Moody v. State, IA-00285-SCT

• Decision Date: 11 June 1998
• Docket Number: IA-00285-SCT
• Citation: 716 So.2d 592
• Parties: Kenneth MOODY v. STATE of Mississippi. NO. 96-
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 592

716 So.2d 592

Kenneth MOODY v. STATE of Mississippi.

NO. 96-IA-00285-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

June 11, 1998.

Michael Adelman, Alison Steiner, Adelman & Steiner, Hattiesburg, for Appellant.

Michael C. Moore, Attorney General, Pat Flynn, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for Appellee.

En Banc.

BANKS, Justice, for the Court:

¶1 In this case, we consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to accept a proffered guilty plea in a capital case where the prosecutor agreed to the plea and declined to pursue the death penalty in exchange for the defendant's cooperation. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. Thus, we reverse and remand this cause of action for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

¶2 In 1995 in Perry County, Mississippi, Kenneth Moody (Moody) was indicted for two counts of capital murder and one count of simple murder. On June 22, 1995, Moody entered into a written, signed agreement with the State entitled "Memorandum of Understanding" (the agreement). Pursuant to the agreement, Moody would plead guilty to the murder charges and would cooperate fully by making complete disclosures to the State regarding his participation in and knowledge of the charged offenses. Moody further agreed to provide testimony against his co-defendants. In exchange for Moody's pleas and cooperation, the State agreed to recommend that he be sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment without parole. The State further agreed not to seek the death penalty.

¶3 The agreement also required that Moody provide truthful testimony before the grand jury if necessary, truthful testimony at trial if necessary, and take a polygraph examination regarding all matters disclosed to law enforcement agents, including information about the charged offenses. Also, the agreement required that Moody truthfully and completely reveal to the State all information and knowledge he possessed concerning a separate, unsolved murder, as well as any other crimes.

¶4 Pursuant to the agreement, Moody provided the State with the information. He also satisfied polygraph examinations concerning his statements about all of the murders in accordance with the agreement. However, at a subsequent plea hearing, the trial court refused to accept Moody's guilty pleas, stating the following:

... I will certainly take judicial notice of the fact that prosecutors ... have to have a great deal of discretion in dealing with matters that are before them. I fully recognize that one of those discretions being whether or not to seek the death penalty in capital cases. However, let me also point out several things that have occurred in this particular matter. One being that this Memorandum of Understanding was entered into by the previous District Attorney, who is not now serving. While I ... appreciate [the] pronouncement that [the State] feel[s] bound by it, this Court is of the opinion that that Memorandum of Understanding will not be enforced by this Court for a number of reasons ... [T]he District Attorney exceeded his discretion in entering into the [agreement] without consulting with the Court ... [H]e had the decision to decide whether or not to seek the death penalty, but ... he should have gotten authority of this Court before entering into any memorandum of understanding.... I would hope that he would have consulted the alleged victim's family members. And I would note for this record the heinousness of this alleged crime ... I am not going to enforce the [agreement].

¶5 Following this denial, Moody again moved to enforce the agreement. The circuit court promptly denied his motion, but certified the matter for interlocutory appeal to this Court. With this Court's permission, Moody takes such appeal and asserts a single argument.

II.

THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN APPELLANT AND THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, INCORPORATING THE PLEA AGREEMENT BETWEEN APPELLANT AND THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, SHOULD BE ENFORCED.

¶6 Moody relies upon two theories in support of his argument that the agreement should be enforced. First, he asserts that his guilty pleas were induced by the State's promise that he would not face the death penalty, and therefore the State's end of the bargain must be enforced. Second, he argues that he detrimentally relied on the agreement when he (1) gave several statements to the State about his and others' participation and involvement in the various murders; (2) fully disclosed all information and knowledge he possessed about the charged crimes, as well as another murder; (3) buttressed the credibility of his statements by submitting, satisfactorily, to lie detector tests; and (4) made himself available to testify against the co-defendants charged with the crimes. In light of this reliance and performance, Moody contends that the trial court must be compelled to enforce the agreement. He also points to the fact that the special prosecutor in the instant case (who has since been removed by the trial court) did not contest his motion to enforce the agreement.

