Montoya v. Montoya
| Decision Date | 13 September 2005 |
| Docket Number | (AC 24138). |
| Citation | Montoya v. Montoya, 881 A.2d 319, 91 Conn.App. 407 (Conn. App. 2005) |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | PAULETTE MONTOYA v. FRED MONTOYA. |
Schaller, Dranginis and Berdon, Js.
Steven D. Ecker, for the appellant (defendant).
Samuel V. Schoonmaker IV, with whom was Jill H. Blomberg, for the appellee (plaintiff).
The defendant, Fred Montoya, challenged certain financial orders made by the trial court in its judgment dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff, Paulette Montoya. He also challenges the court's post-judgment order awarding attorney's fees to the plaintiff to defend the appeal. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly applied the terms of the parties' prenuptial agreement when it (1) calculated the appreciation of assets subject to distribution under the agreement, (2) mixed gross figures with net figures when calculating the net appreciation of assets under the agreement, (3) fixed the amount of attorney's fees to which he was entitled for defending the validity and enforceability of the agreement, and (4) awarded the plaintiff attorney's fees on appeal. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendant's appeal. On June 17, 1995, just hours prior to their wedding ceremony, the parties executed a prenuptial agreement (agreement) that was the result of a vigorous and contentious negotiation between the parties, both of whom were represented by counsel. The following paragraphs from the agreement are relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
Paragraph seven provides in relevant part that each of the parties
Paragraph eight provides in relevant part:
Paragraph nine provides in relevant part: "Subject to the terms of this agreement, each party hereto shall during his or her lifetime keep and retain sole ownership, control and enjoyment of all property which is his or her separate property under the terms of this agreement . . . ."
Paragraph ten provides in relevant part: "[E]ach of the parties shall have the absolute right to manage, dispose of, or otherwise deal with any property now separately owned, or hereafter separately acquired, in any manner whatsoever."
Paragraph twelve provides in relevant part: "In the event that the contemplated marriage of the parties hereto shall end in divorce . . . the parties hereto agree . . . [that][e]ach party shall be responsible [for] his or her own legal fees and expenses . . . ."
Paragraph fourteen provides in relevant part: "All property received by a party as compensation for his or her personal services, skill or effort (whether received before or during the marriage of the parties hereto) shall be and remain the separate property of the party receiving such property."
Paragraph seventeen provides in relevant part: "Any assets obtained by either party as a consequence of the use, investment, reinvestment or any transfer of any portion of his or her separate property, and any income therefrom, and any appreciation in the value thereof, shall remain part of his or her separate property and separate estate."
Paragraph eighteen provides in relevant part: "`Marital property' includes all property acquired by either party after the date of the marriage by the use of any economic resources not defined herein as being `separate property,' and all property placed in joint names and any other property specifically identified by the parties as being joint property."
Paragraph twenty-six provides in relevant part: "The parties specifically agree that this Ante-Nuptial Agreement and all of the rights and obligations of the parties hereunder shall be construed and interpreted according to the Laws of the State of New York."
Paragraph thirty-two provides: "In the event that either party initiates litigation against the other with respect to this Agreement, the successful party shall be entitled to receive, in addition to any award followed by any Court, the amount of reasonable attorney['s] fees fixed by the Court before [which] this litigation was initiated as an additional amount to be added to the judgment awarded to the successful party."
Paragraph thirty-four provides in relevant part: "The parties acknowledge that this Ante-Nuptial Agreement is a document which has been negotiated by both parties and the parties agree that for purposes of construction neither party is deemed to be the draftsman thereof."
