Moon v. State

Decision Date09 March 2005
Docket NumberNo. 27A02-0408-CR-687.,27A02-0408-CR-687.
Citation823 N.E.2d 710
PartiesRyan MOON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Craig Persinger, Marion, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Jodi Kathryn Stein, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

VAIDIK, Judge.

Case Summary

After twenty-seven-year-old Ryan Moon had sexual intercourse with a fourteen-year-old girl, he was convicted of sexual misconduct with a minor and received the maximum sentence. On appeal he argued that he should not have had the burden to prove the defense that he reasonably believed that his victim was older than fifteen; that his sentencing enhancement violated the Sixth Amendment; and that the trial court should not have rejected a proffered mitigator. We affirm, holding that the burden to prove the "reasonable belief" defense properly may be placed on a defendant charged with sexual misconduct with a minor and that the sentence was within the trial court's discretion.

Facts and Procedural History

The facts most favorable to the judgment show that around midnight on December 17, 2003, J.V., age thirteen, sneaked out of her grandparents' home to meet a friend at McCulloch Middle School. Because the weather was cold and she had a long distance to travel, J.V. hitchhiked.

Ryan L. Moon, age twenty-seven, picked up J.V. and drove her to McCulloch. When they could not find J.V.'s friend, Moon asked her if she wanted to come to his house, and she agreed. In the car, J.V. told Moon that she attended McCulloch, a school for students in grades 5 through 8, and showed him her school photo identification card. That evening, she told Moon that she was 16 years old.

At Moon's home, he turned on a pornographic videotape to watch with J.V. During the video, he unzipped her pants and touched her genitals. He asked her to go to his bedroom several times. The first two times, she declined. On the third invitation, she agreed. In his bedroom, Moon and J.V. had sexual intercourse. He drove her home at approximately 2 a.m.

By January 6, 2004, when Moon and J.V. were again together, J.V. had had her fourteenth birthday. On this date, J.V. and S.R. skipped school and went to Moon's home, which was near McCulloch. They told Moon they had come from McCulloch. During this encounter, J.V., S.R., and Moon all were in Moon's bedroom. Moon asked S.R. to leave, and J.V. and Moon had sexual intercourse again.

Later that day, after the school had informed S.R.'s mother that S.R. was not in school, S.R.'s mother learned from S.R.'s babysitting employer that the girls were likely at Moon's residence. She went to the residence, and when no one would let her in, she called police.

On January 8, 2004, the State charged Moon with one count of Child Molesting as a Class A felony1 and one count of Sexual Misconduct with a Minor as a Class B felony.2 After trial, the jury convicted him of sexual misconduct with a minor and acquitted him of child molesting. The trial court sentenced him to a twenty-year term.

Discussion and Decision
I. Jury Instruction on Reasonable Belief Defense

Moon first questions whether the trial court's instructions to the jury properly placed on Moon the burden to prove the defense that he reasonably believed that J.V. was at least 16 years old. Like Moon, we have found no case discussing the burden of proof on the defense of reasonable belief under Indiana Code § 35-42-4-9.

The well-settled standard by which we review challenges to jury instructions affords great deference to the trial court. The manner of instructing the jury lies within the trial court's sound discretion. Kelly v. State, 813 N.E.2d 1179, 1185 (Ind.Ct.App.2004),trans. denied. In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion regarding challenges to jury instructions we will consider: (1) whether the tendered instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether there was evidence presented at trial to support giving the instruction; and (3) whether the substance of the instruction was covered by other instructions that were given. Id. Moon challenges as an incorrect statement of law the trial court's instruction allocating to him the burden to prove that he reasonably believed J.V. to be at least sixteen years old.

Indiana law states that an individual older than twenty-one commits sexual misconduct with a minor as a Class B felony when he participates in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct with an individual older than fourteen but younger than sixteen. I.C. § 35-42-4-9(a). The statute also sets forth a defense: "It is a defense that the accused person reasonably believed that the child was at least sixteen (16) years of age at the time of the conduct." Id. at (c).

The trial court's Final Instruction No. 3 defined the crime of sexual misconduct with a minor. It then stated: "It is a defense that the defendant reasonably believed that [J.V.] was sixteen years of age or older. If the defendant proved this by a preponderance of the evidence, you must find the defendant not guilty of sexual misconduct with a minor...." Appellant's App. p. 95 (capitalization omitted).

