Monticello School Dist. No. 25 v. George L. on Behalf of Brock L.
| Decision Date | 16 December 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-1765,96-1765 |
| Citation | 102 F.3d 895 |
| Parties | 114 Ed. Law Rep. 1042, 19 A.D.D. 883 MONTICELLO SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 25, Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant-Appellee, v. GEORGE L. and Carolyn L., on behalf of BROCK L., a Minor, Defendants and Counter-Plaintiffs-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Larry D. Kuster (argued), Rammelkamp, Bradney, Dahman, Kuster, Keaton & Fritsche, Jacksonville, IL, for Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant-Appellee.
Katherine M. Black (argued), Carbondale, IL, for Defendants and Counter-Plaintiffs-Apellants.
Before CUMMINGS, ESCHBACH and FLAUM, Circuit Judges.
On March 15, 1995, the plaintiff and counter-defendant Monticello School District No. 25 (the "School District") filed a complaint to vacate the Level II hearing officer's decision of November 21, 1994. That decision approved a Level I hearing officer's finding that the School District's Individualized Education Program ("IEP-1"), developed February 23, 1994, for Brock L., a student with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD"), did not provide him with a "free appropriate public education" ("FAPE") within the meaning of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (the "IDEA"). Consequently, both the Level I and Level II hearing officers found that the School District was required to reimburse Brock's parents, George L. and Carolyn L. (the "Parents"), for their unilateral placement of Brock in a private school from March 1994, when such placement was made, until the semester following the Level I hearing officer's decision requiring modifications to the IEP-1 to eliminate its deficiencies. Defendants and counter-plaintiffs the Parents counterclaimed alleging that the hearing officers had erred by applying a faulty legal interpretation of the least restrictive environment ("LRE") requirement under the IDEA. Count I of the counterclaim alleged that the Level I and Level II hearing officer decisions erred by failing to order continued placement of Brock in the private school for the entire 1994-95 school year based on the requirements in the IDEA; Count II sought relief under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., alleging that the School District intentionally failed to provide Brock with the accommodations required under § 504; and Count III sought relief under §§ 1983 and 1988 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C., alleging Brock's constitutional and statutory rights had been violated by the School District's intentional failure to provide him with an appropriate special education program under the IDEA and § 504.
After a hearing on November 6, 1995, the district court entered an order on December 18, 1995, affirming the Level II hearing officer's decision, but denying the Parents' counterclaims. The court agreed with the Level II hearing officer that the IEP-1, as modified by the Level I hearing officer's decision, satisfied the requirements of the IDEA, and it agreed with the Level I and Level II hearing officers' determination that the LRE for Brock was a mainstream public school education, rather than the private school Brock was currently attending. In addition, the court found that the Parents had failed to prove a violation of § 504 or §§ 1983 and 1988 because the IEP-1, as interpreted, complied with the IDEA. Therefore, the district court found no basis for a finding of intentional discrimination against Brock or of an intentional violation of his constitutional rights. In an order dated February 27, 1996, the court (i) clarified that the School District was required to reimburse the Parents for Brock's private school education from March 1994, when he was unilaterally withdrawn from the School District, through only the first semester of the 1994-95 school year (the first semester following the Level I hearing officer's decision requiring modification of the IEP-1), and (ii) denied the Parents attorneys' fees, finding that they were not a "prevailing party" within the meaning of the attorneys' fees provisions of the IDEA.
The Parents appeal the district court's dismissal of their § 504 and §§ 1983 and 1988 claims and its denial of attorneys' fees and reimbursement for Brock's continued placement in the private school after the first semester of the 1994-95 school year. We affirm.
