Montin v. Moore, 16-1560
| Decision Date | 19 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 16-1560,16-1560 |
| Citation | 846 F.3d 289 |
| Parties | John Maxwell MONTIN, Plaintiff–Appellant v. Y. Scott MOORE, M.D.; Mario Scalora, Ph.D.; Mary Paine, Ph.D., Defendants–Appellees Stephen Paden, M.D., Defendant Lisa Woodward, Ph.D., Defendant–Appellee Chin Chung, M.D.; Marco Baquero, M.D.; Eugene Oliveto, M.D., Defendants Ann Evelyn, M.D.; Dinesh Karumanchi, M.D.; Rajeev Chaturvedi, M.D.; Joanne Murney, Ph.D.; Sherri Browning, Ph.D.; Lorrene Jurgens, Nurse Practitioner; Mindy Abel, Psy.D., Defendants–Appellees Cynthia Petersen, Nurse Practitioner; James Allison, Ph.D., Defendants Corrine McCoy, Program Manager; Jennifer Cimpl, Psy.D.; Shannon Black, Psy.D.; Zakaria Siddiqui, M.D., Defendants–Appellees Roberto Alves, Psy.D., Defendant Kathleen Barrett, Psy.D.; Klaus Hartmann, M.D., Defendants–Appellees |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Michael David Gooch, Attorney, Omaha, NE, for Plaintiff–Appellant.
Stephanie Anne Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, Bijan Koohmaraie, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney General's Office, Lincoln, NE, for Defendants–Appellees Y. Scott Moore, MD, Mary Paine, PH.D, Lisa Woodward, PH.D, Ann Evelyn, MD, Dinesh Karumanchi, MD, Joanne Murney, PH.D, Sherri Browning, PH.D, Lorrene Jurgens, Nurse Practitioner, Mindy Abel, Psy D, Corrine McCoy, Program Manager, Jennifer Cimpl, Psy D, Shannon Black, Psy D, Zakaria Siddiqui, MD, Kathleen Barrett, Psy D, Klaus Hartmann, MD.
David A. Lopez, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney General's Office, Lincoln, NE, for Defendants–Appellees Y. Scott Moore, MD, Mary Paine, PH.D, Lisa Woodward, PH.D, Ann Evelyn, MD, Dinesh Karumanchi, MD, Rajeev Chaturvedi, MD, Joanne Murney, PH.D, Sherri Browning, PH.D, Lorrene Jurgens, Nurse Practitioner, Mindy Abel, Psy D, Corrine McCoy, Program Manager, Jennifer Cimpl, Psy D, Shannon Black, Psy D, Zakaria Siddiqui, MD, Kathleen Barrett, Psy D, Klaus Hartmann, MD.
John Wiltse, University of Nebraska, Office of Vice President & General Counsel, Lincoln, NE, for Mario J. Scalora, PH.D.
Jason W. Grams, Lamson & Dugan, Omaha, NE, for Defendants–Appellees Mario Scalora, PH.D, Mary Paine, PH.D, Ann Evelyn, MD, Jennifer Cimpl, Psy D, Kathleen Barrett, Psy D.William Maxwell Lamson, Jr., Lamson & Dugan, Omaha, NE, for Defendants–Appellees Mario Scalora, PH.D, Mary Paine, PH.D, Ann Evelyn, MD, Dinesh Karumanchi, MD, Joanne Murney, PH.D, Sherri Browning, PH.D, Lorrene Jurgens, Nurse Practitioner, Mindy Abel, Psy D, Corrine McCoy, Program Manager, Jennifer Cimpl, Psy D, Shannon Black, Psy D, Zakaria Siddiqui, MD, Kathleen Barrett, Psy D, Klaus Hartmann, MD.
Before RILEY, Chief Judge, BEAM and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.
John Maxwell Montin was committed to the Lincoln Regional Center (LRC) for a period of almost twenty years after a jury found him not responsible by reason of insanity. After his release, Montin brought suit in federal district court against various psychologists, psychiatrists, and other employees of the LRC, alleging defendants committed medical malpractice under Nebraska state law. Montin also alleged defendants violated his constitutional rights to be free from unnecessary confinement and free from retaliation for seeking access to courts. The district court1 dismissed Montin's state law malpractice claim as barred by sovereign immunity, and dismissed Montin's unnecessary confinement claim, ruling defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Because we conclude Montin's state law malpractice claim was improperly filed in federal court under the Nebraska State Tort Claims Act, and defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Montin's unnecessary confinement claim, we affirm.
