Montuori v. Narragansett Elec. Co.

• Decision Date: 11 June 1979
• Docket Number: No. 77-286-A,77-286-A
• Parties: Anthony MONTUORI d.b.a. Montuori's Auto Service v. The NARRAGANSETT ELECTRIC COMPANY. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 583

402 A.2d 583

121 R.I. 635

Anthony MONTUORI d.b.a. Montuori's Auto Service v. The NARRAGANSETT ELECTRIC COMPANY.

No. 77-286-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 11, 1979.

[121 R.I. 638] Gerard McG. DeCelles, Thomas C. Angell, Providence, for plaintiff.

Roberts & Willey Inc., David W. Carroll, Providence, for defendant.

OPINION

JOSLIN, Justice.

This civil action was brought in the Superior Court to recover for damages to the plaintiff's property caused by a fire that allegedly resulted from the negligent transmission of electric power by the defendant public utility company. A jury returned a verdict of $10,580 for the plaintiff and, following the entry of judgment, the defendant appealed. Its only assignment of error is to the trial justice's denial of its motion for a directed verdict.

The record in this case, viewed most favorably to plaintiff, as it must be on defendant's motion for a directed verdict, discloses the following: around midnight on October 10, 1972, Colonel McQueeney, then Chief of the Providence Police Department, while driving his automobile near plaintiff's garage, observed a small flame on a utility pole. The flame was moving down the wire leading from the pole to plaintiff's premises. The chief radioed his headquarters, reported the fire, ascertained that it would be taken care of, and, since "(t)here was nothing (he) could do for that pole," he left the scene. A short time later he was informed that a blaze had developed and he returned to the vicinity. By then, plaintiff's garage was engulfed in flames and, before the fire was extinguished, the premises and its contents had been extensively damaged.

The chief's testimony regarding the source of the fire was buttressed by that of an electrical engineer who was called by plaintiff as an expert witness. He testified that the fire originated outside, rather than inside, the premises and, when asked to give his opinion concerning the cause of the fire, he replied that "the conductor(s) out on the cross-arm (on the pole), for some reason, I don't know why have never seen it before became (sic) in proximity with each other, so they were able to come in physical contact." That condition, he believed, sent a surge of electricity into the garage's electrical system and thereby caused the fire. Basing his evaluation on the foregoing evidence, the trial justice denied defendant's motion for a direction, upon which he had reserved decision; and defendant now challenges that ruling.

The case raises two questions. The first involves what a plaintiff must establish in a case like this in order to escape a directed verdict; the second is whether the expert testimony evidence relied upon here by plaintiff was couched in terms of "probability" rather than "possibility" and thus overcame the limitations imposed by Evans v. Liguori, 118 R.I. 389, 398, 374 A.2d 774, 778 (1977) and Sweet v. Hemingway Transport, Inc., 114 R.I. 348, 355, 333 A.2d 411, 415 (1975). It is the first question, however, that causes us concern.

With reference to that bothersome question, we acknowledged with approval in Burdick v. South County Public Service Co., 54 R.I. 310, 314, 172 A. 893, 895 (1934) the

"well-established principle of law that one using a dangerous instrumentality is bound to exercise care commensurate with the potential danger of such instrumentality. The duty of companies distributing electricity is therefore to use great care."

The defendant does not challenge the Burdick rule. It argues, however, that the record...