Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Unitedretail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Employees of America, C.I.O.

• Decision Date: 13 May 1948
• Docket Number: No. 30031.,30031.
• Parties: MONTGOMERY WARD & CO. v. UNITED RETAIL, WHOLESALE & DEPARTMENT STORE EMPLOYEES OF AMERICA, C.I.O., et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

400 Ill. 38

79 N.E.2d 46

MONTGOMERY WARD & CO.

v.UNITED

RETAIL, WHOLESALE & DEPARTMENT STORE EMPLOYEES OF AMERICA, C.I.O., et al.

No. 30031.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 18, 1948.

Rehearing Denied May 13, 1948.

Appeal from Third Division Appellate Court, First District, on Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Joseph A. Graber, Judge.

Action by Montgomery Ward & Company against United Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Employees of America, C. I. O., and others, to enjoin defendants from issuing, publishing, and circulating certain papers, pamphlets, and publications, claimed to be defamatory and libelous, and for damages and other relief. Judgment for plaintiff was reversed by the Appellate Court, 330 Ill.App. 49, 70 N.E.2d 75, and plaintiff appeals

Affirmed. Stuart S. Ball, John A. Barr, and Francis D. Roth, all of Chicago, for appellant.

Francis Heisler, of Chicago, for appellees.

GUNN, Justice.

Montgomery Ward & Co., Incorporated, hereafter referred to as Wards, filed a complaint in the superior court of Cook County against the United Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Employees of America (a union), unincorporated, and its subordinate local unions and officers, and members of such unions, to enjoin and restrain them, or their members, from issuing, publishing and circulating certain papers, pamphlets and publications, claimed to be defamatory and libelous, and for damages and other relief. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, as amended, which was overruled by the trial court. The defendants elected to stand by this motion, and the court issued a permanent injunction of broad scope, by which the defendants were enjoined from conspiring together to publish, or cause to be published, or to assist or encourage any other organization to publish untrue statements concerning the plaintiff, its officers, or working conditions, for the purpose of causing the plaintiff's employees, or prospective employees, to fear, dislike, or distrust the plaintiff, or its officers, or from causing plaintiff's customers, or its prospective customers, to dislike, or distrust the plaintiff, or its officers. It also issued a like injunction for the same purpose to prevent the defendants from acting in concert instead of conspiring, the only difference being that one charged conspiracy and the other charged actions in concert. Defendants appealed to the Appellate Court for the First District, which reversed the decree of the superior court, and remanded the cause with directions to dismiss the same for want of equity. We have allowed plaintiff's petition for appeal to this court.

The Appellate Court made a full and accurate statement of the facts, as shown in 330 Ill.App. 49, 70 N.E.2d 75, but a somewhat condensed statement is necessary here to bring out clearly the points upon which the case must be decided. Montgomery Ward & Co. has a general office in Chicago, and is engaged in the retail sale and mail order business of merchandise, and does business in every State, operating approximately 650 stores and warehouses. It is alleged that its sales aggregate over $600,000,000 annually, and it employs from 65,000 to 85,000 employees, and that it has been in business for more than seventy years, and has a reputation for honesty, fairness and integrity. Among the places in which there are substantial sized stores are Chicago, Kansas City, Denver, Albany and Jamaica. These places are especially referred to because the publications complained of come chiefly from these locations.

The complaint charges that the United Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Employees of America is an unincorporated association and acts through its officers; that Samuel Wolchok is president; Leonard Levy is vice president, and Michael Mann and Sandra Slotkin are State of Illinois representatives; that the suit is brought against all members in a representative capacity, and that it has many local subordinate unions. Among these are Local 20 of Chicago, Local 269 in Denver, Local 131 at Kansas City, Local 332 in Detroit, Local 40 at Albany, and the Jamaica Local Union. The names of all of the officers of these several unions are set forth, and they are made parties, together with the members. The complaint also charges these unions were certified for bargaining in labor and employment matters with Wards.

