody proceedings, which led the state District Court to rule that the children should remain in JCDSS's custody. See id. ¶¶ 30, 48. Montgomery has appealed that order to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. Id. ¶ 30.

Before the court are five motions:

• Montgomery's motion for court-appointed counsel (D.E. 19);

• DeLaine's motion to dismiss and for attorney's fees (D.E. 6);

• A motion to dismiss filed by JCDSS and the three social workers (D.E. 16);

• NCDHHS's motion to dismiss (D.E. 26); and

• Johnston County's motion to dismiss (D.E. 33).

For the reasons discussed below, the court denies Montgomery's request for an attorney. The undersigned further recommends that the court refrain from hearing her equitable claims for relief under Younger abstention. The court should then dismiss Montgomery's federal claims for damages and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state claims. In sum, the court should dismiss Montgomery's complaint in its entirety.

I. Background^[1]

Before the events underlying this lawsuit took place, Montgomery maintained legal guardianship over her nine grandchildren for roughly 13 years. Compl. ¶ 9. In March 2021, however things changed. Toward the end of that month, two JCDSS employees arrived at Montgomery's house while she was away, entered the residence, and spoke to her grandchildren. Id. ¶ 11. When Montgomery arrived home a few minutes later, the employees informed her that JCDSS had received reports that the children were being abused. Id. ¶ 12. The employees removed five of the children from Montgomery's home and filed juvenile petitions that same day, alleging that the minors were either abused, neglected, or dependent. Id. ¶ 13. Montgomery contends that these reports contained false information. Id.

Despite Montgomery's alleged cooperation in the months that followed, JCDSS refused to develop a strategy to return the children to her care. Id. ¶ 14. That May Montgomery petitioned the juvenile court for visitation, and JCDSS opposed her request. Id. ¶ 16. The state court eventually appointed DeLaine to represent Montgomery, but she claims that neither he nor JCDSS informed her about upcoming court dates. Id. ¶ 24. She also contends that he refused to discuss her case with her. Id. This caused her to miss an adjudication hearing in November 2021 and a disposition hearing a month later. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. At the disposition hearing, the court determined that the children should remain in JCDSS's custody. Id. ¶ 30. Montgomery appealed this decision in February 2022. Id.

Although her challenge to the custody order remains pending, Montgomery sued in federal court in January 2023. Construing her complaint liberally, the undersigned finds that she brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, three North Carolina statutes, the North Carolina Constitution, and North Carolina tort law. Montgomery alleges that:

• JCDSS and its employees violated the Fourth Amendment by entering Montgomery's home without consent, speaking with her grandchildren, and removing them from her care. Id. ¶ 34.

• JCDSS and its employees violated Montgomery's fundamental right to have a family under the Fourteenth Amendment by removing the children from her custody. Id. ¶ 33, 35.

• JCDSS and its employees violated Montgomery's procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by falsely claiming that the children were abused, neglected, or dependent in its juvenile petitions. Id. ¶ 36.

• All Defendants violated Montgomery's procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment because she was never notified about upcoming court dates and was therefore unable to present evidence during the hearings. Id. ¶ 38.

• JCDSS and its employees were negligent because the Department removed the children from Montgomery's care, refused to work toward reunification or visitation, did not try to keep the children together when placing them in foster care, and failed to adequately train its employees. Id. ¶¶ 41-46.

• JCDSS violated N.C. G.S. §§ 7B-100(4), 7B-602, and 7B-506(b) as well as the North Carolina Constitution^[2] by disregarding Montgomery's parental rights and denying her the opportunity to present evidence on her own behalf in the child custody proceedings. Id. ¶ 47.

• DeLaine committed legal malpractice by refusing to communicate with Montgomery before appearing to represent her at the child custody proceedings. Id. ¶ 48.

All told, Montgomery seeks $30 million in damages, reunification with her grandchildren, and a court order requiring JCDSS to change its policies.

A month after filing her complaint, Montgomery moved for court-appointed counsel to assist her with her lawsuit. Mot. for Counsel, D.E. 19. She claims that appointed counsel is necessary because she has been unsuccessful in her attempts to find an attorney, and the important civil rights at stake in her case demand the help of a lawyer. Id. at 1-2.

All Defendants have moved to dismiss, contending that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Montgomery's claim under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that-even if the court has subject-matter jurisdiction-Montgomery has failed to state a claim. See DeLaine Mot. Dismiss, D.E. 6; CJDSS Mot. Dismiss, D.E. 16; NCDHHS Mot. Dismiss, D.E. 26; Johnston County Mot. Dismiss, D.E. 33.

II. Motion for Court-Appointed Counsel

Montgomery asks that the court appoint an attorney to help her with her lawsuit. Mot. for Counsel at 1. But there is no constitutional right to counsel in civil suits, and courts should exercise their discretion to appoint counsel for pro se civil litigants “only in exceptional cases.” Cook v. Bounds, 518 F.2d 779, 780 (4th Cir. 1975). The existence of exceptional circumstances justifying appointment of counsel depends on “the type and complexity of the case, and the abilities of the individuals bringing it.” Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1982)), abrogated on other grounds by Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989).

Montgomery's previous filings indicate that she can handle this litigation herself, and this case is not one in which exceptional circumstances merit the appointment of counsel. Thus, her motion to appoint an attorney (D.E. 19) is denied.

III. Motions to Dismiss

Each Defendant contends that Montgomery's claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and otherwise fail to state a claim. Contrary to Defendants' assertions, Rooker-Feldman does not apply here-the state court judgment placing Montgomery's children in the custody of JCDSS is pending appeal. But Younger abstention counsels against asserting jurisdiction over Montgomery's claims for equitable relief. After dispensing with the claims barred by Younger, the court should dismiss Montgomery's remaining federal claims and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state claims.

A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Each Defendant claims that the court should dismiss Montgomery's complaint under Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The doctrine gets its name from the two cases that created it: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Both cases involved the jurisdiction of lower federal courts to adjudicate disputes involving state court judgments.

Broadly understood, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents a party who has lost in state court from filing an action in a federal district court to overturn the state court's judgment. See, e.g., Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006). But the doctrine does not apply unless the state court has reached a final decision.^[3] See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005) (“This Court has repeatedly held that the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction.”).

Montgomery's challenge to the state court's child custody order is pending appeal before a higher state court. See Compl. ¶ 30. In other words, the judgment granting JCDSS custody over her grandchildren is not yet final. Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not strip this court of its jurisdiction over Montgomery's claims.

B. Younger Abstention and Claims for Equitable Relief

But the court should decline to assert jurisdiction over Montgomery's requests for equitable relief for a different reason-federal courts generally cannot interfere with ongoing state court proceedings. See Younger v Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). This rule, known as the Younger abstention doctrine, comes into play if three elements are met.^[4] First, there must be “an ongoing state judicial proceeding” that was filed before there...