Moon Tp. v. Police Officers of Moon Tp.

• Decision Date: 24 September 1985
• Citation: 508 Pa. 495,498 A.2d 1305
• Parties: TOWNSHIP OF MOON, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. POLICE OFFICERS OF the TOWNSHIP OF MOON, Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 103 C.D. 1983 175 C.D. 1983
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 1305

498 A.2d 1305

508 Pa. 495

TOWNSHIP OF MOON, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. POLICE OFFICERS OF the TOWNSHIP OF MOON, Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

103 C.D. 1983

175 C.D. 1983

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued March 8, 1985.

Decided Sept. 24, 1985.

Richard V. Sica, Joseph Mack, III, Kurt A. Miller, Thorp, Reed & Armstrong, Robert E. Durrant, David F. Luvara, Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck, Pittsburgh, for appellant/cross-appellee

Kenneth M. Jarin, Sprecher, Felix, Visco, Hutchison & Young, Philadelphia, for amicus curiae--Pennsylvania League of Cities.

Dina G. McIntyre, McIntyre & McIntyre, Pittsburgh, Anthony C. Busillo, II, Mancke, Lightman & Wagner, Harrisburg, for appellee/cross-appellant.

Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, HUTCHINSON, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ.

OPINION

NIX, Chief Justice.

This appeal ¹ challenges the validity of an interest arbitration panel's Award settling collective bargaining disputes between Moon Township and the police officers of Moon Township. At issue is whether an interest arbitration panel may include a provision for binding grievance arbitration in an award. The Township challenges the authority of the interest arbitration panel under the Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, as amended, 43 P.S. § 217.1 et seq. ("Act 111") to include in its award a procedure for binding grievance arbitration. Subsumed in this issue is the question as to whether Act 111 requires that a grievance arbitration procedure conform with the arbitration procedure set forth in section 4 of that Act. Finally, we are called upon to determine whether a residency requirement can be provided for under the Act 111 interest arbitration.

I.

In 1981 the Police Officers of the Township of Moon [hereinafter referred to as "appellees"] and the Township of Moon [hereinafter referred to as "appellant"] began negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement which was to be effective January 1, 1982. An impasse was subsequently reached and the parties proceeded to arbitration pursuant to Act 111 to resolve the disputed contract issues. An interest arbitration panel issued an award on March 4, 1982, which provided for, inter alia, a contractual grievance procedure culminating in binding arbitration ² and a residency requirement which replaced a previous provision that required police officers to reside within the boundaries of the Township. ³

The appellant sought relief in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County seeking to vacate paragraphs # 2 and # 13 of the Award. The Common Pleas Court found that the panel was empowered to establish a binding arbitration grievance procedure and a residency requirement. That court, however, determined that a remand was necessary since the grievance arbitration procedure set forth in the Award did not conform to the procedure described in Act 111. The appellants appealed that determination to the Commonwealth Court. The Commonwealth Court, 83 Pa.Cmwlth. 14, 477 A.2d 29, affirmed the lower court's determination on all issues except to the extent that, instead of remand, the Commonwealth Court modified the grievance arbitration by requiring it to conform to the procedures set forth under Act 111. Thereafter, appellant appealed to this Court pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 724. A counter appeal was filed by appellees challenging the Commonwealth Court amendment to paragraph # 3 of the Award. Review was granted and the issue is presently ripe for disposition.

II.

Our scope of review under Act 111 has been narrowly defined. In the Washington Arbitration Case, 436 Pa. 168, 259 A.2d 437 (1969), we stated that although section 217.7(a) of Act 111 expressly prohibits appeals to courts, there was a limited right of review in the nature of narrow certiorari where there were questions of either jurisdiction, the regularity of the proceedings before the agency, excess in exercise of powers, or constitutional violations. ⁴ Here, as in the Washington Arbitration Case, supra, we are presented with a question of the excess in the exercise of powers.

A.

Appellant begins by asserting that the arbitration panel was without constitutional and statutory authority to impose a binding grievance arbitration procedure upon the parties. In developing this argument appellant ignores the legislative history, overlooks the significance of the sequence of the legislative responses, and disregards the clearly stated purpose the General Assembly sought to achieve in promulgating Act 111.

