Montoya v. Española Pub. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 10–CV–651 WPJ/LFG.
| Decision Date | 22 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 10–CV–651 WPJ/LFG.,10–CV–651 WPJ/LFG. |
| Citation | 861 F.Supp.2d 1307 |
| Parties | Sandra MONTOYA, on Behalf of her Minor Child, S.M., Rebecca Archuleta, on behalf of her Minor Child, E. S., Bernadette Gallegos on behalf of Her Minor Child, R.P., Charlene Guinn, on behalf of her Minor Child S.V., Andrea Serna on behalf of her Minor child C.G., Jerry and Michelle Trujillo on behalf of their Minor Child, G.T., and Elizabeth McCall–Guinn on Behalf her Minor Child, S.M.G., and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ESPAÑOLA PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, Superintendent Janette Archuleta, Associate Superintendent Dorothy Sanchez, Española Valley High School Assistant Principal Devanna Ortega, Carlos Vigil Middle School Seventh Grade Principal Lewis Johnson, Carlos Vigil Middle School Assistant Principal Dennis Gallegos, in their individual capacities; City of Española Police Officers Bryan Martinez and Danny Pacheco, in their individual capacities; Elias Coriz and Cheryl Montoya, individually and as owners of Big Ross, Inc. d/b/a ProSec Services; Big Ross Security Guards Geraldine Martinez, Jason Archuleta, Defendant Security Guard John Doe, in their individual capacities, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Brendan K. Egan, John Chapman Young, The Rothstein Law Firm, Carolyn M. Nichols, Joseph P. Kennedy, Philip B. Davis, Attorney at Law, Shannon L. Kennedy, Kennedy & Oliver PC, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiffs.
Elizabeth V. Friedenstein, Brown Law Firm, Kevin M. Brown, Robert L. Cole, Gregory L. Biehler, Albuquerque, NM, John L. Appel, Coppler & Mannick, PC, Santa Fe, NM, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS BREACH OF THIRD–PARTY BENEFICIARY CONTRACT CLAIMS BY R.P., S.V., C.G., AND S.M.G. AGAINST DEFENDANTS ELIAS CORIZ AND CHERYL MONTOYA, d/b/a BIG ROSS SECURITY
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon a Motion to Dismiss Breach of Third Party Beneficiary Contract Claims by R.P., S.V., C.G., and S.M.G. against Defendants Elias Coriz and Cheryl Montoya, d/b/a Big Ross Security (doc. 224), filed on April 2, 2012. Having considered the parties' briefs and the applicable law, I find that Defendants' motion is well-taken and thus, shall be GRANTED.
Plaintiffs in this case are students who were enrolled at either Española Valley High School or Carlos Vigil Middle School in northern-central New Mexico. The Third Amended Complaint (“complaint”) brought by the students' parents alleges negligence, third-party beneficiary claims of breach of contract and breach of implied contract, and violations of various rights under the New Mexico and United States Constitutions. Plaintiffs allege that the school administration is apathetic about school safety, that Defendants have created a dangerous environment for its students, and that they have taken little or no action to prevent attacks on students by other students. They also allege that Big Ross Security has profited economically by providing security officers who lack training and experience and engage in behavior that endangers students, faculty and staff. The complaint (doc. 196) asserts violations of the New Mexico and United States Constitutions, federal statutory law and state common law. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and also seek to certify this action as a class action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2).
The instant motion seeks dismissal of breach of contract claims brought by four of the students, R.P., S.V., C.G., and S.M.G. against the Defendants who provided the security for the schools: Elias Coriz and Cheryl Montoya, d/b/a Big Ross Security (“Defendants” for purposes of this motion).1 Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have no standing to bring third party beneficiary breach of contract claims, and as a result have failed to plead these claims with sufficient facts to meet the required legal standards under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).
The Constitution limits the subject matter jurisdiction of Article III courts to actual cases and controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1; Morgan v. McCotter, 365 F.3d 882, 887 (10th Cir.2004) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)). A plaintiff must have standing to satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement. Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 159 L.Ed.2d 98 (2004); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). There are three requirements to show Article III standing at an “irreducible constitutional minimum.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. The plaintiff must show: (1) that he or she has suffered an injury in fact; (2) that the alleged harm is fairly traceable to defendant's conduct; and (3) that a favorable ruling from the court would redress the injury. Essence, Inc. v. City of Fed. Heights, 285 F.3d 1272, 1280 (10th Cir.2002) (internal quotations omitted).
Under the first prong, an injury in fact is an “invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “distinct and palpable” and not conjectural or hypothetical. Id.;Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). A main focus of the standing inquiry is thus whether a plaintiff has suffered “a present or imminent injury, as opposed to a mere possibility, or even the probability, of future injury.” Essence, 285 F.3d at 1280. Accordingly, a plaintiff “must show something more than simply a deprivation in the abstract.” Morgan, 365 F.3d at 888. Once a defendant asserts lack of subject matter jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has the requisite subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130.
If a plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim for which there is a plausible entitlement to relief, the Court must dismiss the complaint. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. While the well-pled factual allegations of a complaint must be acceptedas true for purposes of a motion to dismiss, neither conclusory allegations nor legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations need be accepted as such. See id. at 555–56, 127 S.Ct. 1955;see also Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir.2007) (). The burden is on the plaintiff to frame a “complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” that he or she is entitled to relief. Twombly at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
The parties dispute several issues related to the breach of contract claims: whether Article III standing is required to proceed with these claims under this Court's supplemental jurisdiction; and if so, whether Plaintiffs have met the requirements of standing for the breach of contract claims to withstand dismissal.
The breach of contract claim at issue is just one of several causes of action in this lawsuit, alleged as Count II of the complaint. It is clear that this Court has original jurisdiction over the alleged federal constitutional claims, and that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. 2 Plaintiffs contend that they need not pass Article III's standing requirements for state law claims, as long as the Court has original jurisdiction over the federal claims. The only basis for this contention is the language in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) which states that:
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.
Id. (emphasis added). Plaintiffs essentially argue that claims for which they have no standing get a “free pass” by coming into court attached to federal claims over which the Court does have original jurisdiction. The Court finds nothing in the language of § 1367 suggesting that it acts as an exception to the provision in the United States Constitution which limits subject matter jurisdiction to actual cases and controversies.
There is no case law which supports Plaintiff's position on this issue, and Plaintiffs would be hard-pressed to find such cases. The language in § 1367, if anything, suggests that supplemental claims would be subject to the same case-or-controversy requirement, since those claims must “form part of the same case or controversy under Article III....” In Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., the Second Circuit noted that the text of § 1367(a) “unambiguously extends jurisdiction to the limits of Article III.” 358 F.3d 205 (2nd Cir.2004). This Court declines to extend its jurisdictional limits any further. Accordingly, I find that Plaintiffs must have standing to bring the breach of contract claims in Count II in order for this Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims.
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have no standing to bring breach of contract claims against Defendants because they cannot show that they are the intended beneficiaries of the contract executed between Defendants and the two schools (Española Valley High School and Carlos Vigil Middle Schools, hereinafter referred to as “Schools”).
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