Moody v. State Highway Dept.

• Decision Date: 31 August 1935
• Docket Number: 6225
• Parties: WILLIAM GREENLEE MOODY, Respondent, v. STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, Employer, and STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety, Appellants
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

48 P.2d 1108

56 Idaho 21

WILLIAM GREENLEE MOODY, Respondent, v. STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, Employer, and STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety, Appellants

No. 6225

Supreme Court of Idaho

August 31, 1935

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW-CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION, TIME FOR FILING-STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF.

1. In construing statutory amendment, court must presume that legislature did not change words of statute idly and without reason.

2. Provision in Workmen's Compensation Act requiring claim for compensation with respect to injuries to be made within one year after date of accident held to provide that time for making claim should commence to run from date of accident rather than from date of first manifestation of compensable injuries as was provided before amendment of statute (I. C. A., sec. 43-1202).

3. Where language of statute is unambiguous, Supreme Court is powerless to intervene and grant relief.

4. Where amputation of employee's leg was necessitated because employee's toe had been frost-bitten while he was working for employer over one year prior to time of amputation of leg, and written claim for compensation was not filed until day following amputation, employee held not entitled to maintain proceedings for compensation where claim for compensation was not filed within one year from date of accident (I. C. A., sec. 43-1202).

5. Sections of Workmen's Compensation Act which provide that claim for compensation must be filed within one year after date of accident in order for proceedings on claim to be maintained, and providing that employee may enforce claim for compensation against employer and fund separately, must be construed together (I. C. A., secs. 43-1202, 43-1605).

6. To enforce claim for injury against compensation fund, employee must file claim with Industrial Accident Board within same period as required for claims to be filed against employer (I. C. A., secs. 43-1202, 43-1605).

APPEAL from the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, for Bonner County. Hon. Everett E. Hunt, Judge.

Proceeding under Workmen's Compensation Law. Appeal from judgment of District Court, reversing order of dismissal of the Industrial Accident Board, and ordering Board to find for claimant. Reversed.

Reversed. Costs to appellants.

Robert E. McFarland and P. C. O'Malley, for Appellants.

The claim for compensation must be filed within one year after the date of the accident and there is a distinction between the accident and the injury caused by the accident. (Sec 43-1202, I. C. A.; Cooke v. Holland Furnace Co., 200 Mich. 192, 166 N.W. 1013, L. R. A. 1918E, 552; Dane v Michigan United Traction Co., 200 Mich. 612, 166 N.W 1017; Feuling v. Farmers' Co-operative Ditch Co., 54 Idaho 326, 31 P.2d 683.)

The provision in section 43-1202 of the Idaho Code Annotated so far as the filing of the claim for compensation is concerned is a statute of limitation and should be construed as such. (Smith v. Solvay Process Co., 100 Kan. 40, 163 P. 645, 646; Utah Consolidated Min. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 57 Utah 279, 194 P. 657, 16 A. L. R. 458; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah 66 Utah 235, 241 P. 223.)

A. K. Bowden, for Respondent.

"The words 'accident' and 'injury' as used in the Workmen's Compensation Act are not synonymous, but the 'accident' produces the 'injury.' In point of time, they are concurrent." (Feuling v. Farmers' Co-operative Ditch Co., 54 Idaho 326, 31 P.2d 683; Fee v. Department of Labor and Industry, 151 Wash. 337, 275 P. 741; Selders v. Cornhuskers Oil Co., 111 Neb. 300, 196 N.W. 316; Stolp v. Department of Labor and Industry, 138 Wash. 685, 245 P. 20; Page v. State Ins. Fund, 53 Idaho 177, 182, 22 P.2d 681.)

The above references apply to cases of latent or progressive injury. And we invite the court's attention to the fact that all the references quoted by appellant refer to cases where severe injury occurred and of which the claimant must perforce have had knowledge.

