Monumental Task Comm., Inc. v. Foxx

• Decision Date: 26 January 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO: 15-6905
• Citation: 157 F.Supp.3d 573
• Parties: Monumental Task Committee, Inc et al. v. Anthony R. Foxx et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

157 F.Supp.3d 573

Monumental Task Committee, Inc et al.

v.Anthony R. Foxx et al.

CIVIL ACTION NO: 15-6905

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.

Signed January 26, 2016

Franklin Hardy Jones, III, McAlpine & Cozad, James R. Logan, IV, Logan & Soileau, LLC, New Orleans, LA, Jennifer A. Fiore, John B. Dunlap, III, Susan Eccles, Dunlap Fiore, LLC, Baton Rouge, LA, for Monumental Task Committee, Inc. et al.

Peter M. Mansfield, Jason M. Bigelow, K. Paige O'Hale, U.S. Attorney's Office, N. Sundiata Haley, Haley Law Firm, Randy George McKee, McKee Law Firm, L.L.C., Adam J. Swensek, Cherrell Simms Taplin, Churita H. Hansell, Ewell Patrick Eagan, Gregory J. Feeney, Rebecca H. Dietz, City Attorney's Office, New Orleans, LA, for Anthony R. Foxx et al.

ORDER & REASONS

CARL J. BARBIER

, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief (Rec. Doc. 11) filed by Plaintiffs, Monumental Task Committee, Inc. (“MTC”), Louisiana Landmarks Society (“LLS”), Foundation for Historical Louisiana, Inc. (“FHL”), and Beauregard Camp No. 130, Inc. (“BC130”); an opposition (Rec. Doc. 27) filed by Defendants Anthony R. Foxx, Matthew Welbes, Federal Transit Administration, and the United States Department of Transportation (collectively “Federal Defendants”); an opposition (Rec. Doc. 35) filed by Defendants Mitchell J. Landrieu and the City of New Orleans (collectively “the City”); an opposition (Rec. Doc. 38) filed by Defendant New Orleans Regional Transit Authority; and a reply (Rec. Doc. 36) filed by Plaintiffs. Having considered the motion, legal memoranda, and arguments of counsel; the record; and the applicable law, the Court finds that the motion should be DENIED .

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The events that precipitated this litigation are widely known, so the Court will provide only a brief summary here. This dispute arises from the City's decision to remove three monuments honoring Confederate leaders and a fourth commemorating an 1874 battle between the White League and the City's first integrated police force. The four monuments are the Robert E. Lee Monument, the P.G.T. Beauregard Equestrian Monument, the Jefferson Davis Monument, and the Battle of Liberty Place Monument.

On June 26, 2015, Mayor Landrieu asked the City Council to initiate the legal process for removing the four monuments pursuant to section 146-611 of the City's Code of Ordinances. (Rec. Doc. 35-1, at 1.) On July 9, 2015, the City Council adopted a resolution soliciting recommendations from various City agencies regarding whether the monuments should be deemed a nuisance and removed from public property. Id. at 3-4. On August 13, 2015, the Historic District Landmarks Commission (“HDLC”) held the first meeting to provide comments and recommendations regarding the removal of the monuments. Id. at 5. Following public comment, the HDLC voted 11-1 to recommend removal of each monument. Id. That same day, the Human Relations Commission (“HRC”) held a public hearing on monument removal. Id. at 12. The HRC also voted to recommend removal of the monuments. Further, on September 2, 2015, the Vieux Carré Commission (“VCC”) considered the Battle of Liberty Place Monument and voted unanimously to recommend removal. Id. at 15.

In addition, the City Council also received reports and recommendations from public officials. For example, the City Attorney conducted her own analysis and opined that the monuments were inconsistent with the requirements of equal protection and constituted a nuisance. Id. at 28. Police Superintendent Michael Harrison confirmed that the sites had been the location of criminal activity and violent protest. Id. at 25. The Director of Property Management advised the City Council that the City had spent several thousand dollars removing graffiti from the monuments in 2015. Id. at 23. Further, the City's Chief Administrative Officer advised the Council that a potential donor had agreed to fund the cost of removing the monuments. Id. at 35.

