Montin v. Gibson
| Decision Date | 12 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | 4:07CV3271 |
| Parties | JOHN MAXWELL MONTIN, Plaintiff, v. BILL GIBSON, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
This matter is before the court on the parties' competing motions for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion, (filing no. 111) is denied and Defendant's motion, (filing no. 108) is granted.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment is proper "if pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the move party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In order to avoid summary judgment the opposing party must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual dispute is genuine only if the evidence presented "is such that a reasonable jury could return averdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
As to his substantive due process claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate (1) he or she has a protected liberty interest or property interest at stake, and (2) he or she was deprived of such an interest without due process of the law. See Van Horn v. Nebraska State Racing Com'n, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (2004). To constitute a liberty interest, an individual must have a legitimate claim or entitlement to the subject of the deprivation which rises to more than a unilateral hope or expectation. Kentucky Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). In Persechini v. Callaway, 651 F.3d 802, 806 (8th Cir. 2011).
Involuntarily committed individuals "are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish." Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982). Committed individuals have a retained interest in reasonable care, safety, and freedom from undue restraint. Id. But that right is not absolute and must be balanced with legitimate interests of the state. Id. at 321-22. As explained by the Eighth Circuit:
Substantive due process offers only limited protections and only guards against the exercise of arbitrary and oppressive government power." Hawkins, 316 F.3d at 780. "Before official conduct or inaction rises to the level of a substantive due process violation[,] it must be so egregious or outrageous that it is conscience-shocking." Burton v. Richmond, 370 F.3d 723, 729 (8th Cir.2004) (Burton II) (). . . . "[I]n a due process challenge to executive action, the threshold question is whether the behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience." 523 U.S. at 847 n. 8, 118 S.Ct. 1708.
Beck v. Wilson, 377 F.3d 884, 890 (8th Cir. 2004) ().
Moreover, when the court engages in the test to balance the rights of the individuals against the relevant state interest, "decisions made by the appropriate professionals are entitled to a presumption of correctness . . . ." Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324. Accordingly, "liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the...
To continue reading
Request your trial