Appellant contends that Act 111 is limited to "interest" arbitration and does not permit the use of "grievance" or contract arbitration between the public employer and police and fire personnel in the resolution of disputes that may arise under the terms of an existing collective bargaining agreement. This contention is premised upon the fact that Act 111 expressly provides for interest arbitration. See 43 P.S. § 217.4. Act 111 does not contain an express provision authorizing the arbitration procedure set forth in section 4, 43 P.S. § 217.4, to be used to resolve grievances that might arise under a collective bargaining agreement. Thus appellant states that this absence of an express authorization represents a legislative intent not to provide binding arbitration as a means for resolution of disputes as to the interpretations of the terms of the contract. In support of this position appellant notes the fact the Public Employe Relation Act, Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, § 101, 43 P.S. § 1101.101 et seq. (hereinafter "Act 195"), specifically provides for grievance arbitration as indicative of a legislative awareness of the distinction between the two types of arbitration procedures and as further evidence of a deliberate legislative judgment to deny grievance arbitration between public employers and police and fire personnel. ⁵

Because of the increasing concern over disruptive work stoppages in the public sector, the General Assembly enacted the Act of June 30, 1947, P.L. 1183, § 1 et seq., which prohibited strikes and attempted to provide for the adjustment of grievances through negotiations. However there was no provision made for collective bargaining as to terms and conditions of employment for public employees. Experience proved that the Act of 1947 was not effective in establishing harmony in the public employment sector. ⁶ By the late 1960's it was accepted that the right of collective bargaining as to terms and conditions of employment should be given to the public employee.

In response, the legislature in 1968 passed Act 111 which conferred upon police and fire personnel the right of collective bargaining. The right to strike was withheld because of the crucial services being performed by these employees. See generally, Thrush, A Survey of Public Sector Collective Bargaining Law in Pennsylvania, 83 Dick.L.Rev. 755 (1979); Note, Recommendations of the Governor's Commission to Revise the Public Employment Law of Pennsylvania: A Preliminary Assessment, 30 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 161 (1968-69). However, statute established binding arbitration by three arbitrators to resolve an impasse in negotiations. Two years later in 1970 the right to bargain collectively was given to the remaining public employees under Act 195. Since the services of these employees were not as critical to the public safety and welfare they were afforded a voluntary arbitration procedure where an impasse in negotiation was reached, 43 P.S. § 1101.804, and the right to strike was recognized after the exhaustion of negotiation and mediation procedures provided for under the Act, 43 P.S. § 1101.1003. ⁷

From the foregoing it is apparent that the General Assembly was committed to the view that the right to collective bargaining over terms and conditions of employment was critical to the restoration and maintenance of harmony in the public employment sector. See Note, Recommendations of the Governor's Commission to Revise the Public Employment Law of Pennsylvania: A Preliminary Assessment, supra at 169-70. The sequence of the legislative responses evidences the priority afforded by the legislature to the employment of police and fire personnel. Act 111 unequivocally states that it was intended to provide "the right to an adjustment or settlement of their [police and fire personnel] grievances or disputes in accordance with the terms of this Act" ⁸ 43 P.S. § 217.1.

With this clear demonstration of the legislative priority in seeking to restore harmony in the employment relationship with police and fire personnel, it is difficult to accept appellant's underlying premise that the legislature intended to exclude grievance arbitration as a method for the resolution of disputes as to meaning, interpretation and implication of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. When we are seeking to construe the legislative intent we are instructed to look to the occasion and necessity for the enactment, the circumstances under which it was enacted, the mischief to be remedied and the object to be obtained. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c); Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. State College Area School District, 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975); Commonwealth v. Emerick, 373 Pa. 388, 96 A.2d 370 (1953); In re Martin's Estate, 365 Pa. 280, 74 A.2d 120 (1950); Phipps v. Kirk, 333 Pa. 478, 5 A.2d 143 (1939); Orlosky v. Haskell, 304 Pa. 57, 155 A. 112 (1931). A consideration of any or all of these points of reference mitigates against the interpretation urged by appellant.

The 1967 Amendment to Article III, § 31 of the Pennsylvania Constitution by its express terms provided for binding arbitration "for the adjustment or settlement of grievances or disputes" for police and fire personnel.

The General Assembly shall not delegate to any special commission, private corporation or association, any power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, or to levy taxes...