Moody v. Ark. State Highway & Transp. Dep't
| Decision Date | 04 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:12CV00312 JLH,4:12CV00312 JLH |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
| Parties | ETHAN O'DELL MOODY PLAINTIFF v. ARKANSAS STATE HIGHWAY & TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT; FRANK VOZEL, Deputy Director and Chief Engineer, in his official and individual capacities; and DAN FLOWERS, Director of the Highway & Transportation Department, in his official and individual capacities DEFENDANTS |
Ethan O'Dell Moody brings this action against his former employer, the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department, and two of its directors, Frank Vozel and Dan Flowers, in their official and individual capacities. Pursuant to Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Moody alleges claims of sex and race discrimination, retaliation, equal protection and due process violations, and civil conspiracy. All of these claims stem from Moody's discharge. The defendants have now moved to dismiss most of the claims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Moody has responded and has requested the Court to convert the proceedings into a summary judgment analysis. For the following reasons, the defendants' motions to dismiss are granted.
The pleading standards, and the correlative standards for ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), are well known. A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8(a)(2) does not require a complaint to contain detailed factual allegations, it does require a plaintiff to state the grounds of his entitlement to relief, which requires more than labels and conclusions. Bell Atl. Corp.v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and review the complaint to determine whether its allegations show that the pleader is entitled to relief. Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008). All reasonable inferences from the complaint must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Crumpley-Patterson v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., 388 F.3d 588, 590 (8th Cir. 2004). The Court need not, however, accept as true legal conclusions, even those stated as though they are factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).
The following facts are taken from the complaint. For more than 26 years, Moody was employed by AHTD, which is an agency of the State of Arkansas. During that time, Moody received annual and merit raises, and he never received an oral warning, written reprimand, demotion, or time off without pay. In July 2008, Moody was promoted to crew leader. At some point prior to April 2010, Moody applied for a supervisor's position in Jackson County, Arkansas.
In 2008 or 2009, Moody reported to his superior that he had observed a female AHTD employee, Wanda Aldrich, holding a knife to the neck of a black employee, Ernest Russell. Both Aldrich and Russell denied that the incident occurred, although Aldrich told Moody on October 26, 2010, that "[s]omeone is going to pay for telling on me for pulling a knife on Ernest's throat." On July 14, 2010, Moody reported that AHTD employees Belinda Rogers—Aldrich's cousin—and Rebecca Bohannon were swimming while they were on the clock. On August 9, 2010, Moody encountered Bohannon while she was wearing cut-offs and washing herself off with a herbicide hose; he told her to put her work clothes back on or sign out. More recently, Moody enforced AHTD'sno cell phone policy.
Between April 2010 and October 2010, five false allegations of sexual harassment were made against Moody. In one instance, Rogers falsely accused Moody of "putting a stop and slow sign between her legs." In addition, Bohannon falsely accused Moody of patting her on her backside, stating to her that "her milk would sour in those things," and pulling on her jeans pocket. These allegations were all made because Aldrich, Rogers, and Bohannon wanted to get Moody fired instead of him being promoted to the supervisor position for which he had applied. Moody was discharged on November 1, 2010, and was notified of this termination on November 10.
On May 24, 2011, Moody filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against AHTD alleging race and sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, section 1983, and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. In the charge, Moody recounted the above facts concerning Aldrich, Rogers, and Bohannon; he did not, however, mention Vozel or Flowers.1 On February 29, 2012, the EEOC notified Moody that it declined to pursue the action. On May 25, 2012, Moody filed his complaint in this Court against Vozel, Flowers, and AHTD. In it, in addition to the aforementioned facts, Moody alleges that the discharge was the culmination of a conspiracy involving the false sexual allegations and that it was "in retaliation for his testimony in a racial incident, for enforcing the rule about no cell phones, and [for] reprimands he gave for workplace violations." Moody also alleges that the discharge occurred "prior to any good faith investigation" and that there was a "sham investigation with a foregone conclusion."
Under Title VII, Moody brings claims of sex discrimination, race discrimination, and retaliation against all the defendants. The defendants have moved to dismiss all of these claims, except the claims against AHTD for race and sex discrimination, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The Court will address these arguments in turn.
Vozel and Flowers move to dismiss the Title VII claims against them in their individual capacities. In response, Moody admits that Vozel and Flowers cannot be held personally liable under Title VII. Therefore, all Title VII claims against Vozel and Flowers in their individual capacities will be dismissed with prejudice. See Clegg v. Ark. Dep't of Corrs., 496 F.3d 922, 931 (8th Cir. 2007); Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 821 n.2 (8th Cir. 2000).
Vozel and Flowers move to dismiss the official capacity Title VII claims against them because they were not named in the original charge of discrimination submitted by Moody to the EEOC. See Document #36-4, at 2. It is generally true that a plaintiff must file a charge against a particular party with the EEOC before a lawsuit against that party is allowed under Title VII. See Lewis v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 402 F. App'x 454, 456 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Virgo v. Riviera Beach Assocs., Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350, 1358 (11th Cir. 1994). This general rule does not apply, however, if the party named before the EEOC and the party sued later are completely identical, see Duffy v. Se. Pa. Transp. Co., No. CIV. A. 94-4260, 1995 WL 299032, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 1995) (citing Alvarado v. Bd. of Trs. of Montgomery Cmty. Coll., 848 F.2d 457, 461 (4th Cir. 1988)), or if there is a sufficient identity of interest between them to provide notice of the charges to the latter party.See Winbush v. State of Iowa, by Glenwood State Hosp., 66 F.3d 1471, 1478 n.9 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Greenwood v. Ross, 778 F.2d 448, 451 (8th Cir. 1985)).
In asserting official-capacity claims against Vozel and Flowers, Moody is essentially asserting claims against AHTD itself. See Zajrael v. Harmon, 677 F.3d 353, 355 (8th Cir. 2012) (). Thus, there is a complete identity of interest between AHTD and Vozel and Flowers in their official capacities, and it is irrelevant whether the latter were specifically named in the EEOC charge. See Duffy, 1995 WL 299032, at *2 (citing Alvarado, 848 F.2d at 461). For the same reason, however, the official capacity claims against Vozel and Flowers are redundant of the claim against AHTD and therefore should be dismissed without prejudice. See Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010).
AHTD moves to dismiss any claim against it for punitive damages under Title VII because Title VII does not allow for punitive damages against a state agency. Moody does not directly dispute this argument. Moody's claims for punitive damages under Title VII will therefore be dismissed with prejudice.2 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (); Robinson v. Runyon, 149 F.3d 507, 517 (6th Cir. 1998) ().
In 2002, the Supreme Court held that, in the employment discrimination context, a plaintiff's complaint does not necessarily need to "contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the framework set forth by this Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973)." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, 122 S. Ct. 992, 995, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2002). Rather, the complaint "must contain only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). The Supreme Court so held in large part because the notion of a "prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas . . . is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement." Id. at 510, 122 S. Ct. at 997. Some of the circuits have held that Swierkiewicz is still good law. See, e.g., Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 609 (6th Cir. 2012) (); ...
To continue reading
Request your trial