A Nebraska state court committed Montin to the LRC on August 13, 1993, after a jury found Montin not responsible by reason of insanity on two felony charges. On July 16, 2013, almost twenty years after his initial commitment, that state court found Montin no longer dangerous to himself or others and ordered him unconditionally released. Defendants were all employees of the LRC during the time Montin was committed there and rendered professional healthcare services to Montin by conducting forensic evaluations, administering psychological testing, formulating and implementing treatment plans, and providing annual court reports.
In July 2014, Montin brought suit against defendants in federal court. Montin asserted, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, defendants violated his federal civil right to be free from unnecessary confinement by creating unreliable evaluations and reports and failing to evaluate and treat Montin properly so that Montin continued to be unnecessarily confined. Montin claimed this failure to evaluate and treat him adequately violated his fundamental right to freedom from physical restraint. Montin further asserted defendants violated his federal civil rights by retaliating against him for seeking relief in state and federal courts. Montin also alleged defendants failed to meet the standard of care in their respective disciplines under Nebraska state law by incorrectly labeling Montin as mentally ill and subjecting Montin to unnecessary and inappropriate treatment and confinement.
The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the state law malpractice claim because the claim was barred by sovereign immunity and not waived by Nebraska under its State Tort Claims Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81–8,209, et seq. The district court also granted defendants' Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed Montin's federal civil rights claims, concluding defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Montin appeals the district court's orders dismissing his claims, and we have jurisdiction to hear his appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Montin alleged defendants committed medical malpractice under Nebraska state law. The district court dismissed this claim following defendants' Rule 12(b)(1) and (6) motion to dismiss.2 We review such a dismissal de novo and interpret all factual allegations in the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Nelson v. Midland Credit Mgmt. Inc., 828 F.3d 749, 751 (8th Cir. 2016).
All defendants were state employees at the time of the events alleged in Montin's amended complaint. Sovereign immunity bars any suits against states and their employees in their official capacities. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712–13, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999). Congress can abrogate sovereign immunity, like it has for claims filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or states can waive sovereign immunity, but in the absence of such abrogation or waiver, sovereign immunity bars all suits. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54–55, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996).
Nebraska has waived sovereign immunity for a limited set of claims. See Nebraska State Tort Claims Act (STCA), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81–8,209, et seq. For suits not barred by sovereign immunity within Nebraska's waiver, the STCA provides:
The district court, sitting without a jury, shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear, determine, and render judgment on any suit or tort claim. Suits shall be brought in the district court of the county in which the act or omission complained of occurred or, if the act or omission occurred outside the boundaries of the State of Nebraska, in the district court for Lancaster County.
As an initial matter, Montin asserts the state law malpractice claim is against defendants in their individual capacities and is thus not barred by sovereign immunity. Montin's amended complaint alleges all state claims are "against the listed defendants in their individual capacity only" and "Defendants [sic] actions and omissions were taken under color and authority of state law, but not in furtherance of the official policy, practice, and custom of the LRC." (Emphasis added). All actions and omissions Montin pled—such as the failure to use appropriate forensic tools, the failure to score and interpret psychological tests correctly, and the submission of false or misleading reports—evidence defendants' malpractice occurred within the scope of defendants' employment as psychiatrists, psychologists, and employees of the LRC. Under Nebraska law, a state official acting within the scope of his or her employment at the time of an alleged tort must be sued in his or her official capacity, and the plaintiff must "comply with the requisites set out in the [STCA]." Bohl v. Buffalo Cty., 251 Neb. 492, 557 N.W.2d 668, 673 (1997). Though Montin's amended complaint explicitly declares all claims are against defendants in their individual capacities, all the actions or omissions alleged occurred in the scope of defendants' state employment, and we must treat the state law malpractice claim as if it is against defendants in their official capacities. See id.
Montin's claim against defendants in their official capacities is barred unless Nebraska has waived sovereign immunity. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54–55, 116 S.Ct. 1114. If Nebraska has waived its immunity, Montin must bring the claim within the bounds set forth by the Nebraska STCA. See Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 529, 20 How. 527, 15 L.Ed. 991 (1857) ().
If we assume Nebraska waived its sovereign immunity in this instance, any waiver of that immunity does not extend to actions brought in federal court. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81–8,214 (). State sovereign immunity bars actions in federal court regardless of the basis for otherwise appropriate subject matter jurisdiction. See Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S....
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