Montoya v. Jeffreys
| Decision Date | 30 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 18 C 1991 |
| Citation | 565 F.Supp.3d 1045 |
| Parties | Celina MONTOYA, Zachary Blaye, and Ronald Molina, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Rob JEFFREYS, in his official capacity as Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Mark G. Weinberg, Attorney at Law, Adele D. Nicholas, Law Office of Adele D. Nicholas, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff Celina Montoya.
Adele D. Nicholas, Law Office of Adele D. Nicholas, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs Zachary Blaye, Ronald Molina.
Kelly C. Bauer, Erin Walsh, Sarah Hughes Newman, Office of the Illinois Attorney General, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.
Celina Montoya, Zachary Blaye, and Ronald Molina, all serving mandatory supervised release ("MSR") terms following imprisonment for Illinois sex offense convictions, bring this certified class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Rob Jeffreys in his official capacity as Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC"), alleging that IDOC's implementation of an MSR condition prohibiting them from having contact with their minor children without prior approval violates their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Doc. 92. Earlier in the litigation, the court enjoined enforcement of IDOC's then-current parent-child contact policy, Doc. 33, and denied IDOC's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim, Docs. 63-64 (reported at 2019 WL 296556 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2019) ). Plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint directed against IDOC's current policy. Doc. 92. The court denied IDOC's motion to dismiss the amended complaint, Docs. 138-139 (reported at 2020 WL 4464672 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 2020) ), and granted Plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class under Civil Rule 23(b)(2) to seek injunctive relief against certain aspects of the current policy. Docs. 165-166 (reported at 2020 WL 6581648 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2020) ).
Plaintiffs and IDOC now cross-move for summary judgment on all claims. Docs. 171, 192. Plaintiffs’ motion is denied, and IDOC's motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Because the parties cross-move for summary judgment, the court must consider the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs when addressing IDOC's motion and in the light most favorable to IDOC when addressing Plaintiffs’ motion. See First State Bank of Monticello v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. , 555 F.3d 564, 567 (7th Cir. 2009) () (internal quotation marks omitted). To the extent a disputed fact relates to both sides’ motions, the court will set forth the parties’ respective positions. At this juncture, the court does not vouch for either side's version of the facts. See Gates v. Bd. of Educ. , 916 F.3d 631, 633 (7th Cir. 2019).
The class is defined as "all parents of minor children who are on [MSR] for a sex offense under the supervision of [IDOC]." Doc. 165. IDOC is responsible for monitoring persons on MSR—who for ease of reference will be called "parolees"—convicted of sex offenses. Doc. 205 at ¶ 1. IDOC supervises approximately 1,600 parolees who were convicted of sex offenses, most with victims under the age of 18. Id. at ¶ 2; Doc. 195-1 at ¶ 3.
Although IDOC manages the supervision of parolees, the MSR statute grants the Illinois Prisoner Review Board ("IPRB") the power to set MSR conditions: "The conditions of ... [MSR] shall be such as [IPRB] deems necessary to assist the subject in leading a law-abiding life." 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a). The statute lists a series of conditions that IPRB must impose, such as not violating any criminal statute, id. at § 5/3-3-7(a)(1) ; reporting to an IDOC parole agent, id. at § 5/3-3-7(a)(3) ; and—for parolees "convicted of a sex offense"—completing sex offender treatment, id. at § 5/3-3-7(a)(7.5). Another required condition is that a parolee must "follow any specific instructions provided by the parole agent that are consistent with further conditions set and approved by [IPRB] or by law." Id. at § 5/3-3-7(a)(15). IDOC has over forty parole agents and four parole commanders assigned to supervise sex offenders. Doc. 205 at ¶ 3.
The MSR statute further provides that "persons required to register as sex offenders ... may be required by [IPRB] to comply with" several additional conditions. 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(b-1) (emphasis added). One such condition is to "refrain from all contact, directly or indirectly, personally, by telephone, letter, or through a third party, with minor children without prior identification and approval of an agent of [IDOC]." Id. § 5/3-3-7(b-1)(9). Plaintiffs submit that IPRB imposes on all parolees with sex offense convictions a condition that tracks that statutory language. Doc. 171 at 11. IDOC states that "almost all sex offenders" must abide by the condition to not contact minor children without prior IDOC approval. Doc. 192-1 at 15. IDOC does not elaborate as to which offenders might be exempt from the requirement and does not contend that any such exceptions affect this case.
