Moody v. Stanfield
| Decision Date | 07 March 1974 |
| Citation | 291 So.2d 301,292 Ala. 185 |
| Parties | Clarence R. MOODY v. Riley STANFIELD. SC 496. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Stanley E. Munsey, Tuscumbia, for appellant.
Robert H. McKenzie, Florence, for appellee.
This suit originated on the law side as a suit in the nature of ejectment. By agreement of counsel the case was transferred to equity to determine the issue of title to the property in question. There the plaintiff on the law side filed a complaint, and the former defendants filed a plea in bar and an answer, and demanded a jury.
The plea in bar in effect set out that the respondent had acquired the subject land by purchase from Mr. and Mrs. Pierce Burgess in 1943, and have been in open and continuous possession since that time.
Issue was joined, and the decree later entered recites:
'The verdict of said jury * * * on issues of facts presented by the Pleadings and specified by the court is as follows:
'Said cause is submitted for final decree on the verified Bill of Complaint, the Answer of the Respondent, the above jury verdict, and oral testimony taken in open court, all is shown by the note of submission.'
Thereafter the Chancellor, on 12 January 1973, filed his decree in the cause.
He found that at the time of the filing of the Bill of Complaint, the respondent was in actual possession of the subject land, and had been in possession and claiming the land to be his for more than twenty years; that the respondent had built his home on the land in 1943; had cleared several acres of land, and had periodically cut timber off the land for the whole of such period; that at one time he had put no trespassing signs around the property, and had exercised other acts of ownership, such as would ordinarily be done on this type of property by the owner for his own use, and for the exclusion of others; that at the time of the filing of the suit, no claim had been made, nor action filed by any of the complaint's predecessors in title against the respondent.
The Chancellor further found from a consideration of all the evidence that the respondent had been in actual, adverse, continuous, and peaceable possession of the land for over twenty years next preceding the filing of the bill, and that under the doctrine of prescription the complainant's suit was barred by law under the provisions of Section 36, Title 7, Code of Alabama 1940.
The Chancellor then decreed that the complainant, Clarence R. Moody, had no right, title, or interest in the land, and that the respondent, Riley Stanfield, was and is, the owner in fee simple of the subject land.
From this decree, the complainant, Clarence R. Moody, perfected this appeal. Since Moody occupied the position of complainant below, and the appellant here, we will continue to refer to Moody in this opinion as the complainant.
In the hearing below, Moody sought to establish his title to the subject property by the operation of several wills. He testified that Mr. Pierce Burgess, from whom the respondent contends he bought the subject land, died and left his interest in the land to his wife. By her will Mrs. Burgess, who died in May, 1959, devised her interest in the land to her sister, Mrs. Nellie J. Emmert. Mrs. Emmert died in 1967 and devised her interest in the land to a Mrs. Reed and to the complainant. The complainant further testified that he later acquired Mrs. Reed's interest in the land.
The wills were not introduced in evidence, and other than Mr. Moody's testimony as to the provisions of the wills, there is no showing whether the devises in the wills were of the subject land, or were general devises of all the land owned by the respective testators at the time of their deaths.
We interpolate here that Mr. Burgess died about two months after execution of the deed granting certain described land to respondent in 1943.
Mr. Moody testified that on several occasions prior to his acquiring an interest in the subject land, he went with Mrs. Burgess and Mrs. Emmert to look at the land. However, these visits occurred prior to 1957, and consisted of riding in an automobile on a road that went around the land. No one left the automobile to make any inspection. On these drives they would drive by the respondent's house.
In 1957, Mrs. Burgess hired Cletus Jackson to 'look after' her land. Mrs. Burgess owned tracts of land in various localities in addition to the subject land. Jackson's activities in connection with the subject land consisted of driving in an automobile around the land from time to time. He never entered on the land.
The complainant and his claimed predecessors in title had paid taxes on a portion of the subject land.
The respondent testified that in 1943, he negotiated with Mr. Burgess for the purchase of the land in question. He walked over the land three times. He did not have the land surveyed, nor did he obtain an opinion as to title. The land he sought to purchase was known as Sherwood Ridge. In March of 1943, he purchased the land and obtained a warranty deed therefor from Mr. and Mrs. Burgess. The land was described by government survey numbers, and also as Sherwood Ridge, and comprised 100 acres more or less. Actually, it is inferable from the evidence that the land known as Sherwood Ridge contained more than 100 acres. We do not consider the description in the deed of importance since the respondent under his plea claimed the subject land under the doctrine of prescription, and color of title is not an essential element to establish this doctrine, and the other elements of adverse possession being shown, the law presumes title. Fitts v. Alexander, 277 Ala. 372, 170 So.2d 808, and authorities cited therein.
After obtaining the deed from Mr. and Mrs. Burgess, the respondent in 1943 built a house thereon located on the north side of a road that ran through the land. He cleared some five acres around the house, which clearing was enlarged from time to time until some 25 acres were cleared. Respondent also carried on logging operations on the entire tract and erected a log mill, first on the north side of the road, and later moved the log mill across the road to its south side. These operations were carried on intermittently from the time the respondent first acquired the land. The timber was cut in 1944, 1946, and 1953. In 1960, the respondent put up no trespassing signs. He fenced some of the property in 1943 and 1944. In 1952, he and his wife gave an easement to the T.V.A. to run lines across the property, and had obtained cotton allotments on the land. Respondent testified that since his purchase of the land from Mr. Burgess, he had claimed ownership of the subject land.
The respondent also presented witnesses who testified they had lived in the community for a long number of years, and that Sherwood Ridge encompassed all of the subject land, and further that by general repute in the community the land was regarded as owned by the respondent. Neither the respondent nor any of his witnesses had ever heard of anyone claiming title to the subject land adverse to respondent's title.
Reasonable inferences which the jury and the Chancellor could draw from the evidence is that the respondent purchased the subject land in 1943, and took possession thereof in that same year. Thereafter, he exercised possession over the tract, and made such use thereof as would ordinarily by made by an owner in light of the nature and condition of the land. See Long v. Ladd, 273 Ala. 410, 142 So.2d 660; Morris, v. Yancey, 267 Ala. 657, 104 So.2d 553. We think it highly significant that none of the predecessors under whom complainant seeks to claim at any time questioned the possession of the respondent though under the evidence these predecessors must be deemed to have been aware that the respondent had built his home on the tract and had occupied the same openly and continuously since 1943.
The complainant has made some fourteen assignments of error.
Assignment of error No. 1 relates to the action of the court in overruling an objection propounded by counsel for the complainant on cross-examination to Tom Clay, a witness for the...
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