Moody v. Hall

• Decision Date: 26 March 1884
• Citation: Moody v. Hall, 61 Md. 517 (Md. 1884)
• Parties: JOHN S. MOODY v. CHARLES G. HALL and George D. Hall, Infants, By Their Guardian, John P. Poe, and Others.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

61 Md. 517

JOHN S. MOODY v. CHARLES G. HALL and George D. Hall, Infants, By Their Guardian, John P. Poe, and Others.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

March 26, 1884

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City.

Two sisters, Eleanor F. and Louisa Victoria Torrance, by the will of their aunt, Louisa Torrance, who died on the 5th of May 1878, acquired certain property, including a leasehold lot and improvements on North Calvert street. The two sisters made each a deed of trust to the other, in contemplation of their respective marriages, and each shortly after her deed was executed, married; the former marrying James A. Conner and the latter John S. Moody. The deed of Mrs. Moody is set out in the opinion of this court. Mrs. Moody died intestate and without issue, without having altered or rescinded the deed of trust to her sister, leaving her husband surviving her. After the death of Mrs. Moody, Charles G. Hall and George D. Hall, infants under the age of twenty-one years owners of one undivided third of the aforesaid lot on Calvert street, by their guardian, Mr. John P. Poe, filed a bill for the sale of said lot for partition among the parties entitled. The bill made Mr. and Mrs. Conner and Mr. Moody parties defendant, and prayed that Mr. Moody who claimed his deceased wife's share in the lot, should in accordance with the true construction of the said deed of trust, be adjudged to have no interest in the property. The answer of the defendant Moody, admitted the title of the complainants as tenants in common with Mrs. Conner and his deceased wife, and that the property in question was incapable of partition, but claimed that under a proper construction of the said deed of trust he was entitled to the whole of the third of his deceased wife. He objected, however, to any decree of sale until his rights had first been adjudicated. The defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Conner, admitted the allegations of the bill, and claimed that the lot on Calvert street was owned, one-half by the female respondent, and the other half by the infant complainants, and insisted that the defendant Moody had no interest whatever therein, and assented to the decree for sale as prayed. The court (Duffy, J.,) passed a decree for the sale of the property in question, as incapable of partition, adjudging that the defendant Moody had no interest whatever therein, and overruling his claims and pretensions thereto. From this decree the present appeal was taken.

The cause was argued before Alvey, C.J., Miller, Robinson, Irving, and Ritchie, JJ.

William S. Bryan, Jr., and John H. Handy, for the appellant.

The personalty embraced in the deed in question is not affected by the Statute of Uses, 27th Henry VIII, ch. 10. By that statute, uses in personalty are not executed but remain as trusts. The legal estate, therefore, in the personal and leasehold property remains in the trustee.

The cestui que trust took an equitable estate for her natural life, with an equitable remainder, expressed to be to her heirs-at-law. According to the leading case, Horne v Lyeth, 4 H. & J. 431, by force of these limitations, she took the absolute and entire equitable interest in the personalty. It was decided in that case that a limitation in such words as would create an estate tail or an estate in fee simple, if applicable to real estate, would vest the absolute interest in chattels in the grantee. It can no longer be doubted that the words of this deed in the case of real estate, would have conveyed a fee simple. Simpers v. Simpers, 15 Md. 160; Clark v. Smith, 49 Md. 106.

As Miss Louisa Victoria Torrance took the absolute equitable interest in the personalty, and afterwards married Moody, when she died, without leaving children, it would naturally follow that the personalty became his absolutely. Code, Art. 45, sec. 2.

It is maintained, in opposition to this result, that the proper construction of the deed excludes Moody from any participation in the property.

The rule laid down in Carroll v. Lee, 3 G. & J. 508, is, that in order to exclude the husband, the language of the deed must show that "he was not to enjoy what the law would otherwise give him," and this rule has always been regarded as the standard.

By the deed of trust it is decarled that Miss Torrance, who had the absolute interest in the property, is to hold it to her sole and separate use, and that she may dispose of it by deed or will; and after the power to devise, we find the words "whether married or single." Now it is quite clear that these words do not enlarge her estate, because it was already absolute and as extensive as it could be. To give the owner of property the right to dispose of it by will or deed is mere supererogation. And it is equally clear that the words do not diminish her rights in her property. They have no effect and could have no effect as long as she remained unmarried. It is supposed, however, that when she married, the words had some effect. Let us see. Compare the language of Art. 42, sec. 2, of the Code, which defines the rights of married women to their property. We find that a married woman holds her property "to her separate use, with power of devising the same as fully as if she were a feme sole, or she may convey the same by a joint deed with her husband." If there be any difference between the powers expressed in the deed and those conferred by the statute, it is in the circumstance that the law requires the deed to be made jointly with her husband, whereas the deed simply mentions the right to convey. The difference would simply dispense with the necessity of joining the husband in a deed inter vivos, and to this extent would abridge his rights during the life of his wife. But there is no expression in the deed which affects the rights of the husband after the death of the wife.

The limitation to the heirs-at-law of the wife after her death, simply designates the estate which she took under the deed. It did not point out persons who were to take after her death. It did not provide that she was to hold it for her life, and then it was to go to individuals who would be her heirs-at-law. On the contrary the limitation gave to her, immediately, an absolute estate, (Simpers v. Simpers, 15 Md. 186); there was no postponement of an interest until her death, but she took the whole interest at once. As she took the entire interest eo instanti when the deed was executed, and as no disposition was made of the property by will, it must devolve as other intestate property--that is, upon her husband.

It is supposed by the appellees that certain cases in this court establish that this deed makes a disposition of the property after the wife's death to the exclusion of the husband. It may be remarked that in all cases of this kind the question is whether the deed takes away from the husband the rights which the law gives him. Formerly, the husband had far greater rights in his wife's personalty than he now has. In fact he had the entire interest. It would, therefore, be easy to state cases which formerly would take away rights from the husband when the very same words at the present time would leave them unaffected.

The case of Waters v. Tazewell, 9 Md. 291, construed a deed which, in express terms, provided that the trust estate and property should not at any time be subject to the power, disposal or control of the present or any future husband; and after the wife's death there was an express designation of persons who were to take as purchasers, and the husband was not included in the class.

In Townshend v. Matthews, 10 Md. 251, the property was settled, in contemplation of marriage, to the sole and exclusive use of the wife, her heirs and assigns. The whole interest was secured exclusively to the wife. The controversy related to personalty. By the law, as it stood when the deed was made, the personalty would have belonged exclusively to the husband.

In Hutchins v. Dixon, 11 Md. 29, the husband executed a deed which recited that he wished to invest her with all her property for her exclusive use and benefit as though she were a feme sole, and then conveyed the property in...