Moon v. Mayor Charles Brown

Decision Date29 March 2013
Docket NumberNo. 5:11–CV–180 (CAR).,5:11–CV–180 (CAR).
Citation939 F.Supp.2d 1329
PartiesDeborah MOON and Ronald Moon, Plaintiffs, v. Mayor Charles BROWN and City of Jackson, Georgia, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Craig L. Goodmark, Goodmark Law Firm, Decatur, GA, Gerald R. Weber, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs.

Joseph David Stephens, Jon Travis Hall, Thomas F. Richardson, Macon, GA, for Defendants.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

C. ASHLEY ROYAL, District Judge.

Defendants Mayor Charles Brown and the City of Jackson, Georgia (collectively, Defendants) move this Court for summary judgment [Doc. 22] as to Plaintiffs Deborah and Ronald Moon's (collectively, Plaintiffs or “the Moons”) civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Georgia constitution. Having considered the relevant facts, applicable law, and the parties' arguments, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 22] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Specifically, summary judgment is GRANTED with respect to all of Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against Mayor Brown in his official capacity. However, summary judgment is DENIED with respect to Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim, First Amendment free speech claim, and First Amendment retaliation claim against the City and Mayor Brown in his individual capacity, and as to Plaintiffs' state law claims against Mayor Brown in his individual capacity. Summary judgment is DENIED without prejudice with respect to Plaintiffs' state law claims against the City. The Court will reconsider the applicability of the City's sovereign immunity defense at the pretrial conference.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper if the movant “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 1 The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact” and that entitles it to a judgment as a matter of law.2 If the moving party discharges this burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and present specific evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact.3

The Court must view the facts, and any reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.4 “The inferences, however, must be supported by the record, and a genuine dispute of materialfact requires more than ‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.’ 5 In cases where opposing parties tell different versions of the same events, and one is “blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts.” 6 A disputed fact will preclude summary judgment only “if the dispute might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” 7 “The court many not resolve any material factual dispute, but must deny the motion and proceed to trial if it finds that such an issue exists.” 8

BACKGROUND

During the 2010 election season, Ron and Debbie Moon installed a platform political campaign sign in the bed of their pickup truck supporting then-congressional candidate Republican Austin Scott. The sign read:

Austin

Scott

Congress

ScottOfGeorgia.Com

On October 9, 2010, the Moons parked their truck and sign in a downtown Jackson, Georgia parking lot on their way to church, believing the lot afforded optimal campaign exposure. Less than fifteen minutes later, City of Jackson Mayor Charles Brown ordered the city dispatcher to “immediately” tow the truck “with a political sign” from the parking lot.9 Plaintiffs' truck was towed shortly thereafter. Mayor Brown's order is the subject of the instant civil rights action. The relevant facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the non-moving party, are as follows.10

Both the Moons and Mayor Brown have actively participated in local politics for years. Ron and Debbie Moon have been active members of the Butts County Republican Party since 2000. Both have served as Chairperson and Vice Chairperson of the County's Republican Party Committee, and, during the 2010 elections, Debbie was the elected Chairperson. Charles Brown has served as Mayor of Jackson for nearly eighteen years. Although the City's mayoral elections are nonpartisan and Mayor Brown has never publicly supported any candidate, his democratic affiliations appear to be common knowledge in the community. However, shortly before the 2010 election, Mayor Brown began voting for some Republican candidates, including Scott. Aside from meeting each other at a prior event, the parties' paths rarely crossed in large part because the Moons lived outside City limits.

According to Mayor Brown, his position gives him the “power” to “enforce all ordinances of the City of Jackson,” including the City's sign ordinance.11 In short, the sign ordinance permits the City to, in relevant part, remove violating signs on public property:

Section 12–1. General Provisions and Definitions:

...

3. Definitions: As used in this Article, the following words having the following meanings.

...

SIGN: Any display of words, shapes, or images designed to convey a message to the viewer, located on the exterior of any dwelling, building or structure, or located anywhere on a lot upon a dedicated supporting structure or device, including poles, banners, windows and similar devices.

...

Section 12–5. Safety and Construction Standards:

...

6. Removal of Signs: The City may remove a sign in violation of this Ordinance, without giving notice to any party, if said sign is upon the public right-of-way or upon other public property; or said sign poses an immediate safety threat to the life or health of any members of the public.12

The sign ordinance prohibits several types of signs, including portable signs:

Section 12–6. Prohibited Signs:

The following types of signs are prohibited in every zoning district:

...

3. Portable signs (which means signs which are attached to vehicles, trailers, movable structures, or attached to sign structures which are not permanently anchored into the ground, or any sign which may be transported or is designed to be transported). Such signs include, but are not limited to, printed banners or billboards attached to vehicles and trailers.13

Both Mayor Brown and Perry Ridgeway, foreman of the Street Division of the City's Public Works Department, readily remove violating signs on City property. According to Ridgeway, [r]eal estate [signs are] the only one we have—have never really done.... We take down all political signs.” 14 It is undisputed that prior to the events giving rise to this action, no individual acting on behalf of the City had ever removed any type of portable sign.

The sign ordinance applies throughout the City, including the downtown parking lot where Ron and Debbie parked their pickup truck. The parking lot is a City-owned, partly gravel lot situated at the corner of Third Street and Highway 16. At all relevant times, the lot was not open for general public use. Instead, Defendants claim only certain unnamed individuals were permitted to park in the lot: the City's employees and, when the City was not using the lot, the employees of two nearby local drugstores.15 Defendants do not know who is specifically permitted to park in the lot and there is not any way to make this determination. These permitted individuals are not issued tags, stickers, decals, or permits. Thus, authorized vehicles are, for all intents and purposes, indistinguishable from unauthorized ones. There is no history of any regulation of the lot in any form, including ticketing, warning, citing, or towing, by any City employee prior to the facts of this case. 16 Moreover, aside from the drug store employees' limitation above, there is no other indication that lot access was restricted to certain hours or days or for work-related purposes.17

Importantly, the lot's restricted use is not at all apparent. There are no signs or notices posted to inform individuals that the lot is a City-owned, not-for-public-use lot; that only authorized individuals are permitted to use the lot; or that use of the lot by unauthorized persons could result in a ticket, citation, fine, or towing of the vehicle. There are also no signs reserving certain spaces for certain employees—or even painted lines designating parking spaces. The Court is also unaware of any City ordinance that prohibits the public from parking in the lot. According to Mayor Brown, the lot's “unfinished” condition, by itself, alerts the public they cannot use the lot. This description, however, is, according to the record, misleading because there is no evidence there was ongoing or imminent construction in the parking lot on October 9, 2010. Thus, the lot's “unfinished” state is merely due to its partly gravel condition.18

On the morning of Sunday, October 9, 2010, the Moons had a “spur of the moment” idea to park their pickup truck and political sign in the parking lot on their way to church, believing that the parking lot's location afforded “good exposure” for Scott's campaign.19 Planning to return after church around 1 p.m., the Moons parked their truck in the lot at 8:45 a.m. Less than fifteen minutes later, Mayor Brown “glanced over” at the parking lot while stopped at an adjacent red light and spotted the truck and political sign parked in the lot.20 Brown, who had driven by the lot earlier that morning, knew that the truck could only have been parked for forty-five minutes. Although Mayor Brown was stopped at the light for only a “brief moment,” he had enough time to recognize that the sign was political and to read the truck's license...

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