Montoya v. Greenway Aluminum Co., Inc., 1915--I

Citation10 Wn.App. 630,519 P.2d 22
Decision Date25 February 1974
Docket NumberNo. 1915--I,1915--I
PartiesHerman MONTOYA, Respondent, v. GREENWAY ALUMINUM COMPANY, INC., Appellant, Collator Corporation, Respondent.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington

Williams, Lanza, Kastner & Gibbs, William D. Cameron, Seattle, for appellant.

Ferguson & Burdell, W. Wesselhoeft, James P. McGowan, Seattle, for Montoya.

Hoover, Lind & Parkhurst, Fred N. Hoover, Seattle, for Collator Corp.

CALLOW, Judge.

Quaere: Is a third party sued by an employee for injuries suffered in an industrial accident entitled to indemnity from the employer when the injury resulted from the negligence of the employer and/or the third party?

2 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 76.10, p. 227 (1970) poses the inquiry as follows:

Perhaps the most evenly-balanced controversy in all of compensation law is the question whether a third party in an action by the employee can get contribution or indemnity from the employer, when the employer's negligence has caused or contributed to the injury.

(Footnote omitted.)

Herman Montoya, an employee of Collator Corporation, was injured on the premises of the third party, Greenway Aluminum Company, Inc. The action by the plaintiff-employee (Montoya) against the third party (Greenway) was settled prior to oral appellant argument. Only the issue of indemnity from the employer to the third party remains. The third party contends that the indemnity issue raises three questions: (1) Is an independent duty of the employer to indemnify the third party arising from contract, express or implied, free of the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the Industrial Insurance Act? (2) Does an employer owe the third party an implied obligation of due care in performance where the third party allows the employer to perform work upon the third party's premises? (3) Where an employer breaches his duty to perform work upon the third party's premises with due care, thereby imposing liability upon the third party, and the parties are not in pari delicto, is the third party entitled to indemnity from the employer?

Greenway Aluminum Company, Inc. and Collator Corporation are engaged separately in aluminum fabrication. They occupy adjoining premises in a building in Seattle. The president and owner of Collator is also the president and owner of a third corporation which owns the building. Greenway rented its premises from this corporation.

Prior to the accident that gave rise to this action, Collator arranged with Greenway for the use of certain cleaning and caustic tanks which were located upon the premises occupied by Greenway. These tanks often were not used by Greenway, and the arrangement allowed Collator to use them whenever Greenway did not. Greenway received no benefit from the arrangement which it permitted in order to accommodate the corporation owned by its landlord. Greenway continued to pay all utility charges associated with the tanks as well as the expense of the chemicals. There was no arrangement by which Collator or any person associated with Collator was to notify Greenway when Collator intended to use the tanks, and no actual notice was ever given to Greenway that employees of Collator were working on Greenway's premises.

The accident occurred on March 20, 1970, when Herman Montoya, a Collator employee was doing processing work for Collator on the Greenway premises. While so engaged, Montoya was walking on top of four rectangular open tanks containing respectively, caustic chemical, cold water, acid and hot water. Montoya was working with a suspended rack which could be positioned over and lowered into either tank. He pulled this rack out of the hot water and started to push it, lost his footing and fell to his waist in the hot water tank sustaining first and second degree burns. There was extended testimony concerning alternative methods for moving the rack that Montoya could or should have used. There is also a conflict in the evidence about whether Montoya was adequately warned against walking on the tank. However, sufficient evidence was presented to the jury to support a finding that Greenway was negligent in its maintenance of the premises and Collator was negligent in failing to adequately instruct Montoya and provide him with certain safety equipment. Greenway alleged four alternative grounds for indemnity: (1) Collator had a licensee relation with Greenway which required Collator, by implication, to conduct its work upon Greenway's premises in a safe, reasonable manner; (2) Collator violated its obligation of reasonable care; (3) Collator's negligence was active and primary while Greenway's negligence, if any, was passive; and (4) Collator and Greenway had an implied contract of indemnity which arose out of the legal relationship between the parties with respect to the use of Greenway's premises. The trial court refused to grant indemnity against Collator as a matter of law or submit the issue of indemnity to the jury and dismiss the action against Collator Corporation at the close of the presentation of evidence. The trial court instructed the jury on negligence and contributory negligence as between the employee and the third party. The jury could consider only those issues and returned a verdict of $17,000 for Montoya against Greenway.

