Montoya v. City of San Diego

Decision Date21 January 2020
Docket NumberCase No.: 19cv0054 JM(BGS)
Citation434 F.Supp.3d 830
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of California
Parties Alex MONTOYA; Rex Shirley; Philip Pressel; and Aaron Gresson, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, a public entity; Bird Rides, Inc., a Delaware corporation d/b/a Bird; Neutron Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation d/b/a Lime; Wheels Labs, Inc., a Delaware corporation; Uber Technologies, Inc., a Delaware corporation, d/b/a JUMP; Lyft, Inc.; Razor USA, LLC, a California corporation; and Does 1-100, Defendants.

Ann E. Menasche, Nichole Marie Mendoza, Disability Rights California, Matthew Ryan Souther, Phillip Edmond Stephan, Neil Dymott Frank McCabe & Hudson APLC, San Diego, CA, Benjamin T. Conway, Disability Rights California, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff.

Charles E. Bell, Jr., Danna Marie Whit Nicholas, Office of the City Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Defendant, City of San Diego.

Bronwyn F. Pollock, Mayer Brown LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Daniel E. Jones, Pro Hac Vice, Jonathan S. Klein, Pro Hac Vice, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant, Bird Rides, Inc.

Anne Marie Estevez, Pro Hac Vice, Morgan Lewis and Bockius LLP, Miami, FL, Kathy Hua Gao, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Stephanie Schuster, Pro Hac Vice, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Washington, DC, for Defendant, Neutron Holdings, Inc.

Tyler J. Woods, Pacific Trial Attorneys, Newport Beach, CA, for Defendant, Razor USA LLC.

Jennifer P. Suberlak, Thomas S. Ingrassia, Shelby Mae Harris, Pettit Kohn Ingrassia Lutz & Dolin PC, San Diego, CA, for Defendant, Wheels Labs, Inc.

Christopher Sean Patterson, Duane Morris LLP, San Francisco, CA, Courtney Lenore Baird, Jason H. Dang, Duane Morris LLP, San Diego, CA, Joseph Colin Knisely, Pro Hac Vice, Duane Morris LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant, Uber Technologies, Inc.

Kristina M. Launey, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Sacramento, CA, Eden Edwards Anderson, Seyfath Shaw LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant, Lyft, Inc.

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller, United States District Judge

Presently before the court are five motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Doc. Nos. 30, 56, 57, 62, 63.) All six Defendants move to dismiss the first amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), with Defendant Lyft Inc. ("Lyft") and Defendant Uber Technologies Inc., d/b/a JUMP ("Uber") also moving under Rule 12(b)(1). A hearing on the motions was held on January 13, 2020. For the reasons set forth below, City of San Diego's ("City") motion is denied, and the remaining Defendants' motions are granted.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 9, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a putative class action complaint asserting claims for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. , section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq., California Civil Code section 51, et seq. , (the "Unruh Act"), California Civil Code section 54, et seq. , (the "Disabled Persons Act"); California Government Code section 4450, et seq. , and California Government Code section 11135, et seq. , (Doc. No. 1.)

On March 21, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Class Action Complaint ("FAC"). (Doc. No. 14.) The FAC alleges that Plaintiffs, who are individuals with disabilities, have found their access to San Diego's sidewalks diminished by the proliferation of dockless electric vehicles currently in use in the City. (FAC ¶ 1, 12, 13, 14, 15.) They allege that people using the dockless electric vehicles either travel on the sidewalks or block paths of travel because the vehicles are discarded in the middle of sidewalks or at other rights of way, making it difficult for people with disabilities to safely traverse the pathways. (Id. at 2, 3.1 )

Further, the FAC alleges that as usage and abandonment of these vehicles and the speed at which they travel increases, Plaintiffs are denied safe, equal and full access to the sidewalks. (Id. at ¶ 41.) In Plaintiffs' words, the vehicles' "burgeoning proliferation and uncurbed growth comes at the detriment of the rights of all disabled persons with mobility and/or visual impairments who are residents and visitors of the City of San Diego, causing Plaintiffs injury, severe anxiety, diminishing their comfort and discriminating against them based on their disabilities...." (Id. at ¶ 42.)

Plaintiffs direct allegations at the City regarding its responsibilities as a municipality and the duty it has to maintain the sidewalks. (See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 43-45, 62-76, 78-85, 98-103, 105-115, 117-122, 127-133.) Similarly, the FAC makes allegations against the private entities that rent dockless scooters and bikes, via mobile phone apps, to third-party individuals in San Diego, which Plaintiffs categorize as the "Dockless Vehicles Defendants." (See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 41, 42, 46, 50, 87-95, 105-115, 117-122, 127-133.)

Plaintiffs seek to represent a putative class consisting of "all persons with disabilities with mobility or visual impairments who have been denied access to or full enjoyment of the system of sidewalks, crosswalks, transit stops, curb ramps, pedestrian crossings and other walkways in the City of San Diego because of their disabilities." (Id. at ¶ 52.)

The prayer for relief seeks, amongst other things, an award of statutory damages and an order "enjoining the Dockless Vehicle Defendants from continuing to operate on the system of sidewalks, crosswalks, curb ramps, transit stops, pedestrian crossings and other walkways in the City of San Diego." (Id. at ¶ 137B.)

On April 4, 2019, Defendants Neutron Holdings, Inc. d/b/a Lime ("Lime"), Bird Rides, Inc. ("Bird"), and Razor, USA, LLC ("Razor") (collectively the "Scooter Defendants") filed a joint motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 30.)2 Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion, (Doc. No. 34) and the Scooter Defendants filed a reply, (Doc. No. 38).

On May 31, 2019, both Defendant Wheels Labs, Inc. ("Wheels Labs"), and Defendant City filed motions to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6).3 (Doc. Nos. 56, 57.) The City also filed a Notice of Joinder to the Scooter Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No 58.) Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motions, (Doc. Nos. 68, 69), and Wheel Labs and City each filed a reply, (Doc. Nos. 71, 74).

On June 3, 2019, Defendant Lyft filed its motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 62.) Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion, (Doc. No. 62), and Lyft filed a reply, (Doc. No. 73).

On June 7, 2019, Defendant Uber filed its motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 63.) Uber also joined the Scooter Defendants', Wheel Labs', Lyft's and City's motions to dismiss. (Doc. No. 64). Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion, (Doc. No. 70), and Uber filed a reply, (Doc. No. 72).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a complaint as failing to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). This is because a "pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Ordinarily, for purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court "accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). The court must be able to "draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663, 129 S.Ct. 1937. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief ... [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

In contrast, Rule 12(b)(1) allows a party to move to dismiss based on the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over an action. Ass'n of Am. Med. Colls. v. U.S. , 217 F.3d 770, 778-79 (9th Cir. 2000). In a class action, at least one of the named plaintiffs must meet the Article III standing requirements. Bates v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007). Article III requires that: "(1) at least one named plaintiff suffered an injury in fact, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of standing, both the trial judge and reviewing courts must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party." Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) ). "At the pleadings stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

III. MOTIONS TO STRIKE

Before addressing the motions to dismiss, the court first turns to two motions to strike filed by Plaintiffs.

The first motion to strike, Request to Strike City's Purported Supplemental Authority (the "Supplement"), was filed by Plaintiffs on July 8, 2019. (Doc. No. 78.)

On July 5, City filed a copy of Ordinance Number 0-21070, amending Chapter 8 of the San Diego ...

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