Brock was educated in the School District from the time he began attending kindergarten in the 1983-84 school year until the Parents unilaterally removed him from the tenth grade on March 21, 1994. When Brock was in the seventh grade, the School District evaluated him for possible special education services and prepared a case study. A multidisciplinary conference was convened, which reviewed the case study and found him eligible for special education as a student with a specific learning disability. Brock had previously been diagnosed by a family physician during his first grade year as having ADHD. The various parties disagree on the severity of Brock's disability. The School District diagnosed Brock has having a "mild" disability. The Level I hearing officer described Brock's learning disability as "moderate," and the Level II hearing officer found that the Parents had not shown that Brock "is more than mildly or moderately handicapped."
On February 23, 1994, the School District proposed the IEP-1 to the Parents. Shortly thereafter, because Brock was failing or obtaining barely passing grades in most of his courses, the Parents enrolled him at Brehm Preparatory School ("Brehm"), an Illinois-approved residential school for public school placements that educates students who are classified as learning disabled and attention deficit disordered. The Parents then requested a Level I due process hearing to challenge the IEP-1 as failing to provide Brock with a FAPE program under the IDEA.
After a three-day hearing, the Level I hearing officer found that the IEP-1 did not provide a FAPE to Brock, citing the standard set forth in Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690. The hearing officer stated that:
B[rock] did learn and receive some educational benefit in his school district. However, he did so, not because of IEPs that were reasonably calculated to confer benefit, but in spite of IEPs that conferred virtually none. The fact that B[rock] is bright enough to gain some learning in spite of flawed evaluation and placement procedures and inadequate IEPs does not mean he received a FAPE.
Decision of Level I Hearing Officer at 16 (August 4, 1994). Although she believed that Brehm was an appropriate school for Brock, the hearing officer determined that Brehm was not the LRE for him, finding "it hard to explain how a moderately impaired learning disabled student could not be provided with an appropriate education in his home high school." Id. at 17. Therefore, she (i) directed the School District to develop an IEP providing individualized learning disabilities resource services in the School District for Brock, and (ii) specified certain other actions that the School District must take relating to Brock's education in the School District, e.g., in-service training of all of Brock's teachers on the educational effects of attention deficit disorders in general and of Brock's ADHD needs in particular. The changes to be made to the IEP-1 were set forth with particularity in the decision. 1 However, the hearing officer believed it was unrealistic to make those modifications to Brock's IEP in the one month remaining before the beginning of the school year, so she found appropriate Brock's continued education at Brehm for the first semester of the 1994-95 school year, with reimbursement to the Parents for that period.
The School District filed an appeal of the Level I hearing officer's decision on August 22, 1994, requesting the Level II hearing officer to reverse the Level I order completely with respect to the inadequacy of the IEP- 1 and the reimbursement of the Parents for the unilateral placement at Brehm. The School District also challenged certain other aspects of the Level I hearing officer's decision related to the School District's handling of Brock's education. During the pendency of the Level II review, Brock remained at Brehm.
The Parents first argue that the district court erroneously concluded that the Parents had failed to prove a violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and §§ 1983 and 1988, because they were never afforded an opportunity to present their evidence on those counterclaims and because intentional discrimination is not required to prove a violation under those sections. Second, they challenge the district court's denial of reimbursement for Brock's continued placement in Brehm after the first semester of the 1994-95 school year. Finally, they assert that the district court erred when it concluded that the Parents were not prevailing parties under the IDEA entitled to attorneys' fees. Each argument will be addressed in turn.
The Parents first claim that the district court erroneously granted judgment to the School District on the Parents' §§ 504 and 1983 claims. In its December 18, 1995, order, the district court found that the Parents had failed to prove a violation of § 504 or §§ 1983 and 1988. It noted that the IEP-1, as interpreted, complied with the IDEA. Therefore, the district court found no basis for a finding of intentional discrimination against Brock or of an intentional violation of his constitutional rights.
Following the School District's presentation of testimony regarding its claims on November 6, 1995, the district court stated that it would continue the Parents' case until the court decided the claims set forth in the School District's complaint. No opportunity was afforded the Parents to present testimony on the § 504 and § 1983 claims after that time and before the court entered its ...
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