Due to this prohibition on contact with minor children, a parolee who committed a sex offense may not contact his or her own minor children upon release from prison. Doc. 193 at ¶¶ 13-14. The parties dispute whether this imposes a "presumptive ban" on child contact, Doc. 171 at 15; Doc. 192-1 at 6, but the debate is semantic. IDOC states that it "has adopted a process for approving a paroled sex offender's request for contact with his or her minor children," which necessarily implies that approval is required and therefore that a presumptive ban is in place. Doc. 192-1 at 16. Indeed, IDOC Deputy Chief of Parole Dion Dixon testified that "[i]mmediately" upon release, "the presumption is that [the parolee] may not have contact with his or her children." Doc. 174-2 at 3 (6:3-6), 9 (31:15-18). By way of qualification, Dixon added that "some parolees have come out with court orders stating that they can have contact with their children." Id. at 9 (31:20-23). But Dixon could not identify any other circumstances in which immediate child contact would be allowed. Id. at 9 (32:8-15). So, while IDOC resists characterizing its parolee-child contact policy as establishing a "presumption," the evidence shows that, absent a court order, IDOC does not allow parolees with sex offense convictions to contact their children upon their release on MSR. The court will refer to this policy as the "no-contact condition."
IDOC's enabling statute provides that, before a person convicted of a sex offense is released from prison, he or she "shall be required to receive a sex offender evaluation." 730 ILCS 5/3-6-2(j). Sarah Brown-Foiles—IDOC's coordinator for sex offender services, Doc. 195-1 at ¶ 1—testified that IDOC conducts this evaluation about a year before the offender's scheduled release from prison. Doc. 174-7 at 23 (86:19-87:2). This "pre-release evaluation" is conducted by licensed sex offender evaluators. Doc. 193 at ¶ 59. The evaluation is a solely an "informative report" and "does not look to predict futur[e] risk" of re-offense. Doc. 174-7 at 24 (91:11-13). The evaluation does summarize the offender's background, educational attainment, medical needs, psychiatric and mental health history, and criminal history. Id. at 24 (92:21-93:15); Doc. 193 at ¶ 60. That information is derived from the prisoner's voluntary self-reporting, IDOC's internal records, and other sources such as case files and police reports. Doc. 174-7 at 24-25 (93:24-96:15). Pre-release evaluations are used to inform IDOC parole agents and treatment providers about "what type of client they're getting" upon an offender's release on MSR. Doc. 193 at ¶ 62.
Separately, the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act ("SVPCA"), 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. , creates a process by which the Attorney General of Illinois or the relevant county's State's Attorney may petition for civil commitment of certain sex offenders upon their release from prison. To facilitate this process, the SVPCA requires IDOC to conduct a "comprehensive evaluation of the person's mental condition," which is different from the pre-release evaluation discussed above. Id. at § 207/10(c)(2). Persons convicted of a "sexually violent offense" as defined in the SVPCA, id. at § 207/5(e), must undergo this additional "SVP screening." Doc. 193 at ¶ 64. All sex offenders in IDOC custody except those convicted of criminal sexual abuse qualify for this SVP screening. Ibid. The SVP screening occurs approximately six months before release and is informed by the earlier pre-release evaluation. Id. at ¶¶ 62, 64. The SVP screening employs "actuarial-based risk assessment tools." Id. at ¶ 65.
IDOC does not use pre-release evaluations or SVP screenings to make any determinations about child contact before sex offenders with children are released on MSR. As noted, the no-contact condition initially prohibits contact absent a court order. Doc. 193 at ¶¶ 13-14. IDOC encourages parole agents to review the pre-release evaluation to "inform decisions regarding restrictions," but that review happens after an offender's release. Id. at ¶ 63.
The parties dispute whether IDOC could practicably use pre-release evaluations and SVP screenings to make decisions before an inmate's release about whether the inmate should be allowed to contact their children after release. Plaintiffs contend that a pre-release evaluation, because it examines the inmate's criminal record, would at least reveal whether the inmate's child was a victim of his or her crimes. Doc. 171 at 47. And pointing out that Blaye was granted contact with his children after only one meeting with a therapist,...
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