On April 12, 2001, the plaintiff filed a complaint seeking dissolution of the marriage. In May, 2002, the court declared a mistrial in the first dissolution trial due to problems with the plaintiff's financial affidavit. On March 4, 2003, after hearing testimony over several days, the court, Shay, J., rendered judgment ordering the marriage dissolved and made certain financial orders and property divisions. In its memorandum of decision, the court found that the marriage of the parties had broken down irretrievably and that both parties had contributed to the breakdown. Turning to the agreement, the court upheld the choice of law provision and applied New York law because it found no evidence of misrepresentation, fraud or undue influence underlying the choice of law provision. The court then concluded that under New York law, contrary to the plaintiff's argument, the agreement was valid and enforceable because it was in writing, subscribed to by the parties, acknowledged and was not unconscionable at the time of entry of final judgment or procured by fraud, deception or undue influence.1
When construing the agreement, the court concluded that it "very clearly calls for an equal division of the net appreciation in value of the assets originally disclosed. . . and this the court proposes to accomplish." The court set forth the following explanation of its construction of the agreement in a lengthy footnote:
The court concluded that "after considering all of the provisions of the agreement as a whole . . . each party is entitled to one-half" of the appreciation in value of the parties' separate property. The court found that the combined appreciation of the parties' separate property was $828,689. The court divided this sum by two and then subtracted $79,191, the amount that the plaintiff's property had appreciated. After those calculations, the court concluded that the defendant owed the plaintiff $335,154. Pursuant to paragraph thirty-two, the court also concluded that because the plaintiff had challenged the validity of the agreement, the defendant, as the successful party, was entitled to reasonable attorney's fees as fixed by the court. The court then found that the defendant's reasonable attorney's fee attributable to the plaintiff's challenge was $15,000, which was to be deducted from the amount owed by the defendant. Accordingly, the court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of $320,154.
After the defendant filed his appeal, the plaintiff filed a motion for attorney's fees to defend the appeal. The court, Hon. Dennis F. Harrigan, judge trial referee, granted the motion and...
Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI
Get Started for FreeStart Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial
- State v. Ledbetter
-
McCann Real Equities Series XXII, LLC v. David McDermott Chevrolet, Inc.
...whether the trial court's conclusions of law are legally and logically correct and find support in the record." Montoya v. Montoya, 91 Conn.App. 407, 416, 881 A.2d 319, cert. granted on other grounds, 276 Conn. 916, 888 A.2d 85 (2005). In their brief, the plaintiffs state the elements of a ......
-
Cruz v. Visual Perceptions, LLC
...favor the drafter or the other party.” (Citations omitted; emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) Montoya v. Montoya, 91 Conn.App. 407, 420–21, 881 A.2d 319 (2005), rev'd in part on other grounds, 280 Conn. 605, 909 A.2d 947 (2006). Thus, the trial court in the present case sh......
-
U.S. Bank, National Association as Trustee v. Cabot Addison 1, LLC
... ... connection with the lockbox account. " The words in an ... agreement must be given their ordinary and plain ... meaning." Montoya v. Montoya , 91 Conn.App. 407, ... 416, 881 A.2d 319 (2005), rev'd on other grounds, 280 ... Conn. 605, 909 A.2d 947 (2006). The ... ...
-
12 Model Title Controls Agreement with Provisions for Weaker Party
...both parties had counsel, no reason to construe ambiguity against drafter where agreement expressly prohibited); Montoya v. Montoya, 91 Conn. App. 407, 909 A.2d 947 (2006) (trial court erred in resolving ambiguity in premarital agreement against husband where agreement provided both parties......
-
§ 4.14 Miscellaneous Marriage Contract Issues
...See: Lashkajani v. Lashkajani, 911 So.2d 1154 (Fla. 2005); Lord v. Lord, 993 So.2d 562 (Fla. App. 2008).[521] Montoya v. Montoya, 881 A.2d 319 (Conn. App. 2005).[522] In re Marriage of Erpelding, 911 N.W.2d 397 (Iowa 2018).[523] Erickson v. Erickson-Mitchell, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 345 (Tenn......
-
Appendix B (1) State Law Summary—premaritalagreements
...agreement waiving post-divorce alimony does not preclude award payable while validity of agreement is litigated); Montoya v. Montoya, 91 Conn. App. 407, 881 A.2d 319 (2005), rev'd in part on other grounds, 280 Conn. 605, 909 A.2d 947 (2006) (premarital agreement fee waiver and prevailing pa......
-
6 Lawyers' Fees and Costs
...LEXIS 345 (Tenn. App. April 12, 2007); Kessler v. Kessler, 33 A.D.3d 42, 818 N.Y.S.2d 571 (2006); Montoya v. Montoya, 91 Conn. App. 407, 881 A.2d 319 (2005), rev'd in part on other grounds, 280 Conn. 605, 909 A.2d 947 (2006); Hardee v. Hardee, 558 S.E.2d 264, 348 S.C. 84 (Ct. App. 2001); Ta......