Moody v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 09 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 864 C.D. 2021 |
| Parties | Amischa Moody, Appellant v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita
Amischa Moody (Licensee) appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of York County (trial court) upholding the suspension of her operating privilege by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (PennDOT), for refusing to submit to chemical testing after her arrest for driving under the influence. Licensee argues that PennDOT did not meet its burden of proving that she refused to submit to chemical testing as set forth in Section 1547(b)(1) of the Vehicle Code, known as the Implied Consent Law.[1] For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court.
The underlying facts are not in dispute. On January 23, 2021 while on duty, Pennsylvania State Trooper David Owens encountered a vehicle parked on the side of the road and found Licensee asleep in the driver's seat. After waking Licensee, Trooper Owens instructed her to put the car in park and step outside. The odor of burnt marijuana and alcohol emanated from the car, and Trooper Owens then detected the smell of alcohol on Licensee once she was outside the vehicle. Notes of Testimony, 6/30/2021, at 21 (N.T. __); Reproduced Record at 30a (R.R. __).
Putting Licensee through various field sobriety tests, Trooper Owens found multiple signs of impairment. Additionally, a preliminary breath test showed a blood alcohol level of 0.203. Trooper Owens arrested Licensee for driving under the influence and placed her in the back of the police vehicle. Trooper Owens read the warnings on PennDOT's DL-26B Form[2] and requested Licensee to submit to a chemical blood test. Trooper Owens asked Licensee if she understood everything, to which she replied that she did not. He then asked Licensee what part of the warnings she did not understand, but she remained silent. He read the warnings again and asked Licensee if she would submit to a blood test. Licensee did not respond, which Trooper Owens construed as a refusal. From the first reading of the warnings to Licensee, to her silence after the second reading, approximately five or six minutes elapsed. Trooper Owens wrote "refused" on Licensee's signature line on the DL-26B Form from which he had read the warnings. N.T. 34-35; R.R. 43a-44a. See also Supplemental Reproduced Record at 5b (S.R.R. ___).
By notice of February 23, 2021, PennDOT informed Licensee that her operating privilege was suspended for 18 months for "chemical test refusal."[3] R.R. 4a. Licensee appealed the suspension, and the trial court held a hearing on June 30, 2021.
Trooper Owens testified to the above-recited facts. Licensee testified that she "was going to ask questions [but Trooper Owens] didn't give [her] time to [do so]." N.T. 40; R.R. 49a. She further testified that while Trooper Owens was reading the Implied Consent warnings, "there were tractor trailers driving back and forth[.]" N.T. 41; R.R. 51a. In addition, she testified that she has "trouble hearing," and she believed there was a "Plexiglass" divider in the vehicle. N.T. 42-43; R.R. 52a-53a. Licensee added that she is "scared of the police." N.T. 42; R.R. 52a.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court issued a decision from the bench dismissing Licensee's appeal. The trial court found that Trooper Owens requested Licensee to submit to a chemical test of her blood, but she refused in spite of being warned that a refusal would result in a suspension of her operating privilege. The trial court upheld PennDOT's suspension of her operating privilege. Licensee appealed to this Court.[4]
On appeal, Licensee raises one issue. She contends that PennDOT did not meet its burden of proving that she knowingly and consciously refused to submit to a chemical blood test. PennDOT rejoins that the record is clear that Licensee did not agree to submit to a blood test.
We begin with a review of the relevant law. To sustain a suspension of a licensee's operating privilege under the Implied Consent Law, PennDOT must establish that the licensee was arrested for driving under the influence by a police officer; was asked to submit to a chemical test; refused to do so; and was warned that refusal might result in a license suspension. Banner v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 737 A.2d 1203, 1206 (Pa. 1999). Whether a licensee has refused a request for chemical testing is a question of law based upon the facts as found by the trial court. Nardone v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 130 A.3d 738, 748 (Pa. 2015). Courts must look to the overall conduct of the licensee to determine if her conduct constituted a refusal of a chemical test. Department of Transportation v. Renwick, 669 A.2d 934, 939 (Pa. 1996). PennDOT has the burden of showing that the licensee was offered a meaningful opportunity to comply with Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §1547. Petrocsko v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 745 A.2d 714, 716 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). Questions of evidentiary weight and witness credibility fall to the trial court to resolve. Hasson v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 866 A.2d 1181, 1186 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). In Mooney v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 654 A.2d 47 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994), this Court explained as follows:
As long as sufficient evidence exists in the record which is adequate to support the finding found by the trial court, as factfinder, [an appellate court is] precluded from overturning that finding and must affirm, thereby paying the proper deference due to the factfinder who heard the witnesses testify and was in the sole position to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and assess their credibility.
Id. at 50 () (emphasis added).
Licensee argues that PennDOT was required to demonstrate that it provided her a meaningful, reasonable, and sufficient opportunity to make a knowing and conscious choice about whether to submit to blood testing or to accept the consequences for not agreeing to the test. Licensee contends that her overall conduct "did not demonstrate a general unwillingness to take the test;" rather, she was "cooperative and cordial" during her entire interaction with Trooper Owens. Licensee Brief at 8. Trooper Owens acknowledged that Licensee did not understand what he read to her. Licensee maintains that she was "briefly contemplating her decision before [Trooper Owens] understood her silence to be a refusal." Id. at 9.
Further, Licensee was not provided a copy of the DL-26B Form to read and "no further discussion regarding the testing occurred." Id.
Licensee asserts that PennDOT did not establish whether she refused the test or merely refused to sign the DL-26B Form. She contends "[t]here is nothing in the record indicating an independent basis for the refusal as Trooper Owens did not ask [her] if she would undergo the testing without signing the Form[.]" Licensee Brief at 10. Consequently, PennDOT did not establish "an independent basis" for her refusal "apart from [Licensee] exercising [her] [] right not to sign a superfluous form." Id. at 9-10.
In her argument, Licensee relies on this Court's decision in Petrocsko for the proposition that PennDOT "should only prevail in such cases if it can demonstrate a basis for the refusal other than the [licensee's] insistence on not signing the waiver." Licensee Brief at 8 (quoting Petrocsko, 745 A.2d at 718). There is a difference between a refusal to sign the DL-26B Form and a refusal to undergo testing.
In addition, Licensee cites Broadbelt v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 903 A.2d 636 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006), to illustrate a situation where a licensee was given a meaningful opportunity to consider the Implied Consent warnings. In that case, the licensee's silence constituted a refusal of blood testing where, over a 12-minute period, he was read the Informed Consent Form twice; read the Form himself; and did not state that he did not understand the warnings. Licensee argues that, by contrast, her silence was brief and followed a statement that she did not understand the warnings. Thus, she was not provided a meaningful opportunity to consider the warnings.
Licensee explains that she was not given time to have her questions answered. She testified to having difficulty hearing the warnings because of traffic noise and the plexiglass divider in the police vehicle. Licensee Brief at 4. Further, Licensee's "fear of the police [] may have caused her to pause or hesitate without ever refusing to provide a chemical sample." Id.
PennDOT counters that any response from a licensee other than an unqualified, unequivocal assent to submit to testing constitutes a refusal. PennDOT Brief at 13 (). PennDOT explains that the "occasion is not one for debate, maneuver or negotiation, but rather a simple 'yes' or 'no' to the officer's request." PennDOT Brief at 13 (quoting Commonwealth v. Morris, 280 A.2d 658, 660 (Pa. Super. 1971)). PennDOT argues that Petrocsko is inapposite because, in that case, the licensee agreed to submit to a blood test while sitting in a police officer's vehicle. Here, Licensee refused Trooper Owens' request for a...
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