HOLDEN, J. Givens, C. J., Morgan, J., AILSHIE, J., and Budge, J., concurring.

OPINION

HOLDEN, J.

This is a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act. (Title 43, Chapters 9 to 19, incl., I. C. A.)

January 15, 1933, respondent W. G. Moody, while working for appellant State Highway Department of the state of Idaho, as surface inspector, frosted the great toe on his right foot. He applied home remedies to the injured toe, after completing his shift that day, and the next day returned to work, without loss of time, and within a day or so thereafter, made verbal report of his injury to his superintendent. He continued with his work, and continued to apply the home treatments to his toe, as theretofore, but was unable to bring about any permanent improvement, and, on March 15, 1933, the condition having become worse, he obtained, for the first time, medical attention. No permanent relief was secured under medical treatment, but he still continued on with his duties under the treatment until March 14, 1934, at which time the condition took a serious turn, and he was taken to a hospital at Spokane, where, on March 19, 1934, his right leg was amputated seven inches below the knee-joint.

March 20, 1934, respondent's claim for compensation, in writing, was made and served upon his employer, and March 29, 1934, it was filed with the Industrial Accident Board.

After a hearing, and on August 6, 1934, the Industrial Accident Board made its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and entered an order denying compensation, for the reason that the claim was not filed within one year after the date of the accident.

August 15, 1934, respondent filed in the district court, and served upon attorney for appellants, notice of appeal. September 27, 1934, appellants filed motion to dismiss the appeal, for the reason that notice thereof was not filed with the Industrial Accident Board within thirty days from the date of the award, as provided by sec. 43-1409, I. C. A. October 15, 1934, the motion to dismiss was, by the court, overruled, and judgment entered, reversing the order of dismissal by the Industrial Accident Board, and ordering the Board to find for claimant.

From that judgment this appeal was taken.

Appellants, by their answer, specially plead sec. 43-1202, I. C. A., in bar of a recovery of compensation by respondent, and now urge that the court erred (1) in entering an order reversing the order of the Industrial Accident Board, and ordering said Industrial Accident Board to find for the claimant; and (2) in denying motion to dismiss the appeal.

The determination of the first contention, which we believe to be decisive, so far as appellant State Highway Department (employer) is concerned, depends upon when the period prescribed by sec. 43-1202, supra (within which claims for compensation must be made and served), commences to run; that is to say, whether that period commences from the date of the accident, or from the date, for example, that a compensable injury first manifests itself. That section reads as follows:

"No proceedings under this act for compensation for any injury shall be maintained unless a notice of the accident shall have been given to the employer as soon as practicable but not later than sixty days after the happening thereof, and unless a claim for compensation with respect to such injury shall have been made within one year after the date of the accident; or, in the case of death, then within one year after such death, whether or not a claim had been made by the employee himself for compensation. Such notice and such claim may be made by any person claiming to be entitled to compensation or by some one in his behalf. If payments of compensation have been made voluntarily the making of a claim within said period shall not be required."

That section, prior to 1927, inter alia, read:

"No proceedings under this chapter for compensation for any injury shall be maintained unless .... a claim for compensation with respect to such injury shall have been made within one year after the date of the injury; .... "

In 1927, the legislature, by amendment (Sess. Laws 1927, Chap. 106, sec. 9), changed the word "injury," above italicized, to the word "accident."

It will be observed that the legislature, in amending sec. 43-1202 supra, changed one word only. It substituted the word "accident" for the word "injury." The legislature must have had some object in view in making that substitution. We must presume that it did not do so idly and without reason. If the legislature had intended that the commencement of the limitation period, within which claims could be made on employers, should continue to be from the date of the first manifestation of a compensable injury, and not from the date of the accident, it would not have made the substitution. We have no doubt that when the legislature substituted the word "accident" for the word "injury," it intended to change the date from which the time for making claim should commence to run, and to change that date from the first manifestation of a compensable injury to the date of the accident. (White v....