¶7 The State responds that the trial court should not be compelled to enforce the agreement since the trial court was not a party to the agreement. In addition, the State argues that, generally, trial courts are not bound by sentencing recommendations that are agreed upon by the parties. Lastly, the State suggests that the terms of the agreement are not frustrated by the court's refusal to accept the guilty plea, since forcing the case to trial in no way prevents the prosecutor from declining to seek the death penalty at Moody's trial.

¶8 We conclude that Moody is correct in arguing that he is entitled to have the plea agreement enforced for two reasons. One, the trial court clearly abused its discretion in flatly refusing to accept Moody's pleas of guilt based solely upon the reasons indicated in the record. Two, Moody did indeed detrimentally rely on the agreement by substantially performing many of the terms of the agreement before the trial court refused to accept the guilty pleas and enforce the agreement. As Moody argues, his detrimental reliance and performance of the terms of the agreement mandate that the agreement be enforced.

III.

¶9 We recognize that a criminal defendant has no absolute right to have his guilty plea accepted by a trial court. A trial judge may decline to accept such a plea in the exercise of sound judicial discretion. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-15-53 (1994); Martin v. State, 635 So.2d 1352 (Miss.1994). However as we explained in Burkett v. Burkett, 537 So.2d 443, 446 (Miss.1989), when a "trial court has discretion in a matter, [it is] impl[ied] that there is a limited right to be wrong." When reviewing a decision that is within a trial court's discretion, the first question we ask is if the court applied a correct legal standard. Id. (citing Detroit Marine Engineering v. McRee, 510 So.2d 462, 467 (Miss.1987); Croenne v. Irby, 492 So.2d 1291, 1293 (Miss.1986)). If a correct legal standard was applied, the next question is whether the trial court's "decision was one of those several reasonable ones which could have been made." Burkett, 537 So.2d at 446 (emphasis added).

¶10 We have, on numerous occasions, upheld a trial court's decision to refuse to accept guilty pleas where the defendants have either asserted viable defenses or insisted on their innocence. See, e.g., Beard v. State, 392 So.2d 1143 (Miss.1981) (finding the trial court acted within its sound discretion in rejecting a defendant's guilty plea where he continued to proclaim his innocence, but all the while urged the trial court to accept a guilty plea); see also Williamson v. State, 388 So.2d 168 (Miss.1980) (holding that defendant's statement at plea proceeding clearly indicated defenses to crime charged).

¶11 However this Court has never held that a trial court may decline to accept a proffered guilty plea to capital murder simply because the court does not wish to see the defendant sentenced to something less than death in exchange for valuable information about the charged offenses and other crimes. Moreover, no authority exists to support the trial court's other reasons for rejecting Moody's guilty pleas, such as his vague concern that the victims' families had not been consulted and his erroneous assertion that the district attorney exceeded its discretion in entering the agreement with Moody. To the contrary, the special prosecutor in this case, stated in response to Moody's petition for interlocutory appeal that his file reflected that the family members were consulted prior to the execution of the agreement. In addition, the special prosecutor noted that the trial court did not have the authority to enter into plea negotiations and that the prosecuting office, not the trial court, decides whether to seek the death penalty even in the most heinous capital murder cases.

¶12 An important fact is that, here, the trial court was not vested with any sentencing options. Moody stood charged with capital murder. Under the sentencing scheme of Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101, a jury would have to sentence Moody to death, life imprisonment without parole, or simply life imprisonment. In the event a jury could not agree upon a sentence, the trial judge is then required under the statute to enter a sentence of life imprisonment. In view of this sentencing scheme, it becomes apparent that this is not, then, a case where the defendant seeks to bind the court to a recommended sentence.

¶13 Moreover, it is a prosecutorial function to choose whether to seek the death penalty, a point acknowledged by the trial court. That court, nevertheless, sought to usurp...