It is also charged that the International Union gives advice and orders to local unions, and that it published a periodical for the information of all of the members of the union; that the Chicago Local Union published a pamphlet called the Spotlight, and that the other locals at Denver, Kansas City, Detroit, Albany and Jamaica, also publish pamphlets which are distributed to the general public, and to members of the union, and that altogether they had given out more than 400 statements concerning Wards, or its officers, or its management, and that all of these statements were untrue.

The complaint also alleges that these unions and officers agreed and conspired to act in concert against the plaintiff for the purposes above alleged, and then sets forth the numerous statements and publications claimed to be made and authorized, in pursuance of said combination and conspiracy, and that they have continuously since March, 1940, persisted in publishing and issuing statements that are defamatory and libelous and refer to the officers and staff of Wards in scurrilous and opprobrious terms, as set out in the several statements, articles and publications attached to the complaint, and that all of said articles are defamatory and untrue and made for the purpose of injuring and damaging the plaintiff; that the defendants intend to continue the publications unless restrained by the injunction of the court; that its remedy at law is inadequate because it would require many suits, that it cannot recover financial remuneration from the individual members because of their number and the time and expense necessary to bring suits; that it has been damaged more that $1,000,000, and that its only relief is by way of injunction against commission of the acts, which it says will cause the public and the employees to fear, distrust, and dislike the plaintiffs, its officers and representatives.

The discussions of counsel cover a wide range, from libel and slander to constitutional law, but with little discussion of what we believe to be the crucial issue in the case. At the outset it must be observed that for the plaintiff to obtain the relief prayed in its complaint it must bring itself within the exceptions to two general principles denying injunctive relief from publishing defamatory matters. The first general principle is that equity does not have jurisdiction to enjoin the commission of crimes and libels; and the second general principle is that the constitutional guaranty of free speech as a general rule prohibits both the courts and the legislature from putting previous restraints on publications. That there are exceptions to these general principles is recognized, but the plaintiff in bringing its suit for such relief must take upon itself the burden of showing facts which bring it within these exceptions.

The rule long in force was that in the absence of the showing of a violation of some property right, or some breach of trust or of a contract, an injunction was not available to prevent actual or threatened publications of a defamatory character. The question was summarily disposed of in Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402, in an application for an order to restrain the publication of a libel by the announcement of the court that such act was a crime, and that it had no jurisdiction to prevent it. Likewise, in Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., 114 Mass. 69, 19 Am.Rep. 310, the rule was laid down specifically: ‘The jurisdiction of a court of chancery does not extend to cases of libel, or slander, or of false representations as to the character or quality of the plaintiff's property, or as to his title thereto, which involve no breach of trust or of contract.’

Many cases during the early history of the country sustain this principle. In Francis v. Flinn, 118 U.S. 385, 6 S.Ct. 1148, 1150, 30 L.Ed. 165, an application for an injunction for publishing words amounting to a libel was denied, the court saying: ‘If the publications in the newspapers are false and injurious, he can prosecute the pubpublishersfor libel. If a court of equity could interfere and use its remedy of injunction in such cases, it would draw to itself the greater part of the litigation properly belonging to courts of law.’ In Flint v. Hutchinson Smoke Burner Co., 110 Mo. 492, 19 S.W. 804, 806,16 L.R.A. 243, 33 Am.St.Rep. 476, it is held that an injunction would not be issued against a slander of title to a patent by false statements made to plaintiff's prospective customers, because the jurisdiction of a court of equity does not apply to cases of libel or slander, and in such case it is required that the libel or slander be first established by a court of law, the court saying: ‘We live under a written constitution which declares that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; and the question of libel or no libel, slander or no slander, is one for a jury to determine. Such was certainly the settled law when the various constitutions of this state were adopted, and it is all-important that the right thus guarded should not be disturbed. It goes hand in hand with the liberty of the press and free speech.’

The same rule has been followed in New York and many other states, and in Christian Hospital v. People ex rel. Murphy, 223 Ill. 244, 79 N.E. 72, the rule is quoted as though it were a maxim of equity. Since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, requiring the several States to accord due process of law, a large number of the cases, in which injunctions to enjoin libels and defamation would have been denied, have been denied upon the...