Collator contends it is immune from Greenway's actions for indemnity by reason of the Industrial Insurance Act, RCW 51, which, it is argued, establishes the statutory compensation as the sole remedy against an employer and bars any remedy at common law.

There are strong arguments for both positions. The employer may argue that indemnification to the third party against the judgment the employee has recovered for the third party's negligence should not be required when one of the purposes of industrial insurance is to limit the employer's liability for compensation payments. The third party may claim it should not bear the whole burden of liability when the employer may have been negligent also and would have had to share or bear the liability entirely but for the happenstance that the plaintiff-employee and his negligent employer are covered by the compensation act. The third party may argue further against thusly being required to support the compensation system when the responsibility normally would be shared with or borne entirely by the employer.

RCW 51.04.010, in declaring the exercise of the police power and sovereign power of the state in establishing the industrial insurance system, stated that:

all phases of the premises are withdrawn from private controversy, . . . regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding or compensation, except as otherwise provided in this title; and to that end all civil actions and civil causes of action for such personal injuries and all jurisdiction of the courts of the state over such causes are hereby abolished, except as in this title provided.

The statute on its face sets forth a recital of remedies that are all-inclusive. This recital encompasses the status of both the employer and the employee. As noted in Greenleaf v. Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co., 58 Wash.2d 647, 658 364 P.2d 796 (1961), quoting from Stertz v. Industrial Ins. Comm'n, 91 Wash. 588, 158 P. 256 (1916):

When the employer, for his part, pays his share into this fund, all obligation on his part To anybody is ended.

(Italics ours.)

The Industrial Insurance Act is intended to grant the employee a sure and certain relief while imposing liability upon the accident found regardless of the fault or due care of either the employer or the employee. Historically, under the act, the employer, as a party defendant, was not to be looked to for recourse; but the fund, set up to provide for the losses which inevitably would occur, was the source for recovery. See Boeing Aircraft Co. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 22 Wash.2d 423, 156 P.2d 640 (1945). The act now imposes upon all employers in a class (except self insureds under RCW 51.14) the responsibility of paying into the accident fund so much in premiums as is necessary to maintain the solvency of the fund. RCW 51.16.035. When an injury to a workman results from the negligence of another not in the same employ, the employee must elect to take under the act or seek a common law remedy against the third party. RCW 51.24.010. Then, as stated in Davis v. Early Constr. Co., 63 Wash.2d 252, 256, 386 P.2d 958, 961 (1963):

for RCW 51.24.010 provides immunity to the employer only. RCW 51.24.010 is not a bar to an action against a negligent third party, whether such party be engaged in extrahazardous employment or not.

Thus, the freedom from suit provided to the employer is a statutory immunity granted in return for the premiums paid into the fund and the loss of legal defenses. Since RCW 51.24.010, which grants the employee the right to bring an action against a third party tort-feasor, is also held to grant an immunity from suit to the employer (which immunity already existed insofar as an action by the employee was concerned) the only grant of immunity that can flow to the employer from RCW 51.24.010 is immunity from suit by the third party.

The arrangement between the employer and the third party was a casual use by the employer of the third party's premises under an oral permission. Their understanding went no further than to allow the use of facilities and did not contemplate the ramifications or possible consequences of that use. In Tucci & Sons, Inc. v. Carl T. Madsen, Inc., 1 Wash.App. 1035, 467 P.2d 386 (1970), the employer (subcontractor) entered into a written agreement with the third party (contractor) which included an indemnity clause agreeing to save the third party harmless from all suits arising out of performance of the contract. When the employee was injured, the written indemnification clause was upheld. The court said the employer could voluntarily assume the burden of...

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