Montoya v. Dairyland Insurance Company
Decision Date | 02 June 1975 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 74-476. |
Citation | 394 F. Supp. 1337 |
Parties | Concha MONTOYA, Individually and as next friend of David Montoya, a minor, Plaintiffs, v. DAIRYLAND INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
Bachicha, Corlett & Casey, P. A., Santa Fe, N. M., for plaintiffs.
LeRoi Farlow, Albuquerque, N. M., for defendant.
This case involves a complaint for declaratory judgment filed by the plaintiff, Concha Montoya, individually and as next friend of David Montoya, a minor, against the defendant, Dairyland Insurance Company concerning the coverage and rights of the plaintiff under an uninsured motorist endorsement to plaintiff's automobile insurance policy issued by the defendant.1
The one fact giving rise to this lawsuit which is not in dispute is that plaintiff's car, at the time being driven by plaintiff who was accompanied by her son, David Montoya, collided with a stone wall. Further, it is agreed there was no physical contact between the plaintiff's vehicle and any other vehicle prior to the collision with the wall.
Plaintiff further states that while she was properly driving her vehicle, plaintiff suddenly noticed the headlights of an oncoming vehicle approaching around a curve on plaintiff's lane of traffic a short distance from plaintiff. Plaintiff states that to avoid an imminent head-on collision, plaintiff swerved her vehicle to the right and collided with a stone wall off the right shoulder of the road. There was never any physical contact by the plaintiff's vehicle and the other unknown vehicle, the operator of which, plaintiff states, drove on without stopping and has never been identified.
Plaintiff and her husband had in force at the time of the collision an automobile liability insurance policy with the defendant insurer which provided certain coverage when an uninsured motorist was involved. That coverage included provisions allowing coverage when the insured is involved in an accident with a "hit-and-run" vehicle provided there is in fact physical contact between the insured and the "hit-and-run" vehicle.
The particular question before this Court is whether an insurance company can contractually restrict its uninsured or unknown motorist coverage to situations in which there is physical contact between the insured and a "hit-and-run"2 vehicle without violating the legislative policy of § 64-24-105 New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 1953 Comp.3
Because the courts of New Mexico have not addressed the aforementioned particular question and because the State law is unsettled, it is the function of the Federal Courts in this diversity suit to determine what the New Mexico Supreme Court would likely decide if presented with the identical issue.
The issue of the validity of the physical contact requirement of insurance policies has been entertained by courts of several states for some time. 25 ALR 3rd 1299.4 In those states, as in New Mexico, there is generally a statute requiring insurance companies to offer uninsured or unknown motorist coverage. There is, however, usually no statutory requirement to include coverage for "hit-and-run" drivers nor a requirement that physical contact must have occurred before one can recover for injury due to a "hit-and-run" vehicle.5 The courts of those same states have, on the other hand been almost unaminous in holding that the operator of a "hit-and-run" vehicle is an uninsured or an unknown motorist. See 26 ALR 3rd 883, 913. The split of the various states has arisen over the physical contact issue.
This Court has considered numerous decisions which conclude that it is reasonable to require physical contact between a "hit-and-run" vehicle and the insured before coverage is allowed under the uninsured or unknown motorist provisions. Phelps v. Twin City Fire Insurance Co., 476 S.W.2d 419 (Tex.Civ.App. 1972); Buckeye Union Insurance Co. v. Cooperman, 33 Ohio App.2d 152, 293 N. E.2d 293 (1972); Ely v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 148 Ind.App. 586, 268 N.E.2d 316 (1971); Collins v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 234 So.2d 270 (La.App.1970), writ refused, 256 La. 375, 236 So.2d 503 (1970); Hendricks v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 5 N.C.App. 181, 167 S.E. 2d 876 (1969); Prosk v. Allstate Insurance Co., 82 Ill.App.2d 457, 226 N.E.2d 498 (1967).
The reasoning is generally based on the premise that requiring physical contact precludes any fraud upon the insurer and prevents recovery of damages in cases where the insured's injuries are the result of his own negligence, without the intervention of any other vehicle, but it is alleged by the insured that the accident was caused by an unidentified vehicle which subsequently left the scene of the accident. See gen. 25 ALR 3rd 1299.
This Court has similarly considered numerous cases holding that, generally, the physical contact requirement is an impermissible limitation on the uninsured or unknown motorist statute, is contrary to public and legislative policy, and is, therefore, invalid. Farmers Insurance Exchange v. McDermott, 527 P. 2d 918 (Colo.App.1974); Balestrieri v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Insurance Co., 22 Ariz.App. 255, 526 P.2d 779 (1974); DeMello v. First Insurance Co. of Hawaii, Ltd., 523 P.2d 304 (Hawaii 1974); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Novak, 83 Wash.2d 576, 520 P.2d 1368 (1974); Webb v. United Services Automobile Association, 227 Pa.Super. 508, 323 A.2d 737 (1974); State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Lambert, 291 Ala. 645, 285 So.2d 917 (1973); Brown v. Progressive Mutual Insurance Co., 249 So.2d 429 (Fla.1971).
Whereas there is generally one reason espoused by the proponents of the physical contact requirement, i. e., fraud on the insurer, those Courts who have ruled against the physical contact requirement cite many and varied reasons for its invalidity.
These latter cases correctly reveal that uninsured or unknown motorist statutes were adopted, and the clear and unambiguous legislative intent was, to expand insurance protection to the public who use the streets, highways and walkways. The public was to be protected from damage or injury caused by other motorists who were not insured and could not make the injured party whole. The public was no longer to be faced with the possible financial distress or all too often certain financial calamity caused by negligent and insolvent drivers.
In short, the uninsured or unknown motorist statutes are designed to protect the injured party from the uninsured or unknown motorist. The statutes are not designed to protect the insurance company from the injured party.
There is, of course, the possibility of fraud by one claiming injury due to an unidentified "hit-and-run" driver when there was no such driver and it was in fact the negligence of the injured party himself who caused the injury. However, Hartford Accident And Indemnity Company v. Novak, supra at 1372.6
Also, the following criticism of the physical contact requirement as an anti-fraud measure has been expressed:
A. Widiss, A Guide To Uninsured Motorist Coverage (1969).
The Supreme Court of Hawaii indicated, as would common sense, that the physical contact requirement may in fact not be a complete barrier to fraudulent claims.
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