Moon v. School City of South Bend

• Decision Date: 19 April 1912
• Docket Number: 7,879
• Citation: 98 N.E. 153,50 Ind.App. 251
• Parties: MOON v. SCHOOL CITY OF SOUTH BEND
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

98 N.E. 153

50 Ind.App. 251

MOON v. SCHOOL CITY OF SOUTH BEND

No. 7,879

Court of Appeals of Indiana

April 19, 1912

From St. Joseph Circuit Court; Walter A. Funk, Judge.

Action by Calvin Moon against the School City of South Bend. From a judgment for defendant, the plaintiff appeals.

Reversed.

Anderson Parker & Crabill and S. J. Crumpacker, for appellant.

Harry R. Wair, for appellee.

OPINION

FELT C. J.

Appellant brought this action to recover damages for an alleged breach of a written contract. A demurrer was sustained to his complaint, and appellant assigns error in such ruling.

The complaint alleges that on March 17, 1908, plaintiff and defendant, by its then board of school trustees, entered into a written contract, by which plaintiff agreed to serve defendant in the capacity of superintendent of the public schools, and to give his whole time and attention to the superintendency of said schools for a period of three years, beginning September 5, 1908, and ending September 5, 1911; that in consideration of said services to be performed by plaintiff, defendant agreed to pay him a salary of $ 2,600 per year during said term of three years; that on said September 5, 1908, plaintiff entered on the performance of his duties under said contract, and continued in the performance of such services, and devoted his whole time and attention thereto until August 17, 1909, and has ever since been ready, able and willing to continue in the performance of all of his duties and services under said contract; that on said August 17, 1909, defendant, through its then board of trustees, without reasonable or just cause, and over plaintiff's protest and against his will, discharged him from his position of superintendent of the public schools, and then and thereafter refused to permit him to discharge and perform the services and duties required of him by said contract.

A copy of the contract is filed with the complaint as an exhibit.

Appellee asserts that the complaint is bad because (1) the contract is against public policy, and (2) the board was without statutory authority to make it.

The statute (§ 6488 Burns 1908, § 4445 R. S. 1881), provides: " The school trustees of incorporated towns and cities shall have power to employ a superintendent for their schools * * * and to prescribe his duties, and to direct in the discharge of the same." The statute clearly empowers the board to employ a superintendent, and the contract is valid unless vitiated by the length of the term of employment. The two objections are therefore practically reduced to one. Under the statute, the school board consisted of three members, each of whose term of office is three years, and the term of one expires on August 1 of each year. § 6477 Burns 1908, Acts 1905 p. 437, §§ 6491, 6492 Burns 1908, Acts 1903 p. 417, §§ 1, 2.

Of the members of the board when the contract was entered into, the term of office of the one having the longest time to serve would expire on August 1, 1910, and the contract would terminate on September 5, 1911. If such contract would terminate on September 5, 1911. If such contract is against public policy, the ruling of the trial court on the demurrer was right, if not, it was erroneous.

Section 9780 Burns 1908, § 6090 R. S. 1881, authorizes the board of county commissioners to employ a superintendent of the county asylum, "to take charge of the same, upon such terms and under such restrictions as the board shall consider most advantageous for the interests of the county." While the phraseology of this statute differs from the one now under consideration, their meaning and general import, when applied to the subject-matter of each, are very similar.

The latter statute was considered in Board, etc., v. Shields (1891), 130 Ind. 6, 29 N.E. 385, with reference to the employment of a superintendent for a county asylum for a term of five years. In that case as in this it was alleged that the superintendent was discharged by the board "without any cause", after a change of its personnel, and after said superintendent had served a considerable portion of his term. The objections there urged are identical with those presented to sustain the ruling of the trial court in this case. The court held that the contract was not against public policy, and said: "The power thus conferred upon boards of county commissioners to employ and contract with a superintendent, in the absence of any restriction contained in the statute, of necessity carries with it the power to fix some term of service or time of duration of such employment. It was undoubtedly competent for the legislature to place any restrictions they might see fit on the board in the employment of a superintendent, and provide that no contract of employment should be for longer than a given time, or even to forbid making a contract of employment for any certain and definite term. They have, however, not seen fit to do so. It must not be understood that there are no bounds to the discretion thus granted. We do not wish to be understood as holding that their action in the making of such contracts is not subject to review, and that a contract would not be annulled if it was shown that the board had abused its discretion in making it, but we do hold that unless it appears that there has been a clear abuse of discretion, and no fraud is shown, the courts will not interfere. It is insisted, however, that this contract is void upon other grounds, that it is in contravention of public policy, for the reason that to uphold it would put it in the power of one board of commissioners to bind the hands of its successors, and that it operates as an unwarranted abridgment of the 'administrative, executive and legislative' powers of the board. The first of the reasons assigned rests upon an erroneous conception of the constitution of the board of county commissioners that that body consists of a series or succession of boards, one following the other. As we have heretofore said, the board of commissioners is a corporation, representing the county. From a legal standpoint it is the county, as is said in State, ex rel., v. Clark [(1853), 4 Ind. 315], supra. It is a continuous body. While the personnel of its membership changes, the corporation continues unchanged. It has power to contract. Its contracts are the contracts of the board, and not of its members. An essential characteristic of a valid contract is, that it is mutually binding upon the parties to it. A contract by a board of commissioners, the duration of which extends beyond the term of service of its then members, is not, therefore, invalid for that reason. As individuals they are not parties to it."

In Reubelt v. School Town of Noblesville (1886), 106 Ind. 478, 7 N.E. 206, it was decided that the employment of a school superintendent in May, prior to the election of a new member of the board in June, for the school year beginning in September following was valid and binding on the school corporation. The court quoted the statute here under consideration, and said: "The authority of the board of school trustees to employ teachers, and a superintendent of the schools in the town or city, is given in general terms, just as the authority to make other contracts is...