The trial court's Final Instruction No. 4 elaborated on this language: "For the defense of mistaken belief to prevail, the defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the defendant had the actual belief that the child was sixteen years of age or older; and (2) the belief was reasonable under the circumstances." Id. at 96 (capitalization omitted; parentheses added).

Moon proffered a different instruction, allocating the burden of proof to the State:

Regarding the Charges in Count # 2, Sexual Misconduct with a Minor, a Class B Felony, it is an issue whether the accused mistakenly committed the acts charged.
Specifically, it is a defense if the accused person (Ryan Moon) reasonably believed that the child (J.V.) was sixteen (16) years of age or older at the time of the alleged offense. (On or about January 6, 2004). The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not reasonably mistaken in his belief that the child was 16 years of age or older at the time of the offense.
In determining whether the accused's belief was reasonable, you must determine whether a reasonable person in his position would have had such a belief. This means that you must consider all the circumstances in deciding whether his belief was reasonable.
If you have a reasonable doubt about whether a reasonable person in the accused's situation would have had such a belief, you must give the accused the benefit of the doubt and find that the belief was reasonably held.

Id. at 59. Moon presented the trial court pattern jury instructions on mistake of fact defenses and other authority supporting his proffered instruction.

The trial court's instruction was a correct statement of law because the mistaken belief defense in Indiana Code § 35-42-4-9 does not negate an element of the crime; if believed, the defense only reduces Moon's culpability for acts he admits that he committed. Because the mistaken belief defense does not negate an element, the burden to prove the defense properly may be placed on the defendant. It is well settled that the State has the burden of proving all elements of a charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 317-18, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985); Powers v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1225, 1227 (Ind.1989),reh'g denied. The burden of proving a defense may be placed on the defendant so long as proving the defense does not require the defendant to negate an element of the crime. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 233-34, 107 S.Ct. 1098, 94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987) (positing that state law may assign defendant burden of proof on defense of self-defense); Moore v. State, 673 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ind.Ct.App.1996),trans. denied.

If the defense specifically negates an element of the crime, however, the State has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the defense. Blatchford v. State, 673 N.E.2d 781, 782-83 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). States may assign burdens of proof relating to defenses to either the State or the defendant, so long as the State still retains the burden of proving the elements. Martin, 480 U.S. at 233-34, 107 S.Ct. 1098; Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 8, p. 47-49 (1972). The Model Penal Code also indicates that the burden to prove a defense may be placed upon the defendant. Model Penal Code § 1.12(4).

As relevant to Moon's conviction, the statutory elements of Sexual Misconduct with a Minor are: (1) a person over age twenty-one who, (2) with a child at least age fourteen but less than age sixteen, and (3) performs sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct. I.C. § 34-42-4-9(a). As the trial court correctly instructed the jury (without objection from Moon), a mens rea of "knowingly" applies to the crime. Appellant's App. p. 94; see also Warren v. State, 701 N.E.2d 902, 905 (Ind.Ct.App. 1998),

trans. denied (holding criminal intent as to the act is required in crime of Sexual Misconduct with a Minor); Louallen v. State, 778 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ind.2002) (holding "knowing" intent implied in Child Molesting statute). The defendant's knowledge of the victim's age is not an element of the crime, so Moon's contention that his reasonable belief that J.V. was at least sixteen negates an element of the crime is incorrect.

Rather, a defendant's reasonable belief that his victim is age sixteen or older is a defense under the specific terms of the statute. Such a defense "admits all the elements of the crime but proves circumstances which excuse the defendant from culpability." Butrum v. State, 469 N.E.2d 1174, 1176 (Ind.1984). When a defense only addresses the defendant's culpability, the defendant may be assigned the burden to prove the...

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2 cases
  • Stokes v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 14 Junio 2005
    ... ... p. 10. These convictions, however, have already been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and are thus exempt from the Apprendi rule as explained in Blakely. Moon v. State, 823 N.E.2d 710, 717 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), reh'g denied. Consequently, we find Stokes' argument that the fact of his prior convictions had to be determined by a jury to be without merit ...         Stokes finally argues that the trial court should not have relied on his juvenile ... ...
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    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • 28 Septiembre 2005

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