Moon v. American Home Assur. Co.
Decision Date | 29 September 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 88-8566,88-8566 |
Citation | 888 F.2d 86 |
Parties | 12 Employee Benefits Ca 1370 Eileen MOON, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate of R. Byron Moon, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Douglas N. Campbell, Laura E. Stevenson, Booth, Wade & Campbell, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant-appellant, cross-appellee.
Joseph Lefkoff, Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellee, cross-appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court of the Northern District of Georgia.
Before RONEY, Chief Judge, JOHNSON, Circuit Judge, and MELTON *, District Judge.
Robert Byron Moon was killed in an airplane crash. Eileen Moon, his widow and executrix, brought this action for accidental death benefits under a group travel accident insurance policy issued by American Home Assurance Company. The district court granted summary judgment for plaintiff. The American Home Assurance Company asserts two grounds of error:
(1) The trial court failed to apply an ERISA standard of review to American Home's denial of benefits, the policy having been issued pursuant to an employer's plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1001 et seq.
(2) There were genuine issues of material fact which rendered summary judgment improper.
Since the trial court denied an award of attorney's fees, Moon cross-appeals. We affirm but remand for clarification of the interest portion of the judgment.
Robert Byron Moon was a vice-president of Day Realty of Atlanta when the airplane in which he was traveling crashed on takeoff from McCollum Airport in Cobb County, Georgia. The group travel policy had been purchased by Moon's employer, pursuant to an ERISA plan, and provided benefits to officers of the company while on company business.
American Home had denied coverage on two grounds: (1) that Byron Moon was not an officer of Day Realty, and (2) that, in any event, the purpose of the trip on which Moon was embarking at the time of his death was unrelated to Day Realty business.
In an opinion that thoroughly reviewed all of the evidence that was proffered by both parties, the district court entered summary judgment for the plaintiff finding there to be no substantial issue as to the fact that Moon was an officer of the company, traveling on company business, and killed while riding in a certified airplane being flown by a certified pilot. Assuming that the district court properly applied the law, the judgment could be affirmed without much additional comment. The district court opinion properly handles all of the claims that are made on this appeal concerning the existence of any substantial issue as to material facts.
As to whether the district court properly applied the law, the major point argued on this appeal concerns the legal standard under which American Home's denial of the claim should be reviewed by a court. The insurance company argues, as it did to the district court, that the standard of review must be derived from the cases decided under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1001, et seq. (ERISA). The district court, because of some procedural problems, refused to apply ERISA to its review of American Home's liability for the insurance benefits, considering the matter instead as it would a state law claim on an insurance policy.
We agree with the insurance company that a claim of this kind is properly reviewed under the preemptive provisions of ERISA. The Supreme Court so held in Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987), a case involving an ERISA plan which provided disability benefits to employees through a group insurance policy. The Court held that
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) ... pre-empts state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an insured employee benefit plan.
Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 43, 107 S.Ct. at 1551.
We need not decide now, however, whether the district court erred in declining to apply ERISA because of the late assertion of the point by the defendant. It appears that any error resulting from the failure to apply ERISA was harmless, because the standard of review required by ERISA is the same standard the court used. At the time this case was heard, the parties and the district court were under the impression that ERISA would require a court to review the denial of benefits under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. Hoover v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, 855 F.2d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir.1988). Since then, however, the Supreme Court has held that a de novo standard of review must be applied in a case like this:
... we hold that a denial of benefits challenged under [29 U.S.C.A.] Sec. 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 948, 956, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989).
The insurance company is not the administrator of the plan. The administrator is a certain Kathleen M. Jenkins, whose business address is the same as that of Days Inns. No fiduciary was involved in the denial of benefits. More importantly, the plan makes no provision for discretionary authority.
Contrary to the argument of the insurance company that discretionary authority can be implied from the plan, the circuit courts which have found that particular ERISA plans granted discretion to plan administrators or fiduciaries, in cases decided after Firestone, have uniformly rested this finding upon express language of the ERISA plan before them. Indeed, this court has recently stated that the "discretionary authority" to which Firestone refers must be "expressly give[n]" by the plan. Guy v. Southeastern Iron Workers' Welfare Fund, 877 F.2d 37, 38-39 (11th Cir.1989) ( ); see also Batchelor v. Int'l Broth. of Elec. Workers Local 861 Pension & Retirement Fund, 877 F.2d 441, 443 (5th Cir.1989) ( ); Boyd v. Trustees of United Mine Workers Health & Retirement Funds, 873 F.2d 57, 59 (4th Cir.1989) ( ); Lowry v. Bankers Life & Cas. Retirement Plan, 871 F.2d 522, 524 (5th Cir.1989) ( ); Bali v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Association, 873 F.2d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir.1989). But see Lakey v. Remington Arms Co., 874 F.2d 541 (8th Cir.1989).
It is difficult to understand why any plan would give discretionary authority to an insurance company from whom had been purchased a fixed-premium policy of this type. The insurance policy in question was originally issued in 1973, before ERIS...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
In re Gulf Pension Litigation, Civ. A. No. 86-4365.
...907 F.2d 554, 559 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 964, 112 L.Ed.2d 1051 (1991), citing Moon v. American Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86, 88 (11th Cir.1989). Although § 7.C.4(a) of the Gulf Plan gave the Benefits Committee the power to construe and interpret the Plan, ......
-
Swint v. Protective Life Ins. Co.
...or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i) & (iii). Cf. Moon v. American Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86 (11th Cir.1989). The duties of a plan fiduciary are described in 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1), which provides, in relevant part, a fiduciar......
-
Eusebio Cotto Villegas v. Federal Express Corp.
...Plan, 46 F.3d 938, 943-44 (9th Cir.1995); Hall v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 300 F.3d 1197, 1200-1203 (10th Cir.2002); Moon v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86, 89 (11th Cir. 1989). The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, however, has declined to rule on the issue and I thus find that in li......
-
Patton v. Mfs/Sun Life Financial Distributors
...900 F.2d 963, 967 (6th Cir.1990) (holding that review must be limited to the administrative record); Moon v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86, 89 (11th Cir.1989) (holding that additional evidence should always be admitted). However, the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and T......
-
ERISA Disability Policies In California And Beyond
...resulting in a bench trial rather than disposition of the case on briefs as is typical in ERISA cases. See Moon v. Home Assur. Co., 888 F.2d 86, 89 (11th Cir. 1989). This could only result in further delays and costs in litigating ERISA In the end, laws and regulations that prohibit discret......
-
Discretionary Language, Conflicts of Interest, and Standard of Review for Erisa Disability Plans
...limited to the record that the fiduciary used in making a determination, otherwise it would not be "review"); Moon v. Home Assurance, 888 F.2d 86, 89 (11th Cir. 1989) (for de novo review, district court may hold evidentiary hearing, otherwise the review is not "de novo" and would not protec......
-
What Does Erisa Have to Do With Insurance?
...1344-45 (11th Cir. 2001). [49] Wells v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 593 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1305 (N.D. Ga. 2008). [50] Moon v. Am. Home Ins., 888 F.2d 86, 89 (11th Cir. 1989). [51] Doyle v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 542 F.3d 1352, 1363 n.5 (11th Cir. 2008) (interpreting Metro. Life......
-
Labor Law - Stephen W. Mooney and Leigh Lawson Reeves
...Id. (citations omitted). 62. Id. 63. 50 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 1995). 64. Id. at 957. 65. Id.; see also Moon v. American Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86 (11th Cir. 1989). 66. 50 F.3d at 957-58. 67. Id. at 958 (citations omitted). 68. Id. (citing Nightingale v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 41 F.3d 1......