Moody v. Boston & M.R.r.

Decision Date19 October 1905
Citation189 Mass. 277,75 N.E. 631
PartiesMOODY v. BOSTON & M. R. R.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
COUNSEL

E. H. Vaughan and Henry B. Montague, for plaintiff.

Chas M. Thayer and Alex. H. Bullock, for defendant.

OPINION

LORING J.

This case is here on two exceptions taken by the plaintiff to the charge to the jury. It was an action at common law for injuries and suffering caused by an injury on August 25 1903, from which the intestate died on April 17, 1904. The plaintiff, a married woman weighing about 180 pounds, was a passenger on a train to Boston arriving between 11 and 12, noon. She had with her, in addition to one other child, a boy aged two, which, owing to infirmity, had to be carried. She came onto the platform to leave the car in which she had been, with this child of two on her right arm, holding him in place with her left hand, in which she had also a shopping bag. Her story is that, as she stepped from the lowest step on to the platform, the conductor, who was standing there, put his right arm under her right elbow, but let go of her, and she fell heavily to the platform, and that he said it was his fault; that he ought not to have let go of her. The conductor's story is that he asked her to allow him to take the baby, to which she said, 'No'; that he then put up his hands to assist her, when she fell, pitching him out of the way; and that she said she tripped.

After telling the jury that the duty of the defendant as a carrier of passengers to the plaintiff as a passenger 'was to use the highest degree of care consistent with the undertaking the running of its train, the motive power used, and other things,' the presiding judge went on to say that: 'Ordinarily, * * * if a railroad company, for the purpose of permitting its passengers to depart from its train, provides safe means of egress and a safe and convenient place upon which to alight, that accomplishes and fulfills the duty which the law imposes upon it. I say ordinarily. Of course, the situation must be changed by what in fact appears or was reasonably excepted by those having the management of the trains. That degree of care is governed and is affected by what the defendant, through its servants, either knows or ought to know. If you are coming down from your place of residence to-day, and getting off at Lincoln Square, being in your ordinary health, unincumbered, and being physically and mentally reasonably sound, and arriving at Lincoln Square, and the steps of the car on which you are riding are safe, ample, and adapted to permit you to step in safety, and the distance is such between the lower step and the platform that you can easily accomplish it, you would be likely to say that was a fulfilling of the duty which the railroad company owes to you.' It is stated in the bill of exceptions that 'the plaintiff duly excepted to so much of the charge as stated that, if the defendant provides safe means of egress and a safe and convenient place to alight, that fulfills the duty imposed by law.' The judge went on to say that while this is ordinarily so there may be mental...

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