Montgomery v. State
Decision Date | 12 February 2020 |
Docket Number | Case No. 2D18-1119 |
Citation | 291 So.3d 170 |
Parties | Monroe Godwin MONTGOMERY, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Christine Trakas Thornhill, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Michael Schaub, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa; and C. Todd Chapman, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa (substituted as counsel of record), for Appellee.
Monroe Montgomery was convicted of aggravated battery with a weapon (great bodily harm) and armed trespass. He challenges only his conviction and sentence for aggravated battery. Montgomery raises claims of error with regard to jury instructions and argues that the trial court erred in permitting the victim to testify regarding injuries caused by Montgomery's codefendant. We affirm the unchallenged conviction and sentence for armed trespass but reverse the conviction and sentence for aggravated battery.
The testimony of the victim and the security video entered into evidence established the following:
In 2017, Montgomery and his codefendant, Lorenzo Godwin, were drinking on the property of a convenience store. The victim worked at the convenience store and was aware that Montgomery had previously been trespassed from the property. The victim exited the store and profanely told Montgomery and Godwin to leave the property. Montgomery approached the victim with a box cutter in his hand and began "swinging it everywhere." The victim avoided being cut and shoved Montgomery off of the convenience store property and toward the road. From his position in the median area of the road, Montgomery then threw a milk crate which struck the victim. In response, the victim ran toward Montgomery and struck him with his fist. During the brief physical altercation, the victim was on top of Montgomery, punching Montgomery in the face. Montgomery used the box cutter to slice the victim's side. According to the victim, after the victim strong-armed Montgomery into loosening his grip on the box cutter, Godwin and a third person—Montgomery's nephew—assisted in disarming Montgomery; the victim testified that the nephew took the box cutter out of Montgomery's hand and that Godwin separated the men. He also testified that Godwin showed no aggression toward him and had been trying to break up the fight. The victim testified that he "backed off" because the box cutter was no longer in Montgomery's hand.
The separation was brief. The victim testified that he became angry when he realized that Montgomery had sliced his side; he "wanted revenge." The victim, having returned to the convenience store property, ran across the road to an intersection where Montgomery and Godwin then stood. The victim again engaged in a physical altercation with Montgomery and was on top of Montgomery until he felt pain in his back. The pain caused him to adjust his position and allowed Montgomery to gain the upper hand. Godwin ultimately pulled Montgomery off of the victim. The victim testified that he did not recall Montgomery asking for Godwin's help at any time.
After the altercation had ended, the victim discovered that he had been stabbed in the back three times. It was only upon viewing the security video from the store that he discovered it was Godwin who had stabbed him.
The victim testified regarding the injuries caused by Montgomery. Over Montgomery's objections, the victim also testified to the injuries caused by Godwin. The injuries caused by Godwin were significant, including a collapsed lung, and required the victim to undergo two surgeries. The victim was permitted, again over objection, to remove his shirt and show the jury scars caused by Godwin's actions as well as a scar from the box cutter.
After the close of evidence and during the charge conference, multiple issues arose as to jury instructions. Montgomery objected to the giving of the principals instruction, arguing that there was no evidence to support that Godwin's actions in stabbing the victim were at the request of or in assistance of Montgomery's crime. The trial court perceived the evidence as establishing the basis for the principals instruction because Montgomery "used" the stabbing to gain the upper hand and continued to beat the victim with his fists after the stabbing. There was a lengthy discussion between defense counsel and the court as to this point. When the court finally turned to the State for its position, the prosecutor presented a less detailed explanation for why the principals instruction should be given and ultimately agreed with the court's perception of why the instruction was appropriate. The court determined that it would give the principals instruction.
Montgomery also objected to the inclusion of the forcible felony instruction in the instruction on justifiable use of nondeadly force. After the court determined over the State's objection that the justifiable use of nondeadly force instruction would be given, the court agreed to the State's request to include: "However, the use or threatened use of non-deadly force is not justified if you find that the defendant was attempting to commit, committing or escaping after the commission of an applicable forcible felony." Montgomery argued that the State's requested instruction nullified the self-defense instruction for the aggravated battery, rendering it meaningless.
The State argued in closing that Montgomery was guilty of aggravated battery for using the box cutter to slice the victim's side during the first physical altercation in the median and that he was guilty of aggravated battery as a principal to Godwin's stabbing of the victim. The information charged one count of aggravated battery; the verdict form was general and did not require the jury to choose between two batteries or to determine whether the battery was committed by Montgomery himself or as a principal. The jury found Montgomery guilty as charged, and Montgomery was sentenced to eighteen years in prison as a habitual felony offender on the aggravated battery conviction and to a concurrent ten years on the trespass conviction.
In his first issue on appeal, Montgomery argues that the trial court abused its discretion in giving the principals instruction. We agree.
The uncontroverted evidence established that Montgomery held a box cutter in his hand at the time of the trespass, that he initiated contact with the victim by approaching him and waiving the box cutter around, and that he still held the box cutter at the time of the first physical altercation in the median. The first physical altercation ended after Montgomery had cut the victim's side, the victim had strong-armed Montgomery into releasing his grip on the box cutter, the nephew had removed the box cutter, and Godwin had assisted in breaking Montgomery and the victim apart. Godwin and Montgomery then walked to a different location but within the immediate area of the convenience store (the intersection). The uncontroverted evidence also established that upon discovering that he had been "sliced," the victim sought revenge and he "charged" at Montgomery. The two engaged in a physical altercation, but no weapons were involved. The victim was on top of Montgomery when he felt pain in his back; Montgomery then took control of the fight. It was not until after the two had been separated again and the victim had reviewed the video footage from the convenience store that the victim realized he had been stabbed in the back by Godwin. The victim testified that he did not recall Montgomery asking Godwin for help.
Montgomery contends that the State's evidence was insufficient to support the principals instruction for aggravated battery. He argues that the actions at issue can be separated into three incidences: (1) the armed trespass; (2) the physical altercation in the median where the victim was sliced with the box cutter; and (3) the physical altercation in the intersection where the victim was stabbed by Godwin. Montgomery suggests that the undisputed facts show that it was the victim who initiated the last altercation, reengaging with Montgomery.
The State contends that the testimony and video evidence established that Montgomery had a conscious intent that the aggravated battery—the stabbing—be done and that Montgomery assisted in the stabbing or caused Godwin to stab the victim. The State's argument is premised on the fact that Montgomery was the initial aggressor—he approached the victim with the box cutter and began swinging it around while still on the convenience store property—which led to the first and second physical altercations, both occurring off the property. The State does not deem the incidents to be separate, having occurred within an undisputed span of eight to ten minutes. The State contends that "Montgomery's initiation and continuation of the fight with [the] victim caused and assisted Lorenzo Godwin to stab the victim." (Emphasis added.) We note that while this aligns with the State's minimal argument at trial, it is significantly different than the court's apparent basis for giving the instruction.
"While it is true that the trial court has broad discretion in instructing the jury, it is also true that a trial court errs when it gives an instruction that has no factual basis in the record." Masaka v. State, 4 So. 3d 1274, 1284 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (citation omitted). "Thus, giving the principals instruction is error when there is no evidence that the defendant had a conscious intent that the crime be committed and did some act or said some word which was intended to and in fact did incite [or assist] a third party to commit the crime with which the defendant is charged." Id. And because "[j]ury instructions requested by the State ‘must relate to issues concerning evidence received at trial,’ " the trial court errs when it "instruct[s] the jury on...
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... ... instruction." Mora v. State , 814 So.2d 322, 330 ... (Fla. 2002). Beyond being "not required" to give an ... instruction lacking an evidentiary predicate, a trial court ... errs in giving such an unsupported instruction ... Montgomery v. State , 291 So.3d 170, 175 (Fla. 2d DCA ... 2020) ("While it is true that the trial court has broad ... discretion in instructing the jury, it is also true that a ... trial court errs when it gives an instruction that has no ... factual basis in the record."). The circuit ... ...
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