Moock v. Conrad

Decision Date25 May 1893
Docket Number51
Citation155 Pa. 586,26 A. 700
PartiesMoock et al. v. Conrad et al., Appellants
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Argued May 2, 1893

Appeal, No. 51, July T., 1893, by defendants, George W Conrad et al., from order of Q.S. Phila. Co., March T., 1893 No. 1, discharging rule to show cause why an election petition should not be quashed.

Rule to quash election petition.

The facts appear by the opinion of the Supreme Court.

The petition in places does not distinguish between petitioners who are contestants and those who are not, calling them all contestants.

The following opinion was filed by FINLETTER, P.J.:

"The reasons in support of this motion are as follows:

"1. Because the offices contested being four separate and distinct offices, there should have been filed four separate and distinct petitions, each signed by at least twenty-five qualified electors, who voted at the election contested, and each petition setting forth the name of the person whose title to the office is contested.

"2. Because the four offices being contested, being four separate and distinct offices, the petition should have been signed by at least one hundred qualified electors who voted at the election contested, and should have been verified by at least twenty of the petitioners.

"3. The affidavit to said petition is not in conformity with the provisions of the act of general assembly approved May 19 1874, relating to contested elections in this commonwealth.

"A motion of this kind is analogous to a demurrer in other proceedings. As the allegations of the petition are sworn to and not denied, we must presume, for the purposes of this investigation, that they are true. To grant the motion is to end the proceedings and close the doors against the investigation of the most dangerous and far-reaching of election frauds. The responsibility should not be assumed by a subordinate court, unless there is no escape from it either in the law itself or in the decisions of the Supreme Court, which it is our duty to follow without question.

"The decisions of our courts show that there has been a gradual relief from the technical embarrassments which beset the citizens in their efforts to correct the mistakes and frauds of elections. The courts have given a willing hearing to wellconsidered charges of fraud, and have assisted, so far as was consistent with their functions, the correction of false election returns.

"In the spirit of these decisions the act of 1874 originated. It was intended to arrest a great and growing evil, which threatened the existence of our free institutions; which made the franchise of voting a farce; which deprived the honest majority of their right to rule, and cheated the legally elected out of the honors and profits of office. It should therefore be construed in the light of judicial decisions and in the spirit of its manifest purpose.

"Chief Justice AGNEW, in the Election Cases, 65 Pa. 31, said: 'The object of the law is to give the people a remedy. It is their appeal from the election board to the court from an undue election or a false return. The law is therefore remedial, and to be construed to advance the remedy.'

"The first objection to the petition is, that it embraces four returns, which are alleged to be undue.

"In Marshall v. Baldwin, 11 Phila. 384, this court said: 'When it is remembered that in cases of contested election the courts are required to decide upon the "merits" we may understand why they have always looked with disfavor upon merely technical objections, and have labored to strip these cases of all impediments to decisions upon the "merits" alone. Accordingly, we find President Judge THOMPSON, of this court, giving emphatic declaration to this idea in Mann v. Cassidy. He says: "It is obvious that, if the court were to require the same precision and certainty in an election petition as in pleadings between parties to a suit at law, the difficulty of stating precisely the manner in which a fraud has been perpetrated, or an undue return made, would, to a great degree, nullify the law itself, which designs that such charges shall be investigated."' This idea of freeing the proceedings from technicalities, which would embarrass them or render them burdensome, runs through all the decisions.

"It is too late now, when the intricacies of pleadings are scarcely a memory, to introduce them into proceedings which are to be determined upon the 'merits' alone.

"In this case four persons are charged with being improperly returned as elected to common council. They were voted for or against by all the voters of the ward to represent them in council, at the same election and at the same polls. The return of each and all is called in question. The petition avers that each one was improperly returned as elected, and that an examination of the ballots will establish this fact. They are not thereby compelled to share each other's labors. Each one, if properly elected, can show it by the ballots, and he can be in no way embarrassed or helped by the facts which relate to the others. But this is all a matter of proof, and in the hearing the court will always make such orders and decrees as will protect the right of all litigants.

