Moog Industries v. Federal Trade Commission Federal Trade Commission v. Niehoff Co

• Citation: 78 S.Ct. 377,2 L.Ed.2d 370,355 U.S. 411
• Decision Date: 27 January 1958
• Docket Number: Nos. 77 and 110,s. 77 and 110
• Parties: MOOG INDUSTRIES, Inc., Petitioner, v. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. C. E. NIEHOFF & CO
• Court: United States Supreme Court

355 U.S. 411

78 S.Ct. 377

2 L.Ed.2d 370

MOOG INDUSTRIES, Inc., Petitioner,

v FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Petitioner,

v. C. E. NIEHOFF & CO.

Nos. 77 and 110.

Argued Jan. 14, 1958.

Decided Jan. 27, 1958.

Rehearing Denied March 3 and 10, 1958.

See 355 U.S. 968, 78 S.Ct. 531;

356 U.S. 905, 78 S.Ct. 559.

Mr. Malcolm I. Frank, St. Louis, Mo., for petitioner, Moog industries.

Mr. Charles R. Sprowl, Chicago, Ill., for respondent, C. E. Niehoff & Co.

Mr. Earl W. Kintner, Washington, D.C., for Federal Trade Commission.

PER CURIAM.

The general question presented by these two cases is whether it is within the scope of the reviewing authority of a Court of Appeals to postpone the operation of a valid cease and desist order of the Federal Trade Commission against a single firm until similar orders have been entered against that firm's competitors. In proceedings arising out of alleged violations of the price discrimination provisions of the Clayton Act, § 2, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13, 15 U.S.C.A. § 13, two Courts of Appeals reached opposed results on this underlying issue. In order to resolve the conflict we granted certiorari, 353 U.S. 908, 77 S.Ct. 665, 1 L.Ed.2d 662; 353 U.S. 982, 77 S.Ct. 1284, 1 L.Ed.2d 1141.

In No. 77, petitioner (Moog Industries, Inc.) was found by the Commission to have violated the Act and was ordered to cease and desist from further violation. 51 F.T.C. 931. Petitioner sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Upon affirmance of the order, 238 F.2d 43, petitioner moved the court to hold the entry of judgment in abeyance on the ground that petitioner would suffer serious financial loss if prohibited from engaging in pricing practices open to its competitors. The court denied the requested relief.

In No. 110, respondent (C. E. Niehoff & Co.) requested the Commission to hold in abeyance the cease and desist order that had been recommended by the hearing examiner, on the ground that respondent would have to go out of business if compelled to sell at a uniform price while its competitors were not under similar restraint. The Commission found that respondent had violated the Act and, in issuing its order, denied respondent's request. 51 F.T.C. 1114, 1153. On review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the Commission's determination of statutory violation was affirmed; however, the court (one judge dissenting) directed that the cease and desist order should take effect 'at such time in the future as the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit may direct, sua sponte or upon motion of the Federal Trade Commission.' 241 F.2d 37, 43.

In view of the scope of administrative discretion that Congress has given the Federal Trade Commission, it is ordinarily not for courts to modify ancillary features of a valid Commission order. This is but recognition of the fact that in the shaping of its remedies within the framework of regulatory legislation, an agency is called upon to exercise its specialized, experienced judgment. Thus, the decision as to whether or not an order against one firm to cease...