On December 1, 2015, the City Council introduced an ordinance providing for the removal of the monuments. Id. at 77. The City Council considered the ordinance at two separate meetings. The first, held on December 10, consisted of more than three hours of public comment; the second, held on December 17, included an additional three hours of public comment. On December 17, 2015, the City Council voted 6-1 to remove the monuments, and the ordinance was signed into law. Id. at 79.

Shortly after the City Council voted to remove the monuments, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit. (Rec. Doc. 1.) Plaintiffs assert approximately twelve causes of action falling into three broad categories: (1) claims alleging violations of federal statutes designed to protect historic sites; (2) claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; and (3) claims alleging violations of the Louisiana Constitution and state law. Id. at 17-47.

On the same day, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief (Rec. Doc. 11) , requesting that the Court enjoin and prevent the City from moving, removing, disassembling, altering, placing into storage, or in any way tampering with the four monuments at issue. The Court held a telephone conference with the parties shortly thereafter, and the City agreed that it would take no action with respect to the removal of the monuments before the Court issues a ruling. (Rec. Doc. 12.) As a result, the Court set a hearing on Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. (Rec. Doc. 16.) The Federal Defendants, the City, and the RTA each filed their oppositions on January 8, 2016. On January 11, 2016, Plaintiffs filed their reply. The Court held a preliminary injunction hearing on January 14, 2016, after which the Court took the matter under submission.

LEGAL STANDARD

A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy” that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief. Munaf v. Geren , 553 U.S. 674, 689, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 171 L.Ed.2d 1 (2008)

. A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (3) that their substantial injury outweighs the threatened harm to the party whom they seek to enjoin; and (4) that granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Hidalgo Cty. Tex., Inc. v. Suehs , 692 F.3d 343, 348 (5th Cir.2012) ; accord

Canal Auth. of Fla. v. Callaway , 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir.1974).

None of the four requirements has a fixed quantitative value. Texas v. Seatrain Int'l, S.A. , 518 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir.1975)

. Therefore, in applying the four-part test, “a sliding scale is utilized, which takes into account the intensity of each in a given calculus.” Id. This requires “a delicate balancing of the probabilities of ultimate success at final hearing with the consequences of immediate irreparable injury that possibly could flow from the denial of preliminary relief.” Klitzman, Klitzman & Gallagher v. Krut , 744 F.2d 955, 958 (3d Cir.1984).

The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is discretionary with the district court. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co. , 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir.1985)

. However, because a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, it “should not be granted unless the party seeking it has clearly carried the burden of persuasion on all four requirements.” Suehs , 692 F.3d at 348. Consequently, the decision to grant a preliminary injunction “is the exception rather than the rule.” Miss. Power & Light Co. , 760 F.2d at 621.

The purpose of a preliminary injunction is limited to preserving the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held. Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch , 451 U.S. 390, 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981)

. “Given this limited purpose, and given the haste that is often necessary if those positions are to be preserved, a preliminary injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits.” Id. For this reason, the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by a court deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction are not binding at trial on the merits. Id.

PARTIES' ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION

1. Threat of Irreparable Harm

“Perhaps the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction is a demonstration that if it is not granted the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm before a decision on the merits can be rendered.” 11A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948.1 (3d ed. 2013)

[hereinafter Wright & Miller]. The focus of this inquiry is not so much the magnitude but the irreparability of the threatened harm. See

Callaway , 489 F.2d at 575. The Fifth Circuit has defined irreparable harm to mean “harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law,” such as monetary damages. Daniels Health Scis., L.L.C. v. Vascular Health Scis., L.L.C. , 710 F.3d 579, 585 (5th Cir.2013) ; accord

Janvey v. Alguire , 647 F.3d 585, 600 (5th Cir.2011).

Plaintiffs must show that “irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008)

. “[A] preliminary injunction will not be issued simply to prevent the possibility of some remote future injury.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Wright & Miller, supra , § 2948.1 ); Morrell v. City of Shreveport , 536 Fed.Appx. 433, 435 (5th Cir.2013). There must be more than “an unfounded fear on the part of the applicant.” Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. Succession...