"It should be recollected that this is not a proceeding in which the persons who are alleged to be elected are the actors. The petitioners are the actors, and responsible for the costs which may be incurred. It is, moreover, a proceeding to protect and enforce the right of all the voters.

"To require four proceedings would necessarily increase the expense and trouble to parties and witnesses. Each witness would be heard four times, each item of evidence, or paper, or document would be four times examined and taken down. The final adjudication would thus be delayed, perhaps, until the terms of office had expired. Such hardship should not be imposed, at least in cases of this kind, without good and sufficient reasons, and none such have been suggested or occur to us. Moreover, it has not been made manifest how the persons whose return is questioned can be benefited by four proceedings or injured by one. When it shall appear that their individual interests may be jeopardized we shall find a way to protect them. There is no other way by which the truth of this election can be ascertained, with a just regard for the rights of all. If single petitions are presented, single persons must be selected as contestants; and the evidence might show that neither was elected.

"This is, perhaps, the first time that this question has arisen. There are no authorities or analogies to aid us. And it must be admitted that it is open to discussion. Why should we, in a doubtful matter, which can only be settled by the Supreme Court, be asked to stop such an important inquiry, and thereby give protection and encouragement to election frauds.

"It is not necessary to consider the second reason. The third objection is as follows: The affidavit to the petition is fatally defective in this: That it omits two important requisites of the act of May 19, 1874. (a.) It does not set forth that the petitioners verily believe the facts stated therein to be true. (b.) It does not set forth that, according to the best their knowledge and belief, the election was undue or illegal. The words of the affidavit to the petition are, in lieu of those required by the statute, the following: 'That the statements set forth in the above petition are just and true to the best of their knowledge and belief. There is no averment respecting the election, or that it was undue or illegal.'

"The act of 1854, under which the Election Cases were decided, required that: 'At least two of the complainants should take and subscribe an oath or affidavit that the facts set forth in such complaint are true.' The oath to the petitions was, 'that the facts are true to the best of their knowledge and belief,' as in the present proceeding. The Supreme Court held this to be sufficient. Chief Justice AGNEW said, 'The law does not prescribe the form of the oath. It certainly was for the court, in judging of its own jurisdiction, to interpret the words of the affidavit. The special purpose of the oath is to initiate this remedy -- to give it the impress of good faith and probable cause.'

"In the same cases the requisites to give the court jurisdiction are given by Chief Justice AGNEW, as follows: 'It (the petition) sets forth in befitting terms the general election of 1868, the persons voted for, the number of votes returned for each, and the majority for the persons returned, charges an undue election and false returns, alleges the election of the opponent, and sets forth the grounds of the illegality of the election.'

"The petition before us is wanting in none of these particulars, and has in addition the averment that the petitioners are qualified voters, which was the only point decided by the Supreme Court in Welti's Case, 3 W.N. 165.

"It specifically avers that there was a 'false return and an undue election;' that 'the said election and the said return is false, fraudulent and untrue.' The specifications of the petition are that certain ballots in the several divisions were cast 'in an improper, informal and illegal manner, and that the said election was false, fraudulent and untrue and void, and the return thereof false.'

"It will not be questioned that these averments duly assert that the election returns were undue and illegal. Does the affidavit sufficiently aver that these facts are true?

"The act of 1874 prescribes no form of oath. It requires only that what is essential to give jurisdiction should have the sanctity of an oath. If, therefore, the petition is sufficient, any words in the affidavit which will give this are...

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    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
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    ...electoral choice, and the rights of the public are to be kept paramount. Wylie's Appeal, 1913, 239 Pa. 510, 86 A. 1018; Moock v. Conrad, 1893, 155 Pa. 586, 26 A. 700. The are affirmed. COHEN, J., dissents. EAGEN, J., did not participate in the consideration and decision of this case. MUSMAN......
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