Montgomery v. United States, 5294.

Decision Date08 January 1945
Docket NumberNo. 5294.,5294.
Citation146 F.2d 142
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

William E. Montgomery, pro se, for appellant.

Joe V. Gibson, U. S. Atty., of Kingwood, W.Va. (C. Brooks Deveny, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Clarksburg, W. Va., on the brief), for appellee.

Before SOPER, DOBIE, and NORTHCOTT, Circuit Judges.


The appellant, William E. Montgomery, herein referred to as the defendant pleaded guilty to an indictment in the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Elkins, in June 1939, charging the violation of sections 1132b, 1132c, 1132d, 1132e and 1132m of Chapter 15A, Title 26 of the Code of the Laws of the United States, in force January 3, 1935,1 and was sentenced to five years imprisonment upon each of the two counts of the indictment, said sentences to run consecutively.

On June 3, 1944, the defendant filed a motion to vacate the judgment as to the second sentence of five years, under the indictment, claiming that the act committed was one offense for which only one sentence could be passed. The court overruled the motion to vacate and the defendant brought this appeal.

The first count of the indictment in question charged the defendant, and others, with possession of a Thompson sub-machine gun in violation of sections 1132c (a), 1132c (c), 1132c (d) and 1132d (a) of Title 26, Code of Laws of the United States, 1934 Edition.2

Count two charges the defendant, and others, with receiving and possessing a Thompson sub-machine gun in violation of sections 1132b (a), 1132b (b) and 1132b (c) of the same Title 26 of the Code.3

The first count charges possession of the sub-machine gun without its having been properly transferred and the second count charges possession of the same sub-machine gun without having paid the tax levied on its transfer.

It is the contention of the defendant that the one act of receiving and possessing which violated different statutes constituted only one offense and justified the imposition of only one sentence.

The appellee, the United States of America, contends that the offense justified the imposition of two sentences. In the case of Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632, 35 S.Ct. 712, 59 L.Ed. 1153, the Supreme Court held that two offenses may be committed and separately charged and punished notwithstanding that there was only one transaction, and that the test of identity of offenses when double jeopardy is pleaded is whether the same evidence is required to sustain them, and, if not, then the fact that both charges relate to and grow out of one transaction does not make a single offense when more than one offense is defined by the statute.

In the case of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306, the Supreme Court lays down the same rule, and in Haggerty v. United States, 52 F.2d 11, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit holds to the same effect. See also, Yep v. United States, 10 Cir., 81 F.2d 637.

In the case of Ong v. United States, 131 F.2d 175, this court held that a motion of this kind could not be granted.

The authorities relied upon by the defendant are easily distinguished and are not in point.

The judgment of the court below was correct and is accordingly affirmed.

On Petition for Rehearing.

A petition for rehearing was filed in this case in which the appellant makes the contention not heretofore brought to the attention of this court that the District Court was without jurisdiction of the crime alleged in the second count of the indictment for the reason that the offense therein charged was committed in the State of Missouri. It is said that at the trial of the case the testimony showed that the firearm was stolen from the owner in the State of Missouri. It was pointed out that Section 1132(b), mentioned in the second count of the indictment, imposes a tax upon firearms transferred in the United States at the rate of $200 for each firearm, to be paid...

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10 cases
  • United States v. Thompson
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Delaware
    • November 19, 1968
    ...made and possession of an unlawfully transferred firearm, United States v. Hardgrave, 214 F.2d 673 (C.A.7, 1954); Montgomery v. United States, 146 F.2d 142, 143 (C.A. 4, 1944), these two separate provisions of § 5851 are not pleaded in the indictment as two separate offenses, but are referr......
  • State ex rel. Lovejoy v. Skeen
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • November 24, 1953
    ...772, 74 S.E. 998. One act or transaction may constitute two offenses which may be separately charged and punished. Montgomery v. United States, 4 Cir., 146 F.2d 142. We note that the transcript of the proceedings before the justice shows that he was fined $100 and sentenced to 30 days in ja......
  • Waters v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • March 4, 1964
    ...§ 5848(1), illegal for non-compliance with any of the enumerated sections. See: Fleish v. Johnston (9 CA), 145 F. 2d 16; Montgomery v. United States (4 CA), 146 F.2d 142; and United States v. Hardgrave (7 CA), 214 F.2d 673. Cf. Mares v. United States (10 CA), 319 F. 2d 71. While possession ......
  • Sipes v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • November 12, 1963
    ...89 L.Ed. 626; Fleish v. Johnston, 145 F.2d 16 (9 Cir.1944), cert. denied 324 U.S. 840, 65 S.Ct. 587, 89 L.Ed. 1402; Montgomery v. United States, 146 F.2d 142 (4 Cir.1944). Cf. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 The sufficiency